The Complexity of Reliable and Secure Distributed Transactions by Wang, Jingjing
POUR L'OBTENTION DU GRADE DE DOCTEUR ÈS SCIENCES
acceptée sur proposition du jury:
Prof. J.-Y. Le Boudec, président du jury
Prof. R. Guerraoui, directeur de thèse
Prof. G. Alonso, rapporteur
Prof. R. Oshman, rapporteuse
Prof. C. Koch, rapporteur
The Complexity of Reliable and 
Secure Distributed Transactions
THÈSE NO 8761 (2018)
ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE
PRÉSENTÉE LE 6 SEPTEMBRE 2018
 À LA FACULTÉ INFORMATIQUE ET COMMUNICATIONS
LABORATOIRE DE PROGRAMMATION DISTRIBUÉE
PROGRAMME DOCTORAL EN INFORMATIQUE ET COMMUNICATIONS 
Suisse
2018
PAR
Jingjing WANG

A journey of a thousand miles
must begin with a single step.
— Laozi
To my parents,
Mingfang Xie and Hongyu Wang

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Rachid Guerraoui for his constant support
and guidance. I do not only receive guidance from him on technical work but also learn a lot
of soft skills including presentation skills, marketing skills and tenacity. More importantly,
Rachid has taught me to be optimistic. Our work is technically challenging and practically
interesting. We are conﬁdent in our work and thus all we need to do is to present properly our
solid work and eventually people will be interested in reading it.
I must also thank the committee members for my private Ph.D. defense, namely Professor Le
Boudec Jean-Yves for being the president of my Ph.D. committee, Professor Koch Christoph
for being the internal examiner and Professor Alonso Gustavo and Professor Oshman Rotem
for being my external examiners. I would like to thank for their time and insights that help
improve this dissertation work.
I am also grateful to my colleagues. To Rhicheek Patra for being always available for discussion
for our project on recommender systems and to Mahammad Valiyev for the same project. To
Antoine Rault and Davide Frey for their time and efforts in our collaboration on private KNN
computation even when we were geographically separated. To Diego Didona for his insights
from the perspective of practitioners for our hard work on causal transactions. I would like
also to thank Professor Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Professor François Taïani and Professor Willy
Zwaenepoel for their patience, advice, and insightful feedback for my research projects, which
I learned from greatly. Our previous secretary of the laboratory, Kristine Verhamme and our
current secretary France Faille also helped me a lot on the administrative steps to attending
conferences and to going through my Ph.D. journey etc., while our system administrator
Fabien Salvi helped me out in installing and conﬁguring necessary software for my research.
Last but not least, I would like to especially thank my family and my friends. Without my
friends in Switzerland, back in China and even far away in the United States who made my
Ph.D. days an enjoyable experience, I could not possibly survive my Ph.D. journey. Moreover,
my education (i.e., diploma, M.Sc., and Ph.D.) to date has lasted for 12 years. I could not
possibly be here and sustain all the pressure (e.g., of the ﬁnancial expenses) without the help
and support of my family. I want to deeply thank my parents for being there for me throughout
all these years.
Lausanne, 2018 Jingjing Wang
v

Preface
This dissertation concerns the PhD work I did under the supervision of Prof. Rachid Guerraoui
at the School of Computer and Communication Sciences, EPFL, from 2013 to 2018. The main
results of this dissertation appeared originally in the following publications (author names are
in alphabetical order).
1. Rachid Guerraoui, Jingjing Wang. “Optimal Fair Computation”. Proceedings of the 30th
International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC). Springer, 2016. (Chapter 4)
2. Rachid Guerraoui, JingjingWang. “How Fast can a Distributed Transaction Commit?”.
Proceedings of the 36th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of
Database Systems (SIGMOD/PODS). ACM, 2017. (Chapter 2)
3. Diego Didona, Rachid Guerraoui, Jingjing Wang, Willy Zwaenepoel. “Distributed Trans-
actions: Dissecting the Nightmare”. Under submission. (Chapter 3)
Besides the work presented in this thesis, I also worked on the following publications (author
names are in alphabetical order).
1. Davide Frey, Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Antoine Rault, François Taïani,
JingjingWang. “Hide & Share: Landmark-based Similarity for Private KNNComputation”.
Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable
Systems and Networks (DSN). IEEE, 2015.
2. Rachid Guerraoui, Anne-Marie Kermarrec, Rhicheek Patra, Mahammad Valiyev, Jingjing
Wang. “I know nothing about you but here is what you might like”. Proceedings of the
47th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
(DSN). IEEE, 2017.
3. Rachid Guerraoui, Jingjing Wang. “On the Unfairness of Blockchain”. Proceedings of the
6th International Conference on Networked Systems (NETYS). Springer, 2018.
4. Diego Didona, Rachid Guerraoui, Jingjing Wang, Willy Zwaenepoel. “Causal Consis-
tency and Latency Optimality: Friend or Foe?”. Proceedings of the 44th International
Conference on Very Large Data Bases (VLDB). 2018.
vii

Abstract
The use of transactions in distributed systems dates back to the 70’s. The last decade has
also seen the proliferation of transactional systems. In the existing transactional systems,
many protocols employ a centralized approach in executing a distributed transaction where
one single process coordinates the participants of a transaction. The centralized approach is
usually straightforward and efﬁcient in the failure-free setting, yet the coordinator then turns
to be a single point of failure, undermining reliability/security in the failure-prone setting, or
even be a performance bottleneck in practice.
In this dissertation, we explore the complexity of decentralized solutions for reliable and secure
distributed transactions, which do not use a distinguished coordinator or use the coordinator
as little as possible. We show that for some problems in reliable distributed transactions, there
are decentralized solutions that perform as efﬁciently as the classical centralized one, while
for some others, we determine the complexity limitations by proving lower and upper bounds
to have a better understanding of the state-of-the-art solutions.
We ﬁrst study the complexity on two aspects of reliable transactions: atomicity and consis-
tency. More speciﬁcally, we do a systematic study on the time and message complexity of
non-blocking atomic commit of a distributed transaction, and investigate intrinsic limitations
of causally consistent transactions. Our study of distributed transaction commit focuses on
the complexity of the most frequent executions in practice, i.e., failure-free, and willing to
commit. Through our systematic study, we close many open questions like the complexity of
synchronous non-blocking atomic commit. We also present an effective protocol which solves
what we call indulgent atomic commit that tolerates practical distributed database systems
which are synchronous “most of the time”, and can perform as efﬁciently as the two-phase
commit protocol widely used in distributed database systems.
Our investigation of causal transactions focuses on the limitations of read-only transactions,
which are considered the most frequent in practice. We consider “fast” read-only transactions
where operations are executed within one round-trip message exchange between a client
seeking an object and the server storing it (in which no process can be a coordinator). We show
two impossibility results regarding “fast” read-only transactions. By our impossibility results,
when read-only transactions are “fast”, they have to be “visible", i.e., they induce inherent
updates on the servers. We also present a “fast” read-only transaction protocol that is “visible”
ix
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as an upper bound on the complexity of inherent updates.
We then study the complexity of secure transactions in the model of secure multiparty compu-
tation: even in the face of malicious parties, no party obtains the computation result unless all
other parties obtain the same result. As it is impossible to achieve without any trusted party,
we focus on optimism where if all parties are honest, they can obtain the computation result
without resorting to a trusted third party, and the complexity of every optimistic execution
where all parties are honest. We prove a tight lower bound on the message complexity by
relating the number of messages to the length of the permutation sequence in combinatorics,
a necessary pattern for messages in every optimistic execution.
Keywords: complexity, failures, distributed transactions, non-blocking atomic commit, indul-
gent atomic commit, causal consistency, optimistic secure multiparty computation, permuta-
tion sequence
x
Résumé
L’utilisation des transactions dans les systèmes distribués remonte aux années 70. La dernière
décennie a également vu la prolifération des systèmes transactionnels. Dans les systèmes
transactionnels existants, de nombreux protocoles utilisent une approche centralisée pour
exécuter une transaction distribuée : un seul processus coordonne les processus rattachés à la
transaction. L’approche centralisée est généralement simple, et elle est efﬁcace en l’absence
de défaillance. Et pourtant, le coordinateur devient un point unique de défaillance, compro-
mettant la ﬁabilité / la sécurité en cas de défaillance, ou même un goulot d’étranglement de
performances en pratique.
Dans ce mémoire, nous examinons la complexité des solutions décentralisées pour des tran-
sactions distribuées ﬁables et sécurisées, qui n’utilisent pas un coordinateur ou utilisent le
coordinateur le moins possible. Nous montrons que pour certains problèmes de transaction
distribuée ﬁable, il y a des solutions décentralisées qui fonctionnent aussi efﬁcacement que
les solutions centralisées classiques, tandis que pour d’autres, nons fournissons les limites
de complexité par la détermination des limites inférieures et supérieures, aﬁn de mieux com-
prendre ce qu’est « l’état de l’art ».
Nous présentons d’abord deux analyse de la complexité sur deux propriétés des transac-
tions ﬁables, atomicité et cohérence, respectivement. Plus spéciﬁquement, nous effectuons
une étude systématique de la complexité en temps et message de validation atomique non-
bloquante d’une transaction distribuée, et étudions les limitations intrinsèques des transac-
tions causalement cohérentes. Notre étude de la validation des transactions distribuées se
concentre sur la complexité des exécutions en l’absence de défaillance où la décision est « vali-
der », qui sont considérées comme étant les exécutions les plus fréquentes en pratique. Grâce
à notre étude systématique, nous résolvons de nombreuses questions ouvertes comme la
complexité de la validation atomique non-bloquante synchrone. Nous présentons également
un protocole efﬁcace qui résout ce que nous appelons validation atomique indulgent qui
tolère la pratique où les systèmes de base de données distribués sont synchrones « la plupart
du temps ». Le protocole peut fonctionner aussi efﬁcacement que le protocole de validation à
deux phases largement utilisé dans les systèmes de bases de données distribuées.
Notre étude des transactions causales met l’accent sur les limites des transactions en lecture
seule, qui sont considérées comme les plus fréquentes en pratique. Nous considérons les
xi
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transactions en lecture seule « rapide » où les opérations sont exécutées dans un échange de
messages d’un aller et retour entre un client cherchant un objet et le serveur le stockant (où
aucun processus ne peut être un coordinateur). Nous montrons deux résultats d’impossibilité
concernant les transactions « rapides » en lecture seule. Selon nos résultats d’impossibilité,
lorsque les transactions en lecture seule sont « rapides », elles doivent être « visibles », c’est-à-
dire qu’elles induisent des mises à jour inhérentes sur les serveurs. Nous présentons également
un protocole de transaction « rapide » en lecture seule qui est « visible » en tant que limite
supérieure de la complexité des mises à jour inhérentes.
Nous étudions ensuite la complexité des transactions sécurisées dans le modèle de calcul
multipartite sécurisé : même face à des partiesmalveillantes, aucune partie n’obtient le résultat
du calcul à moins que toutes les autres parties n’obtiennent le même résultat. Comme il est
impossible de réaliser sans aucune partie de conﬁance, nous nous concentrons sur optimisme
où si toutes les parties sont honnêtes, elles peuvent obtenir le résultat sans recourir à une
tierce partie de conﬁance. Nous nous concentrons sur la complexité de chaque exécution
optimiste où toutes les parties sont honnêtes. Nous montrons une limite inférieure serrée de
la complexité en message en reliant le nombre de messages à la longueur de la séquence de
permutation en combinatoire. La séquence de permutation représente un schéma nécessaire
dans l’échange de messages de chaque exécution optimiste.
Mots-clés : complexité, défaillance, transactions distribuées, validation atomiquenon-bloquante,
validation atomique indulgent, cohérence causale, calcul multipartite sécurisé optimisé, sé-
quence de permutation
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1 Introduction
A distributed transaction is a transaction that spans multiple participants [1]. Gray [2] de-
scribed a transaction as a group of actions that transform the state of multiple data items in a
consistent way. Distributed transactions lie at the heart of many recent distributed database
systems such as Helios [3], where database nodes are participants and jointly decide the
outcome of a distributed transaction. Distributed transactions are also a key component in
distributed transactional storage systems such as Cassandra [4], where both storage servers
and users of storage are participants and where a user may interact with multiple servers via
a transaction. Distributed transactions also play a role in electronic commerce, focusing on
security. These transactions are called secure transactions and fall into the category of secure
multi-party computation [5, 6].
A lot of effort has been devoted to improving the performance of distributed transactions.
To further improve the performance, we study the complexity of distributed transactions
and in this dissertation, we focus on reliable and secure transactions. Roughly speaking,
reliable and secure transactions ensure the correctness of transaction execution in the face of
failures. Distributed transaction would be easy to implement if there were no failure. Here no
failure is two-fold: (1) no participant crashes; all participants follow the assigned protocol (for
distributed transactions) faithfully; and (2) the communication delay is upper-bounded by a
known value. In the case of no failure, although the transaction spansmultiple participants, the
following centralized solution can be proposed. One distinguished process called coordinator
orchestrates database nodes, multiple storage servers, or all the participants involved in the
transaction. The coordinator simply receives a request from each participant, and computes a
response for each participant, which then completes the transaction. However, the coordinator
itself thus becomes a single point of failure and may be considered a performance bottleneck
as well. In addition, according to reports on network failure [7, 8], storage failure [9] and node
failure [10, 11], failures largely exist. As a result, a solution that avoids a coordinator and takes
failures into account is practically appealing. The motivation of this dissertation is to study
the complexity and propose optimal protocols of such solution in the context of reliable and
secure distributed transactions.
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1.1 Reliable and secure transactions
1.1.1 Reliable transactions
A reliable transaction is required to follow the ACID properties [2, 12]: atomicity, consistency,
isolation and durability, among which in this dissertation, we focus on atomicity and isolation.
If a transaction is atomic, then either the transaction executes to its completion and its effects
persist (i.e., a transaction commits), or the transaction appears to have not executed at all
(i.e., a transaction aborts). Isolation levels are deﬁned based on the behavior of concurrent
transactions [13, 14]. Hereafter we use the terminology “transaction consistency” to refer to
isolation. In conventions, the term consistency may refer to (1) the enforcement of predeﬁned
rules on data by transactions; or (2) criteria on the behavior of transactions, for example, the
outcome and/or actions of concurrent transactions. Our usage of the term refers to the latter,
where consistency and isolation are indeed correlated concepts [15].
Atomicity
In a distributed transaction that spans multiple database nodes, each node executes a sub-
transaction. Here each subtransaction may contribute to aborting the ﬁnal transaction if the
subtransaction is denied access to some data (for example, due to lock conﬂict or requirements
of certain isolation levels). Each node can be considered to have the right to cast a vote of 0
(abort) or 1 (commit) according to the failure or success of its subtransaction. To preserve
the atomicity of the distributed transaction, all nodes have to agree on one single decision.
Clearly, these nodes agree to commit only if all votes are 1. The protocol deﬁned to orchestrate
distributed transaction commit is called a commit protocol [16].
The commit protocol employed by many distributed database systems (for instance, Sinfonia
[17], Percolator [18], Spanner [19], Clock-SI [20] and Yesquel [21]) is two-phase commit (2PC).
The 2PC protocol can be considered as one centralized solution mentioned above. Roughly
speaking, a coordinator receives the vote from each node, decides the outcome based on all
votes and then informs each node of the decision. In its original form [22], as explained by
[23], when the coordinator crashes, then the outcome on the transaction is unknown and can
block nodes and clients which wait for an outcome.
Various methods have been implemented to mitigate the risk over the crash failure of the
coordinator. For example, a distinguished node can probe the coordinator for failure detection
and can coordinate the rest of the nodes to continue the commit protocol [17, 21]. If locks are
left on some data, then the coordinator of later transactions may try to remove these locks [18].
Another way is to replicate the coordinator (as well as each node) with Paxos state machines
[24] so that the coordinator is implemented by multiple physical nodes to mitigate the crash
failure itself [19]. Despite extra effort in dealing with crash failures, previous non-blocking
protocols such as three-phase commit [16] are not widely used due to their additional time
complexity compared with 2PC (for example in Sinfonia [17]). On the other hand, few commit
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protocols are designed for a practical network where messages can be delayed out of some
bounds from time to time (we say a network failure occurs). In addition, little was known
on the complexity of commit protocols except for few results on the case where only crash
failures are considered [1, 25, 26].
Transaction consistency
As is mentioned previously, transaction consistency here refers to the isolation property of
reliable transactions. ANSI SQL standard [13] speciﬁed four levels of isolation: read uncom-
mitted, read committed, repeatable read, anomaly serializable (named by a later article [14]).
Roughly speaking, ANSI SQL isolation levels deﬁne the output of reads in a transaction when
some update transaction is concurrent [13, 14]. In addition to ANSI isolation levels, many
database systems including MS SQL server [27], Oracle Berkeley DB [28] and PostgreSQL
[29] support snapshot isolation [14] or serializable snapshot isolation [30]. As transaction
consistency criteria, snapshot isolation and serializable snapshot isolation require that at least
one between two concurrent transactions that write the same object must abort [14, 30].
In a update-anywhere implementation of data storage (as in geo-distributed storage Walter
[31]), data are replicated such that multiple physical nodes (called replicas) can respond to
requests of access to the same item [32]. In this setting, snapshot isolation and serializable
snapshot isolation cannot be implemented without synchronous communication among
replicas during a transaction [33]. Here synchronous communication means the completion
of a transaction waits for some responses from other replicas. The possibility of network
partition and consideration over latency between geo-distributed database nodes unfavours
these isolation levels [33]. There is a trend for distributed data store and database services to
choose not to support isolation levels as the traditional SQL databases above. For instance,
Amazon Dynamo [34] and Cassandra [4] adopt eventual consistency, which allows an update
to be eventually communicated with all replicas. While in the original deﬁnition of eventual
consistency, transactions are not considered, eventually consistent storage like Dynamo and
Cassandra indeed does not support transactions by default.
Recently, quite a few transactional storage systems adopt causal transactions such as COPS
[35], Eiger [36], Orbe [37], GentleRain [38], SwiftCloud [39], Cure [40] and Occult [41]. Causal
transactions allow conﬂicts of concurrent updates to be resolved asynchronously and in these
storage systems, causal transactions are implemented without synchronous communication
among replicas during a transaction. Causal consistency was initially deﬁned for single
accesses of read or write in memory [42] and was then extended to transactions [43]. Different
from traditional transactions (which for example under snapshot isolation, can abort some
concurrent transactions), causal transactions do not need to abort as shown in existing systems
[35, 36, 37, 38, 39].
Recent work [36, 38] compares causal transactions with a group of data accesses (called a
transaction as an abuse of notations) under eventual consistency. If causal transactions
3
Chapter 1. Introduction
always take two-round communication, then the latency of causal transactions doubles that
of eventually consistent transactions [36]. Although there is a gap of performance, causal
transactions in most transactional storage [35, 36, 38, 40, 41] can induce more than one-round
communication, where a client or some server plays the role of a coordinator. The COPS-
SNOW algorithm [44] has causal transactions in one-round communication while the design
decisions seem contrived and sometimes, the performance results might not meet expectation
[44]. A better understanding of the complexity of causal transactions is thus necessary (even
for the best case where crash or network failures, considered for commit protocols, are not
taken into account).
1.1.2 Secure transactions
In electronic commerce, a transaction refers to the exchange of goods and services. As the
standard Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [45] shows, different from database transactions,
distributed electronic transactions primarily focus on security properties [46, 6], including
privacy and authenticity. SET can be considered as a protocol between two parties: buyer and
merchant, where their respective banks are trusted and coordinate the exchange between the
two parties [45]. Some proposal follows the idea of SET and extends it to more parties. For
example, STP [47] stipulates a subtransaction to involve only two party but allows multiple
subtransactions with different pairs of parties to join in the same transaction. These proposals
involve trusted parties (called a trusted third party in general) in every execution of a protocol.
In general, disputes may arise from the execution of a protocol where different parties in the
protocol claim different results of the same transaction. In the case of electronic commerce, a
merchant may claim a successful transaction to have failed and double-charge a buyer while a
buyer may claim a failed transaction to be successful and ask for e-goods from a merchant.
Such behavior deviates from the given protocol, and is considered to be malicious. (On the
other hand, a party which follows faithfully the given protocol is said to be honest.) In face of
malicious parties, fairness, in the sense that either all parties terminate the transaction with
the same output or none of them does, is a necessary security property of secure transactions
[48]. Fairness problem is difﬁcult to solve in a truly distributed setting as shown by (1) the FLP
impossibility [49] where agreement cannot be achieved if a single party can crash (considered
as malicious in the context of secure transactions), for deterministic solutions, and (2) the
impossibility of a coin ﬂip [50] where if two parties jointly generate a random bit and one of
them can be malicious, then the random bit can always be biased, for randomized algorithms.
The difﬁculty lies in the fact that some malicious behavior can be indistinguishable from some
behavior of the asynchronous network where a message is only guaranteed to be eventually
received, yet honest parties are still guaranteed to have fairness.
Thus a trusted third party (assumed to be honest) is necessarily introduced. However, as
discussed previously, a trusted third party can be a single point of failure or a performance
bottleneck. As a result, optimistic fair exchange [48], where the trusted third party is not
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involved when all parties are honest, is appealing. To generalize the possible function executed
by a distributed transaction, we consider multi-party computation in general (rather than
two-party exchange). In this dissertation, we consider optimistic fair multi-party computation
[48, 6] as an equivalent to optimistic secure transaction. Many results have been published on
problems related to fair computation [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. Yet the complexity of optimistic
fair multi-party computation is still unknown.
1.2 Contributions
In this dissertation, we study the complexity of the following three speciﬁc problems in the
context of reliable and secure distributed transactions.
1.2.1 Distributed transaction commit
First, we study the complexity of atomic commit protocols which lie at the heart of reliable
distributed transactions. The commit problem can be abstracted as follows. A set of processes
(database nodes) aim to agree on whether to commit or abort a transaction (agreement
property). The commit decision can only be taken if all processes are initially willing to
commit the transaction, and this decision must be taken if all processes are willing to commit
and there is no failure (validity property). An atomic commit protocol is said to be non-
blocking if every correct process (a database node that does not fail) eventually reaches a
decision (commit or abort) even if there are failures elsewhere in the distributed database
system (termination property).
We present the ﬁrst systematic complexity study of the atomic commit problem. Our result
is systematic in two ways: (1) both crash and network failures are considered and (2) we
study the complexity according to the robustness of the protocol in the face of failures. More
speciﬁcally, we deﬁne a subset of the properties above (validity, agreement, and termination)
to be satisﬁed in failure-prone scenarios (where crash failure or network failure or both can
occur) as a robustness metric, and study the complexity of all combinations of all subsets and
all failure-prone scenarios.
In Chapter 2, we present this complexity result (time and message complexity) of our system-
atic study. We measure the best-case complexity [57], in the executions that are considered
the most frequent in practice, i.e., failure-free, with all processes willing to commit. Through
our systematic study, we answer many open questions like the complexity of synchronous non-
blocking atomic commit (designed for the system where only crash failures occur). We also
present optimal protocols which may be of independent interest. In particular, we present an
effective protocol which solves what we call indulgent atomic commit that tolerates practical
distributed database systems which are synchronous “most of the time”.
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1.2.2 Causal transactions
Second, we study the complexity of causal transactions which are a trend of recent transac-
tional storage systems that need not ensure strong consistency but only causality. Departing
from strong consistency models, causal transactions can be abstracted as follows. Clients
interact with servers (storage) via transactions which group read and write operations of
objects in the storage. The causality relation basically deﬁnes the order between any two
transactions in the following three ways: (1) two transactions performed by the same client
ordered according to when the client performs the transactions (program-order causality
relation), (2) two transactions of which the latter includes a read which returns the value
written by the former (read-from causality relation), and (3) transitivity. Causally consistency
ensures that transactions can be ordered in a way that respects causality.
As read-only transactions are usually considered the most frequent in practice, we ask whether
read-only transactions can be “fast”, i.e., their operations can be executed within one round-
trip message exchange between a client seeking an object and the server storing it. Our goal
is to have a better understanding of the current design choices and performance results of
causal transactions.
In Chapter 3, we present the ﬁrst study of the inherent cost of “fast” read-only causal trans-
actions, contributing to this understanding. In general storage systems where some trans-
actions are read-only and some also involve write operations, we show that even read-only
transactions cannot be “fast”. In such systems (as sometimes implemented today) where
all transactions are read-only, i.e., updates are performed as individual operations outside
transactions, read-only transactions can indeed be “fast”, but we prove that they need to be
“visible” to the servers in the sense that they induce inherent updates on these servers. The
updates in turn impact the overall performance of the transactional storage.
1.2.3 Optimistic secure transactions
Finally, we study the message complexity of optimistic fair computation, as a generalized
form of optimistic secure transactions. More speciﬁcally, in the problem of multi-party com-
putation, a set of n parties aim to jointly compute a function given their inputs, where the
function is previously agreed by all parties. No party obtains the computation result unless all
other n−1 parties obtain the same result (fairness property). If all n parties are honest, then
they can obtain the computation result without resorting to a trusted third party (optimism
property). Different from reliable transactions, to ensure security against malicious behavior,
the deﬁnition of fairness for optimistic secure transactions follows the classical formulation
of secure multi-party computation [46, 6]. Following our complexity study of reliable trans-
actions, we measure the complexity of optimistic fair computation for the best case as well,
which is considered the most frequent in practice. Namely, we study the complexity of any
optimistic execution (of a protocol) where all parties are honest.
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In Chapter 4, we prove a lower bound on the message complexity of optimistic fair computa-
tion for n parties among which n−1 can be malicious in an asynchronous network for any
function. We also show the tightness of the lower bound by presenting a matching protocol
of optimistic fair exchange (an important function in electronic transactions). In both our
proof and our design of an optimal protocol, we relate the optimal message complexity of op-
timistic fair computation to the length of the shortest permutation sequence in combinatorics
[58, 59, 60].
1.3 Thesis Roadmap
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 presents an exhaustive study of the complexity of distributed commit proto-
cols.
• Chapter 3 investigates the complexity of read-only transactions in causally consistent
systems.
• Chapter 4 presents the message complexity of optimistic fair computation.
• Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation and discusses potential future work.
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2 The Complexity of Distributed Trans-
action Commit1
2.1 Introduction
The use of transactions to ensure the consistency of distributed databases systems despite
concurrency and failures dates back to the 70’s [62, 22, 63], and is still prominent today.
Many modern distributed information systems are transactional, including HP’s Sinfonia [17],
Yahoo’s PNUTS [64], Google’s Percolator [18] and Spanner [19], Clock-SI [20] and Yesquel [21].
At the heart of those distributed transaction processing systems lies the fundamental atomic
commit problem [22]. To illustrate the nature of the problem, consider a distributed database
system that ensures the serializability of transactions by tracking their concurrency conﬂicts
across datacenters (nodes) as in Helios [3]. In short, each datacenter D votes to abort every
transaction t x that causes a conﬂict atD. Transaction t x is committed if no datacenter detects
any conﬂict involving t x. To orchestrate the termination of t x, coordination is necessary
among datacenters: all have to agree on whether to commit or abort t x, despite failures,
and t x cannot be committed if at least one datacenter votes to abort. This coordination is
called a distributed commit protocol and its complexity impacts the performance of the entire
distributed database system [3].
2.1.1 Problem statement
More speciﬁcally, the atomic commit problem consists for a set of nodes of the distributed
database system (we simply call them processes) to decide whether to abort or commit a
transaction. The decision is based on the vote of each process about the local faith of the
transaction. A process votes “no” if the transaction did not execute correctly at that process
(due to a full disk, a concurrency control problem, etc.). A process votes “yes” (willingness to
commit) if the transaction did execute correctly at that process. The processes (a) commit
the transaction only if all vote to commit, and (b) have to commit the transaction if all vote to
1Postprint version of the article published in SIGMOD/PODS 2017: Rachid Guerraoui and Jingjing Wang. “How
Fast can a Distributed Transaction Commit?” [61]
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commit and there is no failure. This property is usually called validity [65, 66, 67, 68, 69]. All
processes need to agree on the same decision. This property is called agreement [65, 66, 67,
68, 69]. If one additionally stipulates that correct processes (those that do not crash) need to
eventually decide (commit or abort) despite failures (e.g., crashes of other processes), then
this property is called termination [68, 69], and the resulting problem, where processes need
to ensure validity, agreement as well as termination, is called non-blocking atomic commit
(NBAC) [16]. NBAC has been investigated since the 70’s by the database and distributed system
communities [16, 1, 70, 65, 71, 66, 72, 73].
In this chapter, we present a systematic study of the time andmessage complexity of the atomic
commit problem and study the exact tradeoff between robustness and best-case complexity (in
the sense of Lamport [57]), i.e., the complexity of any failure-free execution where all processes
vote to commit. Such executions, called nice executions in this chapter, are arguably the most
frequent in practice and are those for which protocols are usually optimized.
Not surprisingly, this complexity depends on robustness, i.e., on which property (validity,
agreement, termination) is required in which executions (including less likely executions
with failures). The most robust form of atomic commit protocol is, roughly speaking, the
one that tolerates both crash failures (i.e., some process crashes) and network failures (e.g.,
a network partition occurs and later recovers), i.e., all executions with such failures have to
solve NBAC. However, by the impossibility result of consensus [74, 49], the most robust form
(in an asynchronous network where at least one process can crash) has inﬁnite complexity. On
the contrary, the least robust form of atomic commit, of which only failure-free executions are
required to solve NBAC, is clearly easy to solve in ﬁnite complexity. Although there is obviously
a tradeoff between robustness and complexity, the exact tradeoff was not clear. Furthermore,
between the least and most robust forms of atomic commit, the situation is more complicated
and the complexity results harder to obtain.
We exhaustively study complexity in the cases between two extremes, assuming certain ro-
bustness of an atomic commit protocol. More precisely, we determine the optimal number
of message delays/messages in nice executions of a protocol π assuming that, in π, (1) every
crash-failure execution satisﬁes X and (2) every network-failure execution satisﬁes Y , where
X and Y are subsets of these three properties: agreement, validity, and termination. With two
kinds of failure-prone executions (crash-failure and network-failure) and three properties, we
end up with (23)2 = 64 possibilities, as shown in Table 2.1. Since a property satisﬁed in every
network-failure execution is also satisﬁed in every crash-failure execution, the 64 possibilities
reduce to 27 different cases, the non-empty cells in Table 2.1.
2.1.2 Previous results
Many distributed database systems (Sinfonia [17], Percolator [18], Spanner [19], Clock-SI [20]
and Yesquel [21], for instance) guarantee validity and agreement in crash-failure executions
through a two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [22]. 2PC induces two communication rounds
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Table 2.1 – Complexity of Atomic Commit. NF = network-failure executions; CF = crash-failure
executions; A = agreement; V = validity; T = termination. Fraction d/m in a cell (X , Y ) means
that the tight lower bounds are d message delays, m messages respectively if (1) every failure-
free execution solves NBAC, (2) every crash-failure execution satisﬁes a set X of properties
and (3) every network-failure execution satisﬁes a set Y of properties. For every empty cell (X ,
Y ), there exists a non-empty cell (Z , Y ) such that X ∪Y = Z .
NF
CF  A V T AV AT VT AVT
 1/0 1/0 1/n−1+ f 1/0 1/n−1+ f 1/0 1/n−1+ f 1/n−1+ f
A 1/0 1/n−1+ f 1/0 2/2n−2+ f
V 1/2n−2 1/2n−2 1/2n−2 1/2n−2
T 1/0 1/0 1/n−1+ f 1/n−1+ f
AV 1/2n−2 2/2n−2+ f
AT 1/0 2/2n−2+ f
VT 1/2n−2 1/2n−2
AVT 2/2n−2+ f
among processes. Although efﬁcient, 2PC does not solve NBAC in crash-failure executions
since it does not guarantee termination. However, NBAC can actually be solved in crash-failure
executions (by a three-phase commit protocol [16], which has only ﬁnite complexity).
Except for some results on the number ofmessages necessary for synchronousNBACprotocols
(which solve NBAC in every crash-failure execution) [1, 25, 26], the fundamental question of
the complexity of synchronous NBAC has actually been open for more than three decades
[16, 1]. In fact, only the lower bound of 2n−2 messages in the face of n−1 crashes [1] was
known before. Although important, little was known on the complexity of atomic commit (e.g.,
when network failures are also considered) or its tradeoff with robustness, which we address
in this chapter.
2.1.3 Our results
Table 2.1 summarizes our results for the 27 atomic commit problems considered. Besides
the tradeoff between complexity and robustness (which properties are required in which
execution), we also highlight a tradeoff between time and message complexity. We prove
that in 18 out of 27 problem variants, the optimal number of message delays and the optimal
number of messages cannot be achieved at the same time.
Among the 27 variants, the most robust one, which we call indulgent atomic commit, is partic-
ularly appealing.2 Indulgent atomic commit captures the best robustness3 of a distributed
2We deﬁne indulgent atomic commit in the same vein as indulgent consensus [75, 76] protocols like Paxos [24],
CHT [69] and others [77, 78, 79, 80].
3The most robust form is in the setting of an asynchronous network where at least one process can crash, which
cannot be achieved. The best robustness achieved here tolerates network failures in the setting of an eventually
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commit protocol, i.e., despite failures, agreement, validity and termination are still satisﬁed.
We propose a protocol, which we denote by INBAC, that matches the lower bound of two
message delays of indulgent atomic commit. Moreover, we prove that INBAC is optimal in
the number of messages among all delay-optimal indulgent atomic commit protocols. Thus,
in practical distributed database systems that are synchronous “most of the time" [81]4, and
where practitioners consider violations of timeouts (e.g., due to network failures), if rare, to be
acceptable, INBAC tolerates such violations and is also optimal in complexity for the arguably
most frequent executions. Comparing our INBAC protocol with the popular 2PC protocol, we
show, interestingly, that (1) INBAC has the same best-case message delay as 2PC if all processes
start spontaneously, and (2) in the special case where at most one process can crash (among n
processes), INBAC and 2PC use 2n and 2n−2 messages respectively. In this sense, INBAC may
be of independent interest, as a more robust yet efﬁcient alternative to 2PC for implementing
distributed transactions.
At the same time, we close the question of the complexity of synchronous NBAC (which
is one among the 27 cases we consider). We show, for the ﬁrst time, that for synchronous
NBAC, one message delay is optimal. We also generalize Dwork and Skeen’s lower bound of
2n−2 messages [1] to n−1+ f messages in the face of f crashes and propose a matching
message-optimal synchronous NBAC protocol.
2.1.4 Techniques
We denote a cell in Table 2.1 by a property pair (X ,Y ). (X ,Y ) is less robust than another pair
(U ,V ) if X ⊆U and Y ⊆V . Then our proof goes through two main steps. First, we group the
pairs (X ,Y ) that give the same number of message delays/messages in Table 2.1 and prove
the lower bound for the least robust pair in each group. To design matching protocols, by
symmetry, we look for “the most robust pair” in each group. However, as shown in Table 2.1,
in some groups, there is no “most robust pair”. Thus, our second step is to choose, in each
group, the pairs that are locally maximal in robustness and present a protocol that matches
the lower bound for each local maximum.
Three techniques are key to our results.
1. To prove our lower bounds, we introduce and leverage the notion of “process reachabil-
ity”, the arrival of a message m at process Q that makes Q know process P ’s vote, which
is necessary in the context of a network-failure execution. (Dwork and Skeen [1] used
“process coloring” in proving lower bounds for synchronous NBAC. Compared with our
notion, theirs does not distinguish the arrival from the departure of a message, since
they solely focus on crash-failure executions, featuring bounded message delays.)
synchronous network, which we deﬁne precisely in Section 2.2.
4It was experimentally shown, e.g., in [81], that the latency of a communication round is below some seconds
(most of the time) if the link does not lose too many messages.
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2. To design our optimal protocols, we introduce and leverage “implicit” votes for the
willingness to commit. For example, to achieve 0-message protocols, instead of receiving
a message telling process P processQ’s vote, P may know thatQ votes 1 by not receiving
a certain message. We support an optimal nice execution by a complex failure-free
execution that aborts.
3. Another technique we use is “helping”. To reach the smallest number of messages or
message delays in any nice execution, if some failure occurs, then processes must ask
for help. To enable helping, backing up votes at other processes is necessary while
sometimes a message of acknowledgement (that conﬁrms the success of the backup) is
also necessary. Both are key ideas behind INBAC.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the distributed database
models we consider, deﬁnes the non-blocking atomic commit problem and introduces the
building blocks (modules) of the optimal protocols proposed in this chapter. Section 2.3
establishes our lower bounds. Section 2.4 describes atomic commit protocols that meet the
lower bounds. Section 2.5 presents indulgent atomic commit, our protocol INBAC and a proof
of its optimality. Section 2.6 discusses related work.
2.2 Models and Deﬁnitions
2.2.1 Processes and channels
We consider a set Ω of n processes P1,P2, . . . ,Pn (sometimes also denoted by O, P , Q, R).
Here processes represent database nodes. Processes communicate by exchanging messages,
through the network.
We assume that no process deviates from its speciﬁcation and at most f ,1≤ f ≤ n−1 processes
can crash. After a process crashes, it does not send any message. If a process does not crash, it
is said to be correct.
Communication channels do not modify, inject, duplicate or lose messages. Every message
sent is eventually received.
2.2.2 Failures and executions
We assume synchronous computation: there is a known upper bound on the time to execute a
local step, which includes the delivery of a message by a process, its local processing by that
process, as well as the sending of a message as a consequence of that processing.
Communication is said to be synchronous if there is a known upper bound on message trans-
mission delays. Communication is said to be eventually synchronous if the delay on message
transmission might be unbounded but only until some, possibly unknown, global stabilization
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time (after which there is a known upper bound on delays).5 We accordingly consider two
kinds of system models (or simply systems): a synchronous system [1] and an eventually
synchronous system [82], based on their respective assumptions on communication.
An execution of a synchronous system is either failure-free or has crash failures: either all
processes are correct, or some process crashes, while all message transmission delays are
smaller than some known upper bound which we denote byU .6 If, in some execution, some
message transmission delay is greater thanU , then the system is no longer synchronous: we
say that a network failure occurs. An execution of an eventually synchronous system can be
failure-free, has crash failures, or network failures. We call a failure-free execution an execution
where no failure occurs, a crash-failure execution one execution of a synchronous system
(where only crash failures are possible) and a network-failure execution one execution of an
eventually synchronous system (where network failures are also possible). We accordingly call
a synchronous system and an eventually synchronous system, a crash-failure system and a
network-failure system, respectively.
2.2.3 Non-blocking atomic commit
We consider the problem of non-blocking atomic commit (NBAC) in the classical sense of
Skeen [16], which was later reﬁned in [68, 69].
Deﬁnition 1 (NBAC [68, 69, 16]). A protocol π is an atomic commit protocol if π is deﬁned by
two events:
• Propose: Pi , i = 1,2, . . . ,n proposes value v = 1 (vote “yes”) or v = 0 (vote “no”).
• Decide: Pi , i = 1,2, . . . ,n outputs the decided value.
An execution of π solves NBAC if it satisﬁes the following three properties:7
• Validity: If a process decides 0, then some process proposes 0 or a failure occurred. If a
process decides 1, then no process proposes 0.
• Termination: Every correct process eventually decides.
• Agreement: No two processes decide differently.
Given a system S (crash-failure or network-failure), π solves NBAC in S if every execution of
π in S solves NBAC.
5Recall that, in an asynchronous system, without any communication bound, agreement problems like consen-
sus and NBAC are impossible [49].
6For simplicity, we assume hereafter sending messages and processing messages are considered negligible in
time. The assumption is equivalent to say thatU is an upper bound on time spent on the local computation and
synchronous communication.
7An execution of an atomic commit protocol also satisﬁes a property called integrity, i.e., no process decides
twice in any execution. This is immediate to satisfy in our context so we omit it for presentation simplicity.
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(Later in the chapter, in Section 2.5, we will introduce our new variant of the problem: indul-
gent atomic commit.)
A comparison with previous deﬁnitions from the literature is now in order. A synchronous
NBAC protocol [16, 1] is a protocol which solves NBAC in a crash-failure system (and thus
the complexity is covered by our study). In previous impossibility results [68, 83, 84, 75, 76],
the deﬁnition of validity depended on which failure may occur. (Strong) validity stipulates
that 1 must be agreed if no crash failure occurs and every process proposes 1, which does
not ﬁt the context where no crash failure occurs but network failures can happen. On the
contrary, a weak form of validity, weak validity, allows processes to abort a transaction (decide
0) in this context (even if all processes propose 1). In this chapter, we do a systematic study
where some atomic commit problem is solved so that validity is satisﬁed in every crash-failure
execution and weak validity is satisﬁed in every network-failure execution. Hence we unify in
Deﬁnition 1 validity and weak validity for presentation clarity and consistency with previous
impossibility results.
2.2.4 Modules
The pseudo code which we use to describe the full protocols in this chapter follows the
approach of Cachin et al. [85]. The pseudo code uses “callbacks”: an algorithm is described as
a set of event handlers where a process reacts to incoming events by possibly triggering new
events.
When presenting optimal protocols, we consider each case in Table 2.1 a different abstraction
of the non-blocking atomic commit problem as a set of event handlers. More speciﬁcally,
each abstraction (an instance of which is denoted by name) deﬁnes two events (in addition
to event <name, Init> which performs the initialization of the module once for all): <name,
Propose | v> and <name, Decide | d> where v is the value proposed to the instance name and
d is the decision of the instance name.
Every optimal protocol is built upon communication channels and a few of them employ
a timer. The communication channels are abstracted as a module called PerfectPointTo-
PointLinks, denoted by pl. The module deﬁnes two events: <pl , Send|r , m> and <pl , Deliver|s,
m>, where r is the receiver of the sending event, s is the sender of the message delivery event
and m represents the message. The timer is abstracted as a module called Timer, denoted
by timer. The module deﬁnes two events: <t imer , Timeout> and set timer, where t imer
timeouts at the time set previously. A timer may be set several times at one process.
Some of our optimal protocols use an underlying consensus module. The module solves
consensus in a network-failure system [74, 82, 66], which we recall in Deﬁnition 2. 8 Many
solutions to consensus have been devised, e.g., Paxos and its variants [24, 87], but the correct-
ness of INBAC or the best-case complexity of it does not rely on a particular algorithm among
8Consensus in this sense is sometimes called uniform consensus in the literature [86].
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these solutions. The modular approach (using consensus as a service) has been also taken in
other distributed algorithms [73, 88].
Deﬁnition 2 (Consensus [74]). A consensus protocol is deﬁned by two events: propose, by
which a process proposes a value v = 0 or 1, and decide, which outputs a decision to the pro-
cess; furthermore, every execution satisﬁes the following properties: termination, agreement
(similar to those properties of NBAC) and the following validity property:
• Validity: If a process decides v , then v was proposed by some process.
The indulgent uniform consensus [78] solves uniform consensus (as Deﬁnition 2) in every
network-failure execution and is abstracted as a module called IndulgentUniformConsensus,
denoted by iuc. The module deﬁnes two events: <iuc, Propose | v> and <iuc, Decide | d>,
where v is the value proposed to iuc and d is the decision of iuc. We also consider a module
called UniformConsensus, denoted by uc. The module deﬁnes two events: <uc, Propose |
v> and <uc, Decide | d>, where v is the value proposed to uc and d is the decision of uc.
The module solves uniform consensus (as Deﬁnition 2) in every crash-failure execution,
while it needs only to satisfy a subset of properties of uniform consensus depending on the
optimal protocol where the module is employed: if the optimal protocol satisﬁes property P of
Deﬁnition 1 in every network-failure execution, then the module also satisﬁes P of Deﬁnition
2 in every network-failure execution.
2.2.5 Complexity measures
We deﬁne a nice execution of an atomic commit protocol as a failure-free execution in which
every process proposes 1. We study in this chapter best-case complexity, i.e., the complexity
over nice executions (which are arguably the most frequent in practice). We consider two
complexity measures: the number of messages and the number of message delays. Here
(as in Lamport [57, 89]), for any message m, one message delay is a period of time between
two events: the sending of m and the reception of m [57, 89]. Thus if local computation is
instantaneous (negligible), and every message is received exactly one unit of time after it was
sent, then the number of message delays of an execution is the number of units of time of that
execution [57].
2.3 Lower Bounds
In this section, we establish lower bounds on the number of message delays, and then lower
bounds on the number of messages. For each lower bound, we prove by contradiction that
some messages are necessary in every nice execution and then count the number of these mes-
sages. We show that assuming a nice execution E that does not contain some of the necessary
messages, we can construct a crash-failure (or network-failure) execution indistinguishable
from E that violates a certain property.
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2.3.1 Message delays
As shown in Table 2.1, there are two possibilities for the lower bound on the number ofmessage
delays: 1 and 2. There are four non-empty cells in Table 2.1 of which the lower bound is 2: (AVT,
A), (AVT, AV), (AVT, AT), and (AVT, AVT). Among them, (AVT, A) is the least robust. The rest of
the non-empty cells have 1 as the lower bound, among which (, ) is the least robust. Thus
we need only to prove lower bounds for two cells: (, ), (AVT, A) respectively, as summarized
in Theorem 1.
Theorem1 (Lower bound onmessage delays). LetP1 andP2 be two subsets ofP = {agreement,
validity, termination}. Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every failure-free execution,
(b) satisﬁes P1 in every crash-failure execution and (c) satisﬁes P2 in every network-failure
execution. Let d be the smallest number of message delays among all nice executions of π. If for
π, P1 =P2 =, then d ≥ 1. If for π, P1 =P and P2 = {agreement}, then d ≥ 2.
The proof of the ﬁrst part of Theorem 1 is immediate: to satisfy validity in every failure-free
execution, no process can decide immediately; i.e., the process has to wait for at least one
message delay to know other processes’ votes.
The proof of the second part is less obvious, and goes through an intermediary lemma. This
lemma makes use of the notion of “process reachability”, which we introduce here and use in
all our lower bound proofs.
Deﬁnition 3 (Reaching a process). If a protocol instructs a process sr c to send a message m
to another process dest , then we say that sr c is the source of m and dest , the destination of m.
Let E be any execution. In E , if sr c sends m at time t , then we may interchangeably say that
m leaves from sr c (for dest) at t ; if at time t , dest receives m, then we may interchangeably
say that m arrives at dest at t .
Let m = {m1,m2, . . . ,ml } be a sequence of messages such that (a) the source of m1 is P , (b)
the destination of ml is Q,Q = P , (c) the source sr ci of mi is the destination of mi−1 for
i = 2,3, . . . , l , and (d) mi leaves from sr ci later than or at the time at which mi−1 arrives at sr ci
for i = 2,3, . . . , l . If m exists for two processes P,Q and l ≥ 1 in E , then we say that P reaches Q
in E .
If ml arrives atQ at time t or earlier and m is the earliest sequence ofmessages for P (according
to t ) to reach Q in E , then we say that P has reached Q at time t in E .9
By Deﬁnition 3, if a process P reaches another process Q, it is possible that, by a sequence of
messages, P backs up P ’s vote at Q. The intuition of the lower bound in question, captured by
Lemma 1 below, is then that (the arrival of) the messages by which P backups P ’s vote precede
(the departure of) the message after the reception of which P decides.
9The time t mentioned in Deﬁnition 3 is only for convenience of our proof: the time is assumed to be an
accurate global clock, but no process necessarily has access to the global clock.
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Lemma 1 (Backups). Let π be any protocol that solves NBAC in every crash-failure execution
and ensures agreement in every network-failure execution. Let E be any nice execution of π.
Let P decide at time t1 in E. Among the messages whose destination is P, let M be the set of
messages that arrive at P before or at t1. For each m ∈M , let tm be the time at which m leaves
from its source and let t2 =maxm∈M tm.
Then at t2, P has reached at least f processes.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that at t2, P has reached at most f −1 processes. To show a
contradiction, we ﬁrst construct a crash-failure executionE0 where these f −1 processes aswell
as P (denoted byΦ) crash and every correct process R decides 0. We then construct a network-
failure execution Easync that is indistinguishable from E to P , and also indistinguishable from
E0 to R; then P and R decide differently in Easync , which breaks agreement, contradictory to
the deﬁnition of π.
We ﬁrst construct E0. For any process Q ∈Φ\{P }, denote by τQ the time at which P reaches
Q in E . In E0, P crashes at time 0 (before sending any message). For Q, E0 is the same as E
until Q crashes at τQ (before possibly notifying P ’s crash). Let P propose 0, let every process
other than P propose 1 and let no process in Ω\Φ crash. Then as |Φ| ≤ f , E0 is a legitimate
crash-failure execution. Let R be the earliest correct process that decides. Denote by t3 the
time at which R decides. Since π solves NBAC in every crash-failure execution, R decides 0 in
E0.
We then build Easync based on E and E0. In Easync , every process proposes 1 and no process
crashes. We construct Easync such that Easync starts as E and:
a. Every message from P to a process inΩ\Φ arrives later than max(t1, t3);
b. Every message from Q to a process in Ω\Φ sent after or at time τQ arrives later than
max(t1, t3);
c. Every message sent after t2 to a process inΦ arrives later than t1 at the process.
Delays in (a) and (b) ensure that Easync is the same as E0 for R before R decides: any process
inΦ seems to have crashed. Delays in (c) ensure that Easync and E are indistinguishable for P
before P decides: those messages and only those messages inM arrive for P ’s decision.
Lemma 1 additionally shows that for P ’s vote, at least f backups are necessary. Using Lemma
1, we now prove the necessary number of message delays in Theorem 1.
Proof. (Proof of the second part of Theorem 1.) Let t2 be deﬁned as in Lemma 1 for the earliest
process P that decides in any nice execution. Then for f ≥ 1, by Lemma 1, at t2, at least one
message from P must have arrived while another message just leaves from its source for P .
This, in total, gives at least two message delays before any process decides.
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2.3.2 Messages
As shown in Table 2.1, there are four possibilities for the lower bound on the number of
messages: 0, n−1+ f , 2n−2 and 2n−2+ f . We group the cells in Table 2.1 with the same
value, and then prove the lower bound for the least robust atomic commit in each group. Thus
we need only to prove lower bounds for four cells in Table 2.1: (,), (V,), (V, V), and (AVT, A)
respectively, as summarized in Theorem 2. While proving our lower bounds, we highlight the
intuition behind the increasing lower bounds (from 0 to 2n−2+ f ), and a tradeoff between
time and message complexity (for the 14 variants of the atomic commit problem that have
n−1+ f messages or 2n−2 messages as lower bounds).
Theorem 2 (Lower bounds on messages). Let P1 and P2 be two subsets of P = {agreement,
validity, termination}. Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every failure-free execution,
(b) satisﬁes P1 in every crash-failure execution and (c) satisﬁes P2 in every network-failure
execution. Let m be the smallest number of messages among all nice executions of π. If for
π, P1 = P2 = , then m ≥ 0. If for π, P1 = {validity} and P2 = , then m ≥ n − 1+ f . If
for π, P1 = P2 = {validity}, then m ≥ 2n − 2. If for π, P1 = P and P2 = {agreement}, then
m ≥ 2n−2+ f .
The proof of 0 message for the cell (, ) is trivial and omitted. In what follows, we count the
number of necessary messages in the other three cases separately.
Lower bound of n−1+ f messages. We generalize here the lower bound of 2n−2 messages for
synchronous NBAC from Dwork and Skeen [1]. As in their proof, we ﬁrst present a preliminary
lemma, Lemma 2, which we phrase here in terms of “process reachability”. As Lemma 2 is a
(straightforward) generalization of the preliminary lemma in Dwork and Skeen’s proof, the
proof of Lemma 2 is omitted.10
Lemma 2 (Validity despite crashes). Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every failure-
free execution and (b) ensures validity in every crash-failure execution. Then in any nice
execution of π, every process reaches at least f processes.
Lemma 2 captures the intuition that at least f backups are necessary in the face of at most f
crashes. This leads to n−1+ f messages as the lower bound for cell (V, ): by Lemma 2, every
process has to reach at least f processes in every nice execution, and thus at least n−1+ f
messages have to be exchanged.
10We note, however, that the original preliminary lemma in [1] does not distinguish between the necessity of
sending a message (before a certain point in time) and the necessity of receiving a message (before a certain point
in time). It is thus only appropriate for a crash-failure execution (as after a message m is sent, it is predictable that
m is received within some time period) and does not apply, as is, to the setting of a network-failure execution as
we study in this chapter. Hence the need to rephrase the preliminary lemma.
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Lower bound of 2n−2 messages. Before counting the number of necessary messages for cell
(V, V), we introduce a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 3 (Validity in every execution). Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every
failure-free execution and (b) ensures validity in every network-failure execution. Then in every
nice execution of π, for any process Q, every other process P reaches Q before or when Q decides.
Proof. By contradiction. Consider a nice execution E with two processes P and Q such that P
has not reached Q when Q decides 1. In E , let Q decide at time t ; letΦ be the set of processes
which P has reached before or at t ; for every R ∈ Φ, let τR be the time at which P reaches
R. To show a contradiction, we construct a network-failure execution Easync such that P
crashes before sending any message and P votes 0, but for Q, Easync is indistinguishable from
E (where Q decides 1). In Easync , every process (except P ) votes 1; for them, Easync starts as
E . In addition, for every R ∈Φ, every message from R sent at or after τR arrives later than t .
Since in E , Q does not expect any message from R sent at or after τR and Q does not expect
any message from P either, then Q does not distinguish E and Easync and thus decides 1 at t
again in Easync , which violates validity.
By Lemma 3, now every process P must know every vote explicitly, while in Lemma 2, some
process Q’s vote of 1 may be implicit (i.e., in a nice execution, P knows Q’s vote of 1 by not
receiving a certain message). The requirement of explicit votes clearly adds extra messages,
due to the validity satisﬁed in every network-failure execution. For cell (V, V), we count the
number of necessary messages as follows. Let R be the latest process that decides in a nice
execution. By Lemma 3, before or when R decides, for any process Q, every process P =Q has
reached Q. As a result, before or when R decides, at least 2n−2 messages are exchanged.
We note that for atomic commit problems with n−1+ f messages and 2n−2 messages as
lower bounds, the lower bound on the number of message delays is 1. It is easy to show that
the lower bound on the number of messages and that on the number of message delays cannot
achieved at the same time: all those problems feature validity at least in every crash-failure
execution and thus a 1-delay protocol must use at least n(n−1) messages. This shows that
for those problems (14 cases among totally 27 ones which we consider), there is a tradeoff
between the number of messages and that of message delays. (Later in Section 5, we show
tradeoffs between time and message complexity for other 4 cases related to indulgent atomic
commit.)
Lower bound of 2n−2+ f messages. Before counting the number of necessary messages for
cell (AVT, A), we again introduce a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 4 (Agreement in every execution). Assume f ≥ 2. Let π be any protocol that solves
NBAC in every crash-failure execution and ensures agreement in every network-failure execution.
Let E be any nice execution. Let P decide at time t1 in E. Among the messages whose destination
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is P, let MP be the set of messages that arrive at P before or at t1. For each m ∈MP , let tm,P be
the time at which m leaves from its source and t2,P =maxm∈MP tm,P .
Then at t2,P in E, every process has reached at least f −1 processes.
Let Π denote the class of protocols considered in Lemma 4 above. This is the same class of
protocols considered in Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 4 is actually similar to that of Lemma
1, and thus omitted.
By the robust relation, Π is incomparable with the class of protocols considered in Lemma
3 (with 2n−2 messages as the lower bound) but is more robust than the class of protocols
considered in Lemma 2 (with n−1+ f messages as the lower bound). We highlight the increase
from n−1+ f messages to the lower bound ofΠ due to the improvement of robustness. To
do so, we actually compare Lemma 1 (which considers alsoΠ) with Lemma 2. Although both
lemmas show that P backups at (at least) f processes, Lemma 1 demonstrates that forΠ, after
P backups, it is necessary for some message to leave for P , which increases the number of
necessary messages.
We use Lemma 4 to count the exact number of necessary messages for cell (AVT, A). Let t2,P be
deﬁned as in the statement of Lemma4 for any processP in any execution. Let t2 =minP∈Ω t2,P .
Then at and after t2, at least n messages have to leave their sources respectively. Since at
t2, every process has reached at least f −1 processes, then before or at t2, at least n−2+ f
messages have arrived at their destinations respectively. Therefore, at least 2n−2+ f messages
are exchanged in every nice execution.
2.4 Matching Protocols
In this section, we prove the tightness of the lower bounds by presenting matching commit
protocols. For each protocol, we describe ﬁrst its nice executions, and then sketch the exe-
cutions that deviate from nice executions due to some vote of 0 or failure. We include full
protocols and their proofs of correctness for completeness. We present matching protocols for
the number of message delays and the number of messages separately.
2.4.1 Delay-optimal protocols
Recall that in Table 2.1, there are two possibilities for the lower bound on the number of
message delays: 1 and 2. Recall also that there are four cells in Table 2.1 of which the lower
bound is 2: (AVT, A), (AVT, AV), (AVT, AT), and (AVT, AVT), among which the last one is the
most robust. The rest of the non-empty cells correspond to a lower bound of 1 delay, among
which (AV, AV), (AT, AT) and (AVT, VT) are three local maximum by the relation of robustness.
Thus we need only to present delay-optimal protocols for four cells, as summarized in Table
2.2 as well as in Theorem 3.
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Table 2.2 – Delay-optimal Protocols. 1NBAC is a synchronous NBAC protocol. Each protocol
achieves its lower bound in every nice execution.
Cell AV, AV AT, AT AVT, VT AVT, AVT
Protocol avmNBAC 0NBAC 1NBAC INBAC
Theorem 3 (Delay-optimal protocols). Let P1 and P2 be any two subsets of P = {agreement,
validity, termination}. Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every failure-free execution,
(b) satisﬁes P1 in every crash-failure execution and (c) satisﬁes P2 in every network-failure
execution. Let d be the smallest number of message delays among all nice executions of π.
If d = 1, then it is possible that P1 = P2 = {agreement, validity}, or P1 = P2 = {agreement,
termination}, or P1 = P and P2 = {validity, termination}. If d = 2, then it is possible that
P1 =P2 =P .
Among the protocols of Table 2.2, INBAC solves what we call indulgent atomic commit, which
we will discuss in Section 2.5 separately. 0NBAC is an optimal protocol also for the number
of messages, which we will discuss with other message-optimal protocols. For avmNBAC is
similar to 1NBAC, we only sketch the former.
Protocol sketches
1NBAC. During a failure-free execution of 1NBAC, a process (a) sends its vote to every process,
(b) collects all n votes, (c) sends the logical AND of all n votes to every process, and then (d)
decides. Thus in every failure-free execution (as well as in every nice execution), every process
decides the logical AND of all n votes within one message delay.
In other executions, every process starts by sending its vote to every (other) process, but then
since failures may occur, a process P may collect fewer than n votes at the end of the ﬁrst
message delay. If so, P waits for the logical AND of all n votes sent by another process for
one message delay. (This is the key to agreement in any crash-failure execution, since in a
crash-failure execution, if some process Q decides at step (d), then Q’s messages sent at step
(c) must arrive at their receivers in one message delay.) Denoted by [D, d ] a message that
contains the logical AND, d , of all n votes. If P receives any [D, d ] before or at the end of the
second message delay, then P proposes d to consensus uc; otherwise, P proposes 0 to uc.
(Recall the deﬁnition of consensus in Section 2.2.) Then P decides the same as uc.
avmNBAC. As 1NBAC, avmNBAC starts by having every process send its vote to every other
process. Unlike 1NBAC, avmNBAC does not require termination if a failure occurs; thus every
process decides if and only if it collects all the votes at the end of the ﬁrst message delay. The
full description of avmNBAC, which is similar to that of 1NBAC, is omitted.
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Full protocol
1NBAC.
The pseudo code of the full protocol here (as well as all the other protocols described in this
chapter) uses the following assumptions and notations if not explicitly stated otherwise. (a)
We assume that every process knows its own ID stored in the local variable i of that process.
(b) We assume that a message delivery event has a higher priority than a timeout event; i.e., if
both events occur at a process at the same time, the process is ﬁrst triggered by the delivery
event and then the timeout event. (c) Sometimes a process is triggered by both the delivery
of some message m and a logical condition ; we assume that if m arrives earlier than when
 is satisﬁed, then m (as well as the delivery of m) is queued to wait for the satisfaction of .
(d) If a protocol is designed to satisfy some properties in every crash-failure execution, then
we use timers in the protocol and assume that one unit at the timer at every process is set to
the known upper bound of the message delay of the given crash-failure system. (Clearly, in a
network-failure execution of the protocol, message delays might violate the upper bound, and
as a result, although the timer timeouts, a process does not necessarily receive the message
which it sets the timer to wait for.) (e) The timer starts at time 0 when every process proposes
its value (if we do not say otherwise explicitly).
Here we present 1NBAC that (a) solves NBAC in every crash-failure execution, (b) satisﬁes
validity and termination in every network-failure execution and (c) decides in one message
delay in every nice execution. Algorithm 1 presents the full protocol.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of 1NBAC.)
Termination. Every correct process proposes a value and sets a timer when phase = 0. When
the timer timeouts, every correct process either decides, or sets again the timer and assigns
phase = 1. When the timer timeouts again, the correct process proposes a value to uc. Thus,
by the termination property of consensus, every correct process decides.
Commit-Validity. If process P decides 1, then by the validity property of consensus and the
protocol itself, there exists process Q (not necessarily P ) who sends [D, 1] in phase 0 and
therefore every process proposes 1. Thus, the commit-validity property is satisﬁed.
Abort-Validity. If process P decides 0, then either some process P decides 0 in phase 0, which
implies that some process proposes 0, or by the validity property of consensus, some process
Q proposes 0 to uc in phase 1, which implies that some process proposes 0 or Q receives fewer
than n messages in phase 0. The latter shows that a failure occurs. Thus, the abort-validity
property is satisﬁed.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm 1NBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
UniformConsensus, instance uc.
upon event <1nbac, Init> do
phase := 0;
proposed := FALSE;
decided := FALSE;
decision := ⊥;
collection0 := ;
collection1 := ;
upon event <1nbac, Propose | v> do
decision := v;
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [V, v]>;
set timer to 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, v]> do
collection0 := collection0 ∪ {p};
decision := decision AND v;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 do
if collection0 =Ω then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [D, decision]>;
if not decided then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <1nbac, Decide | decision>;
else
phase := 1;
set timer to 2;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [D, d]> do
collection1 := collection1 ∪ {p};
decision := d;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 do
if not decided then
if collection1 =  then
decision := 0;
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <uc, Propose | decision>;
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upon event <uc, Decide | d> do
if not decided then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <1nbac, Decide | d>;
Table 2.3 – Message-optimal Protocols. Protocol (n-1+f)NBAC is a synchronous NBAC protocol.
Each protocol achieves its lower bound in every nice execution.
Cell AT, AT AVT, T AV, A AVT, VT AV, AV AVT, AVT
Protocol 0NBAC (n-1+f)NBAC aNBAC (2n-2)NBAC 2PC (2n-2+f)NBAC
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that two different processes P and Q decide 1 and
0 respectively, in a crash-failure execution. Then by the commit-validity property and the
abort-validity property, every process proposes 1 and some process crashes before Q decides.
By the agreement property of consensus in a crash-failure execution, P and Q cannot both
follow the decision of uc to decide. Thus P decides 1 in phase 0 and Q decides 0 as a decision
of uc.
Since P decides in phase 0, P succeeds in sending [D,1] to every other process. Moreover, since
every process proposes 1 to 1nbac, no process sends [D,0] after the ﬁrst message delay. Thus
thanks to the synchronous communication, every process that has not decided yet receives
[D,1] and proposes 1 to uc. Thus by the validity property of consensus, Q cannot decide 0 as
a decision of uc. A contradiction.
2.4.2 Message-optimal protocols
As shown in Table 2.1, there are four lower bounds on the number of message delays: 0,
n−1+ f , 2n−2, and 2n−2+ f . Similarly, we group the cells of which the lower bound takes
the same value in Table 2.1, and ﬁnd the most robust one or the local maximum in each group.
Thus we need only to present message-optimal protocols for six cells, as summarized in Table
2.3 as well as in Theorem 4. Among these cells, cell (AV , AV ) has 2n−2 as a lower bound on
the number of messages and hence the classical protocol, 2PC, is a matching protocol, for
which we do not need to propose a new one.
Theorem 4 (Message-optimal protocols). LetP1 andP2 be any two subsets ofP = {agreement,
validity, termination}. Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every failure-free execution,
(b) satisﬁes P1 in every crash-failure execution and (c) satisﬁes P2 in every network-failure
execution. Let m be the smallest number of messages among all nice executions of π. If m = 0,
then it is possible that P1 =P2 = {agreement, termination}. If m =n−1+ f , then it is possible
that P1 = {agreement, validity} and P2 = {agreement}, or P1 = P and P2 = {termination}.
If m = 2n−2, then it is possible that P1 =P2 = {agreement, validity}, or P1 =P and P2 =
{validity, termination}. If m = 2n−2+ f , then it is possible that P1 =P2 =P .
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Belowwe sketch only 0NBAC, (n-1+f)-NBAC, and (2n-2)NBAC, since aNBACand (2n-2+f)NBAC
are close to (n-1+f)NBAC. The full descriptions of the protocols (and their full proofs of
correctness) cover all message-optimal protocols (except for 2PC). As shown in the sketches
below of the three protocols, 0NBAC, (n-1+f)NBAC, and (2n-2)NBAC, the primary technique to
achieve an optimal number of messages is to support nice executions by complex executions
that abort; namely, processes take complex steps before a decision of 0: they try to inform
every other of this decision.
Protocol sketches
0NBAC. During every nice execution, no process sends a message, and after one message
delay, a process (who votes 1) decides 1 if it has received no message. In other executions, a
process who votes 1 still sends no message at the beginning, while a process who votes 0 sends
[V, 0] to every (other) process. Then after one message delay, n processes are divided into three
categories: (1) those who vote 0, (2) those who vote 1 and receive [V, 0], and (3) those who vote
1 but do not receive any message. The last category decides 1 again immediately, while the
other two later propose a value to consensus iuc (and decide the same as iuc). The second
category now sends [B, 0] to every other process. Any receiver of [*, 0] who has not decided yet
acknowledges to the sender. If a process in category (1) or (2) receives n−1 acknowledgements,
then it proposes 0 to iuc , and otherwise, 1. Clearly, both categories (1) and (2) may potentially
decide 0 and thus they try to inform the others of this decision. The key to agreement here
is to agree with the last category which may have already decided 1 (at the end of the ﬁrst
message delay). However, since by the protocol, the third category does not acknowledge to
[*, 0], if the third category is non-empty, then all other processes must propose 1 to iuc and
decide 1, satisfying agreement.
For best-case complexity, it is easy to see that in every nice execution, no message is ever
sent, and furthermore, every process decides after one message delay. 0NBAC achieves the
lower bound on the number of messages and that on the number of message delays at the
same time. As a result, for the 9 cases (among 27 cases) covered by this protocol (using the
robustness relation), no tradeoff is necessary.
(n-1+f)NBAC. During every nice execution of this protocol, the communication steps among
processes are totally ordered. The totally-ordered sequence is: P1, P2, . . . ,Pn and subsequently
P1,P2, . . . ,Pf . Then (a) P1 starts by sending P1’s vote to P2; (b) each process in the sequence,
upon receiving its predecessor’smessage, sends the collection of the votes so far to its successor
except Pf which is at the end of the sequence; (c) (after n−1+ f steps above) every process
waits (i.e., does no-ops) for f +1 message delays; and (d) during step (c), a process does not
receive any message and thus decides 1.
In other executions, for any process P , if P votes 0, then P sends no message to the successor
(when P ﬁrst occurs in the sequence). If P does not receive its predecessor’s message, then P
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sends no message to its successor as well except that P is in the sufﬁx Pn ,P1,P2, . . . ,Pf . In the
sufﬁx, if P does not receive its predecessor’s message or receives 0 from its predecessor, then P
sends 0 to every other process. Subsequently, if any process receives a message of 0, then the
process sends 0 as well to every other process. Every process decides at the same time as in a
nice execution (i.e., step (d) in a nice execution). At the end, if a process has ever received a
message of 0, then it decides 0 (and 1 otherwise).
The number of messages in any nice execution is thus n−1+ f , matching the lower bound.
To match the lower bound, in any nice execution, some process P decides 1 without being
reached by every process: some votes of 1 are only implicit to P . In (n-1+f)NBAC, the decision
at step (d) ensures that those who accept implicit votes (as votes of 1) can be notiﬁed of a
decision of 0 in the face of at most f crashes in any crash-failure execution.
(2n-2)NBAC. During every nice execution, (a) every process sends its vote to Pn spontaneously,
(b) then Pn sends the logical AND of all n votes to every process, and (c) every process waits
for f +1 message delays, and then decides 1. When a failure occurs or some process votes 0, at
step (b), Pn sends 0 to every process. Then at step (c), a process can receive no message from
Pn or a message of 0 from Pn . If so, the process sends 0 to every process. Later, any process
who receives a message of 0 also sends 0 to every process. Every process decides at the same
time as in a nice execution (i.e., the end of step (c) in a nice execution). At the end, if a process
has ever received a message of 0, it decides 0 (and 1 otherwise).
The number of messages in any nice execution is thus 2n−2. Similar to (n-1+f)NBAC, here
any process who decides 0 tries to inform every other process before the decision, while
the decision at the end of step (c) ensures that at least one process succeeds in notifying
every correct process of the potential decision of 0 in every crash-failure execution, to satisfy
agreement.
Full protocols
0NBAC. Here we present our 0NBAC protocol in Algorithm 2. For 0NBAC, every failure-free
execution solves NBAC, every network-failure execution satisﬁes agreement and termination,
and n processes exchange 0 message in every nice execution.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of 0NBAC.)
Termination. Every correct process P proposes a vote v and sets t imer to 1. Then when
t imer ﬁrst timeouts, P either decides, or again sets t imer . At the second timeout of t imer ,
every correct process (which has not yet decided) proposes to iuc, which eventually decides
by the termination property of iuc in a network-failure execution.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm 0NBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
UniformConsensus, instance iuc.
Timer, instance timer.
upon event <0nbac, Init> do
myvote := ⊥;
myack := ;
decided := FALSE;
zero := FALSE;
phase := 0;
upon event <0nbac, Propose | v> do
myvote := v ;
if v = 0 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [V, 0]>;
set timer to time 1;
phase := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, v]> and phase = 1 do
zero := TRUE;
trigger <pl, Send | p, [ACK]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [B, b]> and phase = 2 do
if not (myvote = 1 and decided) then
trigger <pl, Send | p, [ACK]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [ACK]> do
myack := myack ∪ {p};
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 do
phase = 2;
if zero = FALSE and myvote = 1 then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <0nbac, Decide | 1>;
else if zero = TRUE and myvote = 1 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 0]>;
set timer to time 3;
else
set timer to time 2;
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upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 2 do
if myack ⊂ Ω then
trigger <iuc, Propose | 1>;
else
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
upon event <iuc, Decide | d> and not decided do
trigger <0nbac, Decide | d>;
decided := TRUE;
Commit-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every failure-free execution. If in a failure-
free execution, a process P decides 1, then either P decides 1 at the ﬁrst timeout or P decides
the decision of consensus iuc. If P decides at the ﬁrst timeout, then P does not receive any
message [V, 0], which implies that every process proposes 1. If P decides the decision of iuc,
then some process Q proposes 1 at Q’s second timeout. Either Q’s vote is 0 or Q receives a
message [V, 0] before the ﬁrst timeout. In either case, message [V, 0] is sent to all process when
the local variable phase at every process is 1. Then in a failure-free execution, no process
decides at the ﬁrst timeout. However, for Q to propose 1, again in a failure-free execution,
there must be some process R such that R’s vote is 1 and R has decided at the ﬁrst timeout,
which leads to a contradiction. Therefore P cannot decide the decision of iuc in a failure-free
execution. As a result, P can only decide at the ﬁrst timeout and every process proposes 1,
which satisﬁes commit-validity.
Abort-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every failure-free execution. If a process P
decides 0, then some process Q has proposed 0 to iuc. Then Q has votes 0 or has received a
vote of 0, which satisﬁes the abort-validity property.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that E is a network-failure execution in which two
processes P and Q decide differently. W.l.o.g., P decides 1 and Q decides 0. By the agreement
property of consensus, Q’s decision must be a decision of iuc while P ’s decision is not. Then
some process R must have proposed 0 to iuc. As a result, R has t imer timeout twice at
itself. Suppose that the vote of R to the commit protocol is 0. Then the second timeout is
at time 2. We argue that R cannot receive P ’s acknowledgement of R’s message [V ,0] at the
second timeout. If R can, then P ’s local variable zero turns true before P ’s ﬁrst timeout, which
contradicts to P ’s decision of 1. Thus, the vote of R to the commit protocol can only be 1, and
R’s second timeout is at time 3. Similarly, we argue that R cannot receive P ’s acknowledgement
of R’s message [B ,0] at the second timeout. If R can, then P ’s local variables phase = 2 and
decided = FALSE must hold when P sends the acknowledgment, which again contradicts to
P ’s decision of 1 (without invoking iuc).
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Message-optimal protocol for synchronous NBAC: (n-1+f)NBAC. We present the full proto-
col in Algorithm 3. Hereafter we use the following notation convention: symbol %n represents
modulo n except that if the remainder is 0, the result of % is n instead of 0. The terminology of
the timer is slightly different from the other protocols: the timer here starts at time 1 when the
ﬁrst sending event happens.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of (n-1+f)NBAC.)
Termination. When a process proposes a value or its local t imer timeouts, it assigns a value
to phase. Each time a process assigns a value to phase, it sets a timer. Since every correct
process proposes a value, then every correct process enters phase 3 and has t imer timeout at
n+2 f +1. Every correct process decides at n+2 f +1.
Commit-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every crash-failure execution. If process
P decides 1, then at time n+2 f +1, P ’s local variable deci sion = 1. This leads to three facts:
(a) that P has received no 0 from other processes; (b) that P ’s local variable del i vered is
TRUE when the timeout event for phase 1 (and if P is among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf , P ’s local variable
del i vered is TRUE when the timeout event for phase 2 occur at P ); and (c) that P proposes 1.
If P is among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf , then according to (b), P has received 1 at phase 2, which implies
that every process proposes 1. If P is Pn , then according to (b), P has received 1 at phase 1,
which implies that every process proposes 1. If P is not among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf ,Pn , then accord-
ing to (a), P does not receive 0 from Pn ,P1, . . . ,Pf at time n+1, . . . ,n+ f +1 respectively. Since
at most f processes can crash, one processQ among Pn ,P1, . . . ,Pf is instructed by the protocol
to not send 0 to P . This implies that Q has received 1 at phase 2 if Q is among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf or
Q has received 1 at phase 1 if Q is Pn . Therefore, every process proposes 1.
Abort-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every crash-failure execution. If process P
decides 0, then P ’s local variable deci sion = 0. Then either (a) P has proposed v = 0, or (b)
P has received 0 from other processes, or (c) P ’s local variable del i vered is FALSE when the
timeout event for phase 1 or the timeout event for phase 2 occurs at P .
If P receives 0 from another process Q, then since a process only sends its local variable
deci sion to other processes (if it sends any message), w.l.o.g., we may assume that Q is the
earliest process that has local variable deci sion = 0. As a result, either Q has proposed v = 0,
or Q’s local variable del i vered is FALSE when the timeout event for phase 1 or the timeout
event for phase 2 occurs at Q.
Then, to examine the abort-validity property, we need only to examine the case where
del i vered is FALSE for Q, and case (c) for P . Let Pi be either process. As del i vered is
FALSE, Pi does not receive any message from P(i−1)%n before the timeout event for phase
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Algorithm 3 (n-1+f)NBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
upon event <nbac, Init> do
decision := ⊥;
decided := FALSE;
delivered := FALSE;
phase := 0;
upon event <nbac, Propose | v> do
decision := v;
if i = 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | P2, decision>;
if i = 1 then
set timer to time n + 1;
phase := 2;
else
set timer to time i;
phase := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, v> do
decision := decision AND v ;
if phase ≤ 2 then
if p = P(i−1)%n then
delivered := TRUE;
else if not decided then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 do
if delivered = FALSE then
decision := 0;
if decision = 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | P(i+1)%n, decision>;
else if i = n then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
delivered := FALSE;
if i ≥ f + 1 then
set timer to time n+2 f +1;
phase := 3;
else
set timer to time n+ i ;
phase := 2;
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upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 2 do
if delivered = FALSE then
decision := 0;
if decision = 1 and i = f then
trigger <pl, Send | P(i+1)%n, decision>;
if decision = 0 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
delivered := FALSE;
set timer to time n+2 f +1;
phase := 3;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 3 do
decided := TRUE;
trigger <nbac, Decide | decision>;
1 or the timeout event for phase 2 occurs. At the same time, for 2 ≤ i ≤ n, P(i−1)%n is in-
structed by the protocol to send a message to Pi%n in phase 1 if P1,P2, . . . ,Pi−2 do not crash
and P1,P2, . . . ,Pi−1 propose 1; for i = 1, P(i−1)%n is instructed by the protocol to send a message
to Pi%n in phase 2; and for 2≤ i ≤ f , P(i−1)%n is instructed by the protocol to send a message to
Pi%n in phase 2. As del i vered is FALSE, then some process crashes or some process proposes
0.
In conclusion, the abort-validity property is satisﬁed.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that two different processes P and Q decide 1 and
0 respectively in a crash-failure execution. Then by the commit-validity property and the
abort-validity property, every process proposes 1 and some process crashes before Q decides.
Since Q decides 0, then Q’s local variable deci sion is assigned to 0 at some point in phase
1, phase 2, or phase 3. Suppose that Q assigns deci sion to 0 in phase 1. If Q = Pn , then Q
refuses to send a message, which would lead P to decide 0; if Q = Pn , then Q sends 0 to P ,
which would also lead P to decide 0. A contradiction. Suppose that Q assigns deci sion to 0 in
phase 2, then Q also sends 0 to P , which would again lead P to decide 0. A contradiction.
Suppose that Q assigns deci sion to 0 in phase 3, then Q only does the assignment at time
n+2 f +1 or later. Otherwise, since both P andQ are alive at n+2 f +1, whenQ sends deci sion
to P after the assignment, then the network could schedule the message so that P receives
0 before time n+2 f +1 and decide 0 at time n+2 f +1. Now that Q does the assignment at
time n+2 f +1, some process must send 0 to Q at time n+2 f or later. In fact, in order for
Q to receive 0, between time n+ f and time n+2 f , there must be at least f +1 process that
try to send 0 to every process. However, those processes all fail to send 0 to P . This gives a
contradiction: f +1 processes must have crashed (to make all those attempts fail) while at
32
2.4. Matching Protocols
most f processes may crash.
aNBAC. The full protocol is presented in Algorithm 4. Similar to (n-1+f)NBAC, the timer is
slightly changed: the timer here starts at time 1 when the ﬁrst sending event happens. Two
timers are used in the algorithm and identiﬁed by different names.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of aNBAC.)
Termination. We only need to prove that a process decides in a failure-free execution. Clearly,
a process proposes a vote before or at time 1. If every process proposes 1, then every process
eventually timeouts at time n+2 f +1, and noop is never assigned to TRUE. In a failure-free
execution, every process has their local variable del i vered to be TRUE at their timeout. As a
result, at time n+2 f +1, every process decides 1. Otherwise, if some process votes 0, then
every process who votes 0 timeouts at time 3 and decides while every process who votes 1
timeouts eventually at time 4 and also decides, Thus every process decides in a failure-free
execution.
Commit-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every crash-failure execution. If process P
decides 1, then P decides at time n+2 f +1 when P ’s local variable deci sion = 1 and noop is
FALSE. Since deci sion = 1, this leads to three facts: (a) that P has received no 0 from other
processes; (b) that P ’s local variable del i vered is TRUE when the timeout event for phases 1
or 2 occurs at P ; and (c) that P proposes 1. If P is Pn , then according to (b), P has received 1
at phase 1, which means that the logical AND of all votes is 1 and every process proposes 1.
If P is among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf , then according to (b), P has received 1 at phase 2, which implies
that every process proposes 1. If P is not among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf ,Pn , then according to (a), P
does not receive 0 from Pn ,P1, . . . ,Pf at time n+1, . . . ,n+ f +1 respectively. Since at most f
processes can crash, at least one process Q among Pn ,P1, . . . ,Pf is instructed by the protocol
to not send 0 to P . This implies that Q has received 1 at phase 2 if Q is among P1,P2, . . . ,Pf or
Q has received 1 at phase 1 if Q is Pn . Therefore, every process proposes 1.
Abort-Validity. We only need to prove validity in every crash-failure execution. If process
P decides 0, then P only decides 0 at time 3 or at time 4. Then P either has voted 0, or has
received a vote of 0 from some other process. Therefore, the abort-validity property is satisﬁed.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that two different processes P and Q decide 1 and 0
respectively, in a network-failure execution. Then P decides at time n+2 f +1 and Q decides
at time 3 or at time 4.
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Algorithm 4 aNBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
Timer, instance timer0.
upon event <anbac, Init> do
decision := ⊥;
decided := FALSE;
delivered := FALSE;
phase := 0;
vote := ⊥;
delivered_V := FALSE;
collection_V := ;
collection_B := ;
noop := FALSE;
phase0 := 0;
upon event <anbac, Propose | v> do
decision := v;
vote := v;
if i = 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | P2, decision>;
if i = 1 then
set timer to time n + 1;
phase := 2;
else
set timer to time i;
phase := 1;
if v = 0 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [V, 0]>;
set timer0 to time 3;
else
set timer0 to time 2;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, 0]> do
decision := 0;
delivered_V := TRUE;
trigger <pl, Send | p, [ACK, V]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [B, 0]> do
decision := 0;
trigger <pl, Send | p, [ACK, B]>;
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upon event <timer0, Timeout> and vote = 1 and delivered_V and phase0 = 0 do
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 0]>;
set timer0 to time 4;
phase0 := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [ACK, V]> do
collection_V := collection_V ∪ {p};
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [ACK, B]> do
collection_B := collection_B ∪ {p};
upon event <timer0, Timeout> and vote = 0 do
if collection_V = Ω and decided = FALSE then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <anbac, Decide | 0>;
else
noop := TRUE;
upon event <timer0, Timeout> and vote = 1 and delivered_V and phase0 = 1 do
if collection_B = Ω and decided = FALSE then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <anbac, Decide | 0>;
else
noop := TRUE;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, v> do
decision := decision AND v ;
if phase ≤ 2 then
if p = P(i−1)%n then
delivered := TRUE;
else if not decided then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 do
if delivered = FALSE then
decision := 0;
if decision = 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | P(i+1)%n, decision>;
else if i = n then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
delivered := FALSE;
if i ≥ f + 1 then
set timer to time n+2 f +1;
phase := 3;
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else
set timer to time n+ i ;
phase := 2;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 2 do
if delivered = FALSE then
decision := 0;
if decision = 1 and i = f then
trigger <pl, Send | P(i+1)%n, decision>;
if decision = 0 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, decision>;
delivered := FALSE;
set timer to time n+2 f +1;
phase := 3;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 3 and not decided do
if decision = 1 and not noop then
decided := TRUE;
trigger <anbac, Decide | decision>;
When Q decides at time t (t = 3 or 4), Q must have received an [ACK, V] or [ACK, B] from each
process before or at t . On the other hand, when P decides, P ’s local variable deci sion is 1,
which means that P has not received any message [B, 0] or [V, 0] before or when P decides.
Since n+2 f +1≥ 2+2+1= 5> t , P cannot manage to send [ACK, V] or [ACK, B] so that Q
receives the message before or at t . A contradiction.
(2n-2)NBAC. The full protocol is presented in Algorithm 5. As in (n-1+f)NBAC, the timer here
starts at time 1 when the ﬁrst sending event happens.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of (2n-2)NBAC.) We show that every crash-failure execution of
(2n-2)NBAC solves NBAC. While doing so, we show that every execution of (2n-2)NBAC sat-
isﬁes validity and termination. Recall that in every crash-failure execution, every message
arrives in time while in an execution, timeouts may be violated.
Termination. Every correct process decides at time 3+ f .
Commit-Validity. In every execution, if a process P decides 1, then at time 3+ f , the local
variable votes is 1. If P = Pn , then at time 2, P must have received all n votes which are all 1. If
P = Pn , then at time 3, P must have received a message [B, 1] from Pn , which implies that all
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Algorithm 5 (2n-2)NBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
upon event <(2n-2)nbac, Init> do
votes := 1;
received_B := FALSE;
phase := 0;
collection := {Pi };
upon event <(2n-2)nbac, Propose | v> do
votes := votes AND v ;
if 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 then
trigger <pl, Send | Pn, [V, v]>;
set timer to time 3;
else
set timer to time 2;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, v]> do
votes := votes AND v ;
collection := collection ∪ {p};
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 and i = n do
if votes = 1 and collection = Ω then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 1]>;
else
votes := 0;
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 0]>;
set timer to time 3+ f ;
phase := 1;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n−1 do
if recei ved_B = FALSE then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 0]>;
votes := 0;
set timer to time 3+ f ;
phase := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [B, v]> do
received_B := TRUE;
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votes := v ;
if votes = 0 then
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [B, 0]>;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 do
trigger <(2n-2)nbac, Decide | votes>;
processes vote 1.
Abort-Validity. In every execution, if a process P decides 0, then at time 3+ f , the local variable
votes is 0. If P = Pn , then P votes 0, or receives a vote of 0 at time 2, does not receive some
vote at time 2 or receives a message of [B, 0] (but sends a message of [B, 1] at time 2). The last
two imply the crash of some process or the delay of some message. If P = Pn , then P votes 0,
receives a message of [B, 0] from Pn at time 3, or does not receive any message from Pn at time
3, or receives a message of [B, 0] from some process (but receives a message of [B, 1] from Pn
at time 3). The last two imply the crash of Pn or the delay of some message from Pn . There-
fore, in every execution, if a process decides 0, then someprocess proposes 0 or a failure occurs.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that E is a crash-failure execution such that two
processes P and Q decide differently. W.l.o.g., P decides 1 and Q decides 0. Then by the
commit-validity property, every process votes 1. If P = Pn , then P has received all votes from
all processes; since P decides at time 3+ f , P manages to send [B, 1] to every process and
then Q should decide 1, which leads to a contradiction. If P = Pn , then P does not receive any
message [B, 0] and moreover, P receives [B, 1] at time 3 from Pn . Clearly, For Q to decide 0,
Pn must have crashed while sending [B,1] at time 2. (Otherwise, all have received [B,1], none
sends message [B, 0] and then all decide 1. A contradiction.) Now that Pn crashes, Q must
have received message [B, 0] later than time 2+ f . (Otherwise, P would receive a message of
[B, 0] from Q earlier than or at time 3+ f and thus decides 0, which is a contradiction.) Then
between time 2 and time f +2, at least f +1 processes manage to send message [B,0] to some
process and then crash, which contradicts the fact that at most f processes may crash.
(2n-2+f)NBAC. We describe our (2n-2+f)NBAC protocol in Algorithm 6. Here if f − 1 = n,
then the condition f −1≤ i ≤ n−1 is never fulﬁlled no matter what i is (and thus the related
events are never triggered). As (n-1+f)NBAC, we also change the timer slightly from the other
protocols: the timer here starts at time 1 when the ﬁrst sending event happens.
Proof. (Proof of correctness of (2n-2+f)NBAC.)
38
2.4. Matching Protocols
Algorithm 6 (2n-2+f)NBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
IndulgentUniformConsensus, instance iuc.
upon event <(2n-2+f)nbac, Init> do
votes := 1;
received_V := FALSE;
received_B := FALSE;
received_Z := FALSE;
phase := 0;
decided := FALSE;
proposed := FALSE;
upon event <(2n-2+f)nbac, Propose | v> do
votes := votes AND v ;
if i = 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | P2, [V, v]>;
set timer to time n+1;
phase := 1;
else
set timer to time i ;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, v]> and phase = 0 do
votes := votes AND v ;
received_V := TRUE;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 do
if received_V = TRUE then
if i = n then
trigger <pl, Send | P1, [B, votes]>;
else
trigger <pl, Send | Pi+1, [V, votes]>;
else
votes := 0;
if proposed = FALSE then
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
proposed := TRUE;
set timer to time n+ i ;
phase := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [B, b]> and phase = 1 do
votes := votes AND b;
received_B := TRUE;
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upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and i = f do
if received_B = TRUE then
trigger <pl, Send | Pf +1, [B, votes]>;
if decided = FALSE then
trigger <(2n-2+f)nbac, Decide | votes>;
decided := TRUE;
else
votes := 0;
if proposed = FALSE then
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
proposed := TRUE;
phase = 2;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and i = n do
if received_B = TRUE then
if decided = FALSE then
trigger <(2n-2+f)nbac, Decide | votes>;
decided := TRUE;
if f ≥ 2 then
trigger <pl, Send | P1, [Z, votes]>;
else
if proposed = FALSE then
trigger <iuc, Propose | votes>;
proposed := TRUE;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and 1≤ i ≤ f −1 do
if received_B = TRUE then
trigger <pl, Send | Pi+1, [B, votes]>;
else
votes := 0;
if proposed = FALSE then
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
proposed := TRUE;
set timer to time 2n+ i ;
phase := 2;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and f +1≤ i ≤ n−1 do
if received_B = TRUE then
trigger <pl, Send | Pi+1, [B, votes]>;
if decided = FALSE then
trigger <(2n-2+f)nbac, Decide | votes>;
decided := TRUE;
else
forall q ∈ {P1, P2, . . . , Pf , Pn} do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [HELP]>;
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upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [HELP]> and i = n and
phase = 1 do
trigger <pl, Send | p, [HELPED, votes]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [HELP]> and 1≤ i ≤ f
and phase = 2 do
trigger <pl, Send | p, [HELPED, votes]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [HELPED, v]> and not proposed do
trigger <iuc, Propose | v>;
proposed := TRUE;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [Z, z]> and phase = 2 do
votes := votes AND z;
received_Z := TRUE;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 2 and 1≤ i ≤ f −1 do
if received_Z = TRUE then
if decided = FALSE then
trigger <(2n-2+f)nbac, Decide | votes>;
decided := TRUE;
if f − 1 ≥ i + 1 then
trigger <pl, Send | Pi+1, [Z, votes]>;
else
if proposed = FALSE then
trigger <iuc, Propose | votes>;
proposed := TRUE;
upon event <iuc, Decide | d> and not decided do
trigger <(2n-2+f)nbac, Decide | d>;
decided := TRUE;
Termination. Consider any crash-failure (or network-failure) execution E . In E , every correct
process proposes a vote. For a correct process Pi , i ∈ { f ,n}, the timer eventually timeouts at
time n+ i ; at time n+ i , Pi either decides without invoking iuc in (2n-2+f)NBAC or proposes a
value to iuc . For a correct process Pi , i ∈ {1,2, . . . , f −1}, Pi eventually timeouts at time 2n+i ; at
time 2n+ i , Pi decides without invoking iuc or proposes a value to iuc. For a correct process
Pi , i ∈ { f +1, f +2. . . ,n−1}, Pi eventually timeouts at time n+i ; at time n+i , Pi either decides
at time n+i or queries P1,P2, . . . ,Pf ,Pn for help. If Pn is correct, then Pn eventually assigns 1 to
phase; if a process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf } is correct, then the process eventually assigns 2 to phase.
Since at most f processes may crash, then at least one process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf ,Pn} is correct
and therefore Pi receives at least one message [HELPED, *] and then proposes a value to iuc.
Thus by the termination property of iuc in a crash-failure system (or in a network-failure
system), every correct process decides in E .
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Commit-Validity. In every execution, if a process P decides 1, then P ’s decision is either a
decision of iuc or not. If P ’s decision is not a decision of iuc, then P decides its local vari-
able votes = 1 and there are four possibilities for P when P decides: (1) P = Pf , phase = 1,
recei ved_B is TRUE; (2)P = Pn , phase = 1, recei ved_B is TRUE; (3)P ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn−1},
phase = 1, recei ved_B is TRUE; (4) P ∈ {P1,P2, . . . , Pf −1}, phase = 2, recei ved_Z is TRUE.
By the protocol, in each of the four possibilities, votes is the logical AND of all n votes and thus
every process proposes 1. If P ’s decision is a decision of iuc, then some process Q proposes
votes = 1 or v = 1 to iuc and therefore there are three possibilities when Q proposes: (1)
Q = Pn , phase = 1, recei ved_B is FALSE, recei ved_V is TRUE and Q proposes votes; (2)
Q ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn−1}, phase = 1, recei ved_B is FALSE, Q delivers message [HELPED, v]
from some process p ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf , Pn} and Q proposes v ; (3) Q ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf −1}, phase
= 2, recei ved_Z is FALSE, recei ved_B is TRUE, recei ved_V is TRUE, andQ proposes votes.
By the protocol, in each of the three possibilities, votes or v is the logical AND of all n votes
and thus every process proposes 1.
Abort-Validity. In every execution, if a process P decides 0, then P ’s decision is either a de-
cision of iuc or not. If P ’s decision is not a decision of iuc, then P decides its local variable
votes = 0; since votes is the logical AND of all n votes and thus some process proposes 0.
If P ’s decision is a decision of iuc, then some process Q proposes 0 to iuc. If Q proposes
Q’s local variable votes, then again votes is the logical AND of all n votes and thus some
process proposes 0. IfQ proposes v whereQ delivers message [HELPED, v] from some process
p ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf ,Pn}, then there are two possibilities when Q proposes to iuc: (1) p = Pn ,
phase = 1, recei ved_V is FALSE; (2) p ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, phase =2, recei ved_B is FALSE. We
note that by the protocol, in every crash-failure execution where no process crashes, neither
(1) nor (2) occurs. As a result, if (1) or (2) occurs, then some process must have crashed or some
message must have been delayed. If Q proposes 0 to iuc, then there are three possibilities
when Q proposes 0 to iuc: (1) Q ∈ {P2,P3, . . . ,Pn}, phase = 0, recei ved_V is FALSE; (2) Q
= Pf , phase = 1, recei ved_B is FALSE; (3) Q ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf −1}, phase = 1, recei ved_B is
FALSE. By the protocol, in every crash-failure execution where no process crashes, none of the
three possibilities occurs. As a result, if (1) or (2) occurs, then some process must have crashed
or some message must have been delayed.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that E is an execution such that two processes P and Q
decide differently. W.l.o.g., P decides 1 and Q decides 0. Then by the agreement property of
uniform consensus, at least one of P and Q’s decisions is not a decision of iuc. If P ’s decision
is a decision of iuc, then Q’s decision is not a decision of iuc; however, by the proof of the
commit-validity property above, every process proposes 1 and thus when Q decides, Q’s local
variable votes = 1, which leads to a contradiction. If P ’s decision is not a decision of iuc , then
by the proof of the commit-validity property above, every process proposes 1 and moreover,
42
2.5. Indulgent Atomic Commit
Q’s decision must be a decision of iuc; as a result, some process R proposes 0 or v to iuc.
When P decides, if a process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf } has not yet crashed, then its local variables
phase = 2, recei ved_B is TRUE (when phase is assigned to 2), recei ved_V is TRUE (when
phase is assigned to 2); if a process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn} has not yet crashed, then its local
variables phase = 1, recei ved_V is TRUE (when phase is assigned to 1). Therefore, R cannot
propose 0 when at R , phase = 0 or 1; since recei ved_V and recei ved_B can only be assigned
to TRUE by the protocol (except for initialization), no process would send message [HELPED,
0] to R and thus R cannot propose v = 0. As a result, R does not exist, which gives rise to a
contradiction.
2.5 Indulgent Atomic Commit
In this section, we present our INBAC protocol. INBAC solves indulgent atomic commit as
deﬁned below. We believe this protocol to be of practical relevance for it is suited to practical
distributed database systems which are synchronous “most of the time”.
Deﬁnition 4 (Indulgent atomic commit). A protocol π solves indulgent atomic commit if it
satisﬁes the following:
• Every network-failure execution of π solves NBAC.
Indulgent atomic commit is the most robust atomic commit problem in Table 2.1. For this
problem, we show that our INBAC protocol is optimal in the number of message delays, as
well as in the number of messages given that optimal number of message delays. To give
the intuition behind the optimal protocol, we ﬁrst prove the lower bounds on the number of
messages, and then sketch the optimal protocol. For completeness, we also include the full
protocol and its proof of correctness.
2.5.1 Lower bounds
Recall that we have proven the lower bound on the number of message delays of indulgent
atomic commit in Section 2.3. Here we prove a lower bound on the number of messages
exchanged given two message delays (which is optimal as shown in Theorem 1) during any
nice execution actually for a less robust problem (than indulgent atomic commit), as stated in
the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Lower bound on messages given fewer than three message delays). Let π be
any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every crash-failure execution, and (b) satisﬁes agreement
in every network-failure execution. Let E be any nice execution of π where every message is
transmitted after an exact message delayU. W.l.o.g., E starts at time 0. If every process decides
at or before 2U in E, then at least 2 f n messages are exchanged in E.
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Note that for this less robust problem as well as indulgent atomic commit, 2n−2+ f ( f ≥ 2)
messages are optimal. Thus Theorem 5 also demonstrates the tradeoff between the number of
messages and that of message delays for this less robust problem, indulgent atomic commit
and other related problems (in total 4 cases out of 27 ones which we consider). As a result,
including our tradeoff results obtained in Section 3, all atomic commit problems with nonzero
messages as lower bounds (in total 18 out of 27 problem variants) highlight a tradeoff between
time and message complexity.
To prove the lower bound of 2 f n messages, we count the number of necessary messages
for each of the n processes. In particular, we show in any nice execution, for any process P ,
there are two non-overlapping sets of f messages,Λ1 andΛ2, such that every message inΛ1
precedes some message inΛ2. To describe the relation between those messages precisely, we
again apply the notion of “process reachability” introduced in Deﬁnition 3 and complete the
terminology.
Deﬁnition 5 (Reaching a process: complete terminology). Let E be any execution. Let m =
{m1,m2, . . . ,ml } be a sequence of messages in E such that (a) the source of m1 is P , (b) the
destination of ml is Q,Q = P , (c) the source sr ci of mi is the destination of mi−1 for i =
2,3, . . . , l , and (d) mi leaves from sr ci later than or at the time at which mi−1 arrives at sr ci for
i = 2,3, . . . , l .
Recall that (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3) if ml arrives atQ at time t or earlier and m is the earliest
sequence of messages for P (according to t ) to reach Q in E , then we say that P has reached Q
at time t in E .
For any two processes P and Q, if there are two sequences of messages m1 =m11,m12, . . . ,m1l1
and m2 =m21,m22, . . . ,m2l2 such that (a) the source of m
1
1 and the destination of m
2
l2
is P , (b) the
source of m21 and the destination of m
1
l1
is Q, (c) m21 leaves from Q later than or at the time at
which m1l1 arrives at Q, and (d) m
2
l2
arrives at some time t or earlier, then we say that P reaches
Q and subsequently Q reaches P before time t (including t ).
More generally, given three processes P , Q and R, if there are two sequences of messages
m1 = m11,m12, . . . ,m1l1 and m
2 = m21,m22, . . . ,m2l2 such that (a) the source of m
1
1 is R, (b) the
destination of m2l2 is P , (c) the source of m
2
1 and the destination of m
1
l1
is Q, (d) m21 leaves from
Q later than or at the time at which m1l1 arrives at Q, and (e) m
2
l2
arrives at some time t or
earlier, then we say that R reaches Q and subsequently Q reaches P before time t (including
t ).11
Recall that if a process P reaches another process Q, then it is possible that by a sequence of
messages, P backs up P ’s vote at Q. (Lemma 1 actually captures the intuition of backups.)
Similarly, if P reaches Q and subsequently Q reaches P , then it is possible that by a sequence
of messages, Q acknowledges the backup of P ’s vote at Q. Then Lemma 5 below essentially
11The time t mentioned in Deﬁnition 5 is only for convenience of our proof: the time is assumed to be an
accurate global clock, but no process necessarily has access to the global clock.
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says that at least f processes must send acknowledgements that conﬁrm the success of the
backup, which is also the intuition for our proof of lower bound.
Lemma 5 (Quick acknowledgements). Let π be any protocol that (a) solves NBAC in every
crash-failure execution, and (b) satisﬁes agreement in every network-failure execution. Let E be
any nice execution of π. Let P decide at some time t1 in E. Let Θ be such set of processes that
∀Q ∈Θ, Q satisﬁes that before t1 (including t1) in E, P reaches Q, and subsequently Q reaches
P. Among the messages whose destination is P, let M be the set of messages that arrive at P
before or at t1. For each m ∈M , let tm be the time at which m leaves from its source and let
t2 =maxm∈M tm.
If t2 ≤ 2U, then |Θ| ≥ f .
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that |Θ| ≤ f −1. Denote byΦ the set of P and the processes
which P has reached at t2. According to the deﬁnition of Θ and t2, Θ⊆Φ. For each process
Q ∈Θ, denote by τQ the time at which P reaches Q in E . For each process Q− ∈Φ\(Θ∪ {P }),
denote by τQ− the time at which P reaches Q− in E .
We build a crash-failure execution E0 based on E . In E0, P crashes before sending any message.
For Q, E0 is the same as E until Q crashes and Q crashes before sending any message that is
expected to send upon the message(s) received by Q at τQ (i.e., Q crashes at τQ ). For every
other process (i.e., a process not inΘ∪ {P }), E0 is the same as E until some process inΘ∪ {P }
timeouts at some process not inΘ∪ {P }.
Now we construct E0 after some process timeouts as follows. First, we consider the earliest
timeout. The earliest timeout occurs at a process in Φ\(Θ∪ {P }). (By Lemma 1, |Φ\{P }| ≥ f .
As |Θ| ≤ f −1, Φ\(Θ∪ {P }) is non-empty.) Let Q−t imeout ∈Φ\(Θ∪ {P }) be the process at which
the earliest timeout occurs. Denote by t3 at which the earliest timeout occurs. Clearly, t3 >U .
If Q−t imeout sends any message m1 upon the timeout event, then we assume that m1 arrives
at its destination at time t3+U . Second, any other message that is different from E due to
the timeout events arrives in a delay similarly, i.e., with the same message delayU . Finally, in
E0, P proposes 0, every other process proposes 1 and no process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P }) crashes. As
|Θ| ≤ f −1, E0 is a legitimate crash-failure execution of π. Any process R ∈Ω\(Θ∪ {P }) decides
0 in E0. W.l.o.g., let R be the earliest process that decides. Denote by t4 the time at which R
decides.
Then based on E and E0, we build a network-failure execution Easync . In Easync , every process
proposes 1 and no process crashes. Therefore, Easync starts as E . Then we construct Easync
such that:
• Every message from P to a process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P }) arrives later than max(t1, t4);
• Every message from Q to a process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P }) sent after or at τQ arrives later than
max(t1, t4);
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• Every message from Q− to P sent after or at τQ− arrives later than t1.
• Every message sent after t2 to a process inΘ∪ {P } arrives later than t1 at the process.
For every process Q ∈Θ, tQ > τQ . Thus to every process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P }), any process inΘ∪ {P }
seems to crash at the same time as in E0. The ﬁrst timeout event occurs at the same time
t3 at the same process Q−t imeout as in E0. Then to every process in Ω\(Θ∪ {P }), Easync is
indistinguishable from E0 before and at the ﬁrst timeout. We let the messages from/to a
process in Ω\(Θ∪ {P }) after the ﬁrst timeout event be (sent/received) the same as in E0.
Therefore to every process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P }), Easync is indistinguishable from E0 before and at t4.
To Q−, Easync and E are indistinguishable only before τQ− . After τQ− , Q− can distinguish
between Easync and E . There are two possibilities for any Q− to help P in distinguishing
between Easync and E : (1) Q− sends a message in Easync which Q− does not in E ; and (2) Q−
does not send a message in Easync which Q− does in E . For the ﬁrst possibility, Let m1 be the
message sent in Easync . Then m1 is sent after or at max(t3,τQ−). The same message m1 is sent
in E0 according to our construction. If m1 is sent to P , then by our construction, m1 arrives
later than t1; if m1 is sent to any other process, then by our construction of E0, m1 arrives after
or at t3+U and thus the receiver of m1 can only send a message m2 after or at t3+U . As t3 >U ,
t3+U > 2U ≥ t2; then m1 does not help the receiver of m1 in distinguishing between Easync
and E before t2. Hence in the ﬁrst possibility, Q− cannot help P in distinguishing between
Easync and E before and at t1.
For the second possibility, with an abuse of notations, let m1 be the message sent and O be the
receiver of m1 in E . IfO = P , then by the deﬁnition ofQ−, m1 arrives later than t1 in E and does
not belong to M . If O is any oher process, then O can only notice the missing of m1 in Easync
after or at t3+U . As a result, m1 does not help any process other than P in distinguishing
between Easync and E before t2. Therefore, following both possibilities, still the same set of
messages as M are received by P before and at t1 in Easync and P is unable to distinguish
between Easync and E before and at t1.
Now that P is unable to distinguish between Easync and E at t1, and R is unable to distinguish
between Easync and E0 at t4, P decides 1 at t1 and R decides 0 at t4. As a result, Easync is a
network-failure execution of π that does not satisfy the agreement property. A contradiction to
the assumption that π solves indulgent atomic commit.
As the proof of Lemma 5 shows, the sufﬁcient condition in the lemma is non-trivial. In the
proof, it is actually critical that P decides in two or three message delays for f acknowledge-
ments to be necessary. Suppose that P decides slowly instead. Then P could expect a message
from some process R in order to decide so that some process Q− might notice the crash
detection of P (or Q). Q− might report it to P via R , and as a result, P may notice the incorrect
crash detection of itself and wait for others (instead of taking a decision). This also leave an
open question of whether f acknowledgements are necessary if a process decides after more
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than three message delays.
Given Lemma 5, we can go back to our intuition of Theorem 5. As shown in Lemma 5, certain
messages do follow an order in any nice execution and because of the inherent order, there
exist two non-overlapping sets of messages,Λ1 andΛ2, where intuitivelyΛ1 backs up votes
andΛ2 acknowledges the success of backups, in any nice execution of a 2-delay protocol. We
now prove our Theorem 5, the lower bound on the number of messages.
Proof. (Proof of Theorem 5.) Consider any process P and let t1 be the time at which P decides.
Among the messages whose destination is P , let M be the set of messages that arrive at P
before or at t1. For each m ∈M , let tm be the time at which m leaves from its source and let
t2 =maxm∈M tm . Then t2 =U and t1 = 2U . By Lemma 1, at least f messages leave from P at
time 0, and by Lemma 5, at least f messages arrive at P at time 2U . This, in total, gives at least
2 f n messages during any nice execution.
2.5.2 Optimal protocol: overview
We present here a protocol, which we denote INBAC, and which is delay-optimal as well as
message-optimal given the optimal number of message delays.
We start by looking at what happens in nice executions of INBAC (which actually follows
Lemma 1 and Lemma 5); then we explain in other executions, how INBAC uses an underlying
consensus module to solve agreement. The state transition of a process in both executions
(nice or not) is illustrated in Figure 2.1. For simplicity, for time 2U or earlier in INBAC, every
process sends a message or decides at multiples ofU , i.e., at time 0,U or 2U .
Overview of INBAC.
- Nice execution. Every nice execution E of INBAC starts by P1,P2, . . . ,Pn sending their votes
simultaneously. At time 0, every process P sends P ’s vote to f processes. We say that those
f processes are P ’s backup processes. At timeU , each of P ’s backup processes sends P ’s vote
back to P as an acknowledgement. INBAC chooses the set BP of P ’s backup processes as
follows: for P ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn}, BP = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }; for P ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, BP = {P1,
P2, . . . ,Pf +1}\{P }. Clearly, a process may backup more than one vote. In fact, at time U ,
P ’s backup process sends to P a set V of the votes received as an acknowledgement of the
successful backup of each vote in V . (This is a necessary design, which we summarize later
in Lemma 6). Thus at time 2U , P decides if P receives f correct acknowledgements (from
P ’s f backup processes where a correct acknowledgement from process B ∈ BP includes
Q’s vote for all Q such that B ∈BQ ). Obviously, in a nice execution, or more generally, in an
execution where messages arrive in time, at 2U , P knows every process’s vote and is able to
decide properly.
47
Chapter 2. The Complexity of Distributed Transaction Commit
???????????????????????
????????????????
????????????????????
????????
?????????????
???????
??????????
???????
????? ???????? ??????
?????????????????????????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
???????
????????????
??????????????????
?????????????????????
????????
????????????????
????????????????
Figure 2.1 – State transition after 2U
- Consensus to the rescue. Now in an execution E− in which some process crashes, or some
message is delayed, P can propose a value to consensus (we say that P may cons-propose a
value) and wait for the decision of the consensus. We ﬁrst explain when P cons-proposes a
value and then explain which value P cons-proposes. Now, at 2U , if P receives at least one
acknowledgement from a process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, then P cons-proposes a value immediately
at 2U . Otherwise, P asks Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn for the acknowledgements which Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn
have received. I.e., processes ask for help for the missing acknowledgements and their cor-
responding votes. To be more speciﬁc, if P is a process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, then P can always
cons-proposes a value at 2U in E−. If not and if at 2U , P indeed receives no acknowledgement
from any process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, then P eventually receives acknowledgement messages
from n− f out of n processes and then may cons-propose a value. At the point when P is ready
to cons-propose a value, P looks for every process’s vote in the acknowledgement messages
which P has received so far. If P ﬁnds that every process’s vote is 1, then P cons-proposes 1;
otherwise, P cons-proposes 0.
The state transition of P in E and in E− is illustrated in Figure 2.1. We use there the following
notations: AND denotes the logical AND of those 0’s and 1’s as votes; Y and N are the abbre-
viated for yes and no respectively; sel f denotes P , the process in question; ack denotes an
acknowledgement; cons denotes consensus (which is not invoked if no process crashes and
every message arrives in time).
Some remarks on the protocol are in order. Clearly, the strategy of decisions of our INBAC
protocol is independent of the underlying consensus algorithm. In addition, INBAC does not
necessarily decide 0 when a failure occurs. When a process succeeds in collecting all votes
by helping (while, for example, another process may have crashed), INBAC encourages it to
propose 1 to consensus by looking at every process’s vote in the acknowledgements received.
Hence INBAC may decide 1 when a failure occurs.
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Best-case complexity. We now count the number of messages and that of message delays.
Since in every nice execution every process decides at 2U , then the number of message
delays meets the lower bound (Theorem 1). As for the number of messages in any nice
execution, at time 0, for every process P , f messages leave from P ; at time 2U , exactly f
messages arrive at the same process P .12 (This is because in INBAC, a backup process sends
the acknowledgement of several votes V in one message). Therefore, among n processes, 2 f n
messages are exchanged in E , which meets the lower bound on the number of messages in
Theorem 5. This optimal result shows that both lower bounds are tight, as summarized in
Theorem 6.
In the version as described above, the complexity of INBAC of a failure-free execution in which
some process votes 0 is the same as the complexity of any nice execution. We remark that
our protocol INBAC may accelerate such failure-free execution by doing the following: if a
process P votes 0, then P sends its vote to every process and decides 0 at the very beginning
(and in the meantime, a process Q = P who receives one vote of 0 decides 0 immediately).
Then a failure-free execution in which some process votes 0 can terminate at the end of the
ﬁrst message delay, which is faster than any nice execution.
Theorem 6 (Message-optimal indulgent atomic commit given two message delays). Given
any protocol that solves consensus in a network-failure system, INBAC solves indulgent atomic
commit, and during every nice execution of INBAC, (a) any process decides after two message
delays, and (b) n processes exchange 2 f n messages.
Finally, as we claimed in the beginning of this section, we note a necessary design for the
optimal protocol. We show in Lemma 6 that f −1 acknowledgements of other processes’ votes
are necessary. (Our INBAC adopts this design for optimality; for example, when Pf +1 decides
in a nice execution, Pf +1 has received exactly f −1 acknowledgements of P1’s votes.) As both
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 are necessary in designing message-optimal protocols, e.g., given
three message delays, they may be of independent interest and worth mentioning here.
Lemma 6 (Quick acknowledgements of other votes). Let π be any indulgent atomic commit
protocol. Let E be any nice execution of π. Let P decide at some time t1 in E. Let process R = P.
LetΘ be such set of processes that ∀Q ∈Θ, Q satisﬁes that before t1 (including t1) in E, R reaches
Q, and subsequently Q reaches P. Among the messages whose destination is P, let M be the
set of messages that arrives at P before or at t1. For each m ∈M , let tm be the time at which m
leaves from its source and let t2 =maxm∈M tm.
If t2 ≤ 2U, then |Θ| ≥ f −1.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that |Θ| ≤ f −2. Denote by τQ the time at which R reaches
12A message whose source and destination is the same does not need to be sent over the network; such a message
arrives immediately and is not counted in the messages exchanged among the n processes.
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Q in E . Denote by τP the time at which R reaches P in E . Denote by Φ the set of R and the
processes which R has reached at t2. Denote by τQ− the time at which R reaches Q− for each
process Q− ∈Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}) in E .
We build a crash-failure execution E0 based on E . In E0, R crashes before sending any message
(i.e., R crashes at time 0). For Q, E0 is the same as E until Q crashes and Q crashes before
sending any message that is expected to send upon the message(s) received by Q at τQ (i.e.,
Q crashes at τQ ). For P , E0 is the same as E until P crashes before sending any message that
is expected to send upon the message(s) received by P (i.e., P crashes at τP ). For every other
process O, E0 is the same as E until some process inΘ∪ {P,R} timeouts at some process not in
Θ∪ {P,R}.
Now we construct E0 after some process timeouts as follows. First, we consider the earliest
timeout. If Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}) is empty, the earliest timeout occurs at a process later than t2. If
Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}) is non-empty, the earliest timeout occurs at a process in Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}). Let
Q− be the process at which the earliest timeout occurs. Denote by t3 at which the earliest
timeout occurs. Certainly, whether Q− ∈Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}) or not, t3 >U . W.l.o.g., we assume that
Q− ∈Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}). If Q− sends any message m1 upon the timeout event, then we assume that
m1 arrives at its destination at time t3+U . Second, any other message that is different from
E due to the timeout events arrives in a delay similarly, i.e., with the same message delayU .
Finally, every message that is sent after t2 arrives later than t1.
Moreover, in E0, R proposes 0, every other process proposes 1 and no process inΩ\(Θ∪ {P,R})
crashes. As |Θ| ≤ f −2 and t1 − t2 ≤U , E0 is a legitimate crash-failure execution of π. Any
remaining process O ∈Ω\(Θ∪ {P,R}) decides 0 in E0. W.l.o.g., let O be the earliest process that
decides. Denote by t4 at which O decides.
Then based on E and E0, we build a network-failure execution Easync . In Easync , every process
proposes 1 and no process crashes. Therefore, Easync starts as E . LetΩ1 =Ω\(Θ∪ {P,R}). Let
Φ1 =Φ\(Θ∪ {P,R}). Then we construct Easync such that:
• Every message from R to a process inΩ1 arrives later than max(t1, t4);
• Every message from Q to a process inΩ1 sent after or at τQ arrives later than max(t1, t4);
• Every message from P to a process inΩ1 sent after or τP arrives later than max(t1, t4).
• Every message from a process inΦ1 to R arrives later than max(t1, t4);
• Every message from a process Q− in Φ1 to Q sent after or at τQ− arrives later than
max(t1, t4).
• Every message from a process Q− in Φ1 to P sent after or at τQ− arrives later than
max(t1, t4).
• Every message sent after t2 arrives later than t1.
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In addition, the rest of the messages which are communicated among Ω\(Θ∪ {P,R}) are
(sent/received) the same as in E0 after the ﬁrst timeout event. This timeout event occurs at
the same time t3 at Q− in both Easync and E0.
Process Q− might send some message m1 due to the timeout event. If m1 is sent to P , Q or R,
then we assume that m1 arrives later than t1; if m1 is sent to some process O inΩ\(Θ∪ {P,R}),
then O can only send some message m2 after or at t3 +U . As t3 >U , t3 +U > 2U ≥ t2 and
therefore, m2 also arrives later than t1. Thus any message that is different from E due to the
timeout events arrives later than t1. Then Easync and E are indistinguishable for P before and
at t1. As a result, P decides 1 at t1.
Process O is amongΩ\(Θ∪ {P,R}). For O, Easync is the same as E0 before and at t4. As a result,
O decides 0 at t4.
Clearly, Easync is a network-failure execution of π that does not satisfy the agreement property.
A contradiction to the assumption that π solves indulgent atomic commit.
2.5.3 Full protocol INBAC
We describe here our INBAC protocol in detail as shown in Algorithm 7. Here the timer starts at
time 0 when every process proposes its value as assumed in the beginning of Section 2.4. Each
unit of time is set to the known upper bound of the message delay of the given crash-failure
system. Sending messages and processing messages are considered negligible in time. In
practice, processes may spend different amounts of time in processing a (sub)transaction
(which is to be committed or aborted through the protocol); the crash-failure system here
imposes that the this amount of time is also known and upper bounded„ and has already
been included in the unit of time for the timer (so that the even if different processes start
the protocol at different time instants, the use of the timer helps them to incorporate this
difference). Thus in a network-failure execution of the protocol, if the timer timeouts and a
process has not yet received the message (which it sets the timer to wait for), then a failure
(network failure or crash failure) occurs, and vice-versa. Below we also present the proof of
correctness of Algorithm 7, i.e., our INBAC protocol.
Proof. (Proof of Correctness of INBAC as well as Theorem 6.) First, we prove that every execu-
tion of INBAC satisﬁes the agreement property.
Agreement. By contradiction. Suppose that in some execution E , two different processes
P and Q decide differently. Suppose further that P decides 1 and Q decides 0. Given that
consensus satisﬁes the agreement property, at least one of P and Q’s decisions is not a result
of the decision of the consensus.
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Algorithm 7 INBAC
Uses:
PerfectPointToPointLinks, instance pl.
Timer, instance timer.
IndulgentUniformConsensus, instance iuc.
upon event <inbac, Init> do
phase := 0;
proposed := FALSE;
decided := FALSE;
collection0 := ;
collection1 := ;
collection_help := ;
wait := FALSE;
val := ⊥;
decision := ⊥;
proposal := ⊥;
cnt := 0;
cnt_help := 0;
upon event <inbac, Propose | v> do
val := v;
forall q ∈ {P1, . . . , Pf } do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [V, v]>;
if 1 ≤ i ≤ f then
trigger <pl, Send | Pf +1, [V, v]>;
if 1 ≤ i ≤ f +1 then
set timer to 1;
else
set timer to 2;
phase := 1;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [V, v]> and phase = 0 do
collection0 := collection0 ∪ {(p, v)};
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 and 1≤ i ≤ f do
forall q ∈ Ω do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [C, collection0]>;
phase := 1;
set timer to 2;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 0 and i = f + 1 do
forall q ∈ {P1, P2, . . . , Pf } do
trigger <pl, Send | q, [C, collection0]>;
phase := 1;
set timer to 2;
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upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [C, collection]> do
collection1 := collection1 ∪ {(p, col lect ion)};
cnt := cnt + 1;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and not decided and not pro-
posed and i ≥ f + 1 do
phase := 2;
collection_val :=
⋃
(p,c)∈ col lect ion1 c;
collection0 := collection0 ∪ collection_val ∪ {(sel f , val )};
if col lect ion1 = {(Pj , c j ) | 1 ≤ j ≤ f } where c j = {(Pk , valk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} for ev-
ery j , 1≤ j ≤ f (with valk being the proposal of Pk ) then
decision := AND1≤ k ≤ nvalk ;
decided := TRUE;
trigger <inbac, Decide | decision>;
else if cnt ≥ 1 then
if for every process Pk , 1≤ k ≤ n, ∃ valk s.t. (Pk ,valk ) ∈ ⋃(p,c)∈ col lect ion1 c then
proposal := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | proposal>;
else
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
else
wait := TRUE;
forall q ∈ {Pf +1, Pf +2, . . . , Pn} do
trigger < pl , Send | q, [HELP]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [HELP]> and phase = 2 and i ≥ f +1 do
trigger < pl , Send | p, [HELPED, collection0]>;
upon event <pl, Deliver | p, [HELPED, collection]> and i ≥ f +1 do
collection_help := collection_help ∪ collection;
cnt_help := cnt_help + 1;
upon cnt + cnt_help ≥ n− f and wait and not proposed and not decided and i ≥ f +1 do
wait := FALSE;
if col lect ion1 = {(Pj , c j ) | 1 ≤ j ≤ f } where c j = {(Pk , valk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} for ev-
ery j , 1≤ j ≤ f (with valk being the proposal of Pk ) then
decision := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
decided := TRUE;
trigger <inbac, Decide | decision>;
else if cnt ≥ 1 then
if for every process Pk , 1≤ k ≤ n, ∃ valk s.t. (Pk , valk ) ∈ ⋃(p,c)∈ col lect ion1 c then
proposal := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | proposal>;
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else
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
else
if col lect ion_help = {(Pk , valk ) | 1≤ k ≤ n} where valk is the proposal of Pk then
proposal := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | proposal>;
else
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose |0 >;
upon event <timer, Timeout> and phase = 1 and not decided and not pro-
posed and 1≤ i ≤ f do
if col lect ion1 = {(Pj , c j ) | 1 ≤ j ≤ f +1} where c j = {(Pk , valk) | 1 ≤ k ≤ n} for ev-
ery j , 1≤ j ≤ f and c f +1 = {(Pk , valk ) | 1≤ k ≤ f } (with valk being the proposal of Pk ) then
decision := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
decided := TRUE;
trigger <inbac, Decide | decision>;
return;
if for every process Pk , 1≤ k ≤ n, ∃ valk s.t. (Pk ,valk ) ∈ ⋃(p,c)∈ col lect ion1 c then
proposal := AND1≤ k≤ nvalk ;
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | proposal>;
else
proposed := TRUE;
trigger <iuc, Propose | 0>;
upon event <iuc, Decide | v> and not decided do
decided := TRUE;
trigger <inbac, Decide | v>;
If neither of P andQ’s decisions is a result of the decision of the consensus, then either process
decides the value of its local variable deci sion. Since deci sion is assigned as the AND of the
n processes’ votes to inbac at every process, P and Q must agree on their decisions, which
contradicts our assumption. If P ’s decision is a result of the decision of the consensus, then
by the validity property of consensus, some process R proposes 1 to iuc. Therefore R’s local
variable proposal is 1, which is equal to the AND of the n processes’ votes to inbac. Now
that Q’s decision is equal to its local variable deci sion, which is the AND of the n processes’
votes to inbac, P and Q must agree on their decisions, which contradicts our assumption.
As a result, Q’s decision must be a result of the decision of the consensus while P ’s decision
must not be. Now P ’s local variable deci sion is 1. Therefore, every process proposes 1 to
inbac and at the same time, if any process assigns a value to its local variable proposal
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or deci sion, it can only assign a 1. Since Q’s decision is a result of the consensus, by the
validity property of consensus, some process R (not necessarily Q) proposes 0 to consensus.
First, we assume that P ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . , Pn} and examine whether R exists. As P decides 1,
variable col lect ion0 at every process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf } is {(Pk ,valk)|1 ≤ k ≤ n}. Therefore,
R ∉ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }. I.e., R ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn}. Then variable cnt at R must be 0 and thus
for R to propose 0, R must have cnt_help = n− f , i.e., every process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn}
has sent to R their variable col lect ion0. As a result, P has also sent its col lect ion0, which is
updated to {(Pk ,valk )|1≤ k ≤ n} when phase = 2. This leads R to propose 1 to consensus. A
contradiction.
Now we assume that P ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf } and examine whether R exists. Similarly, variable
col lect ion0 at every process in {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf } is {(Pk ,valk)|1 ≤ k ≤ n}. Moreover, variable
col lect ion0 at Pf +1 includes {(Pk ,valk)|1 ≤ k ≤ f } as a subset. Again, R must belong to
{Pf +1,Pf +2, . . ., Pn}. For R to propose 0, R must have cnt_help = n− f , i.e., every process in
{Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn} has sent to R their updated variable col lect ion0, the union of which is
equal to {(Pk ,valk )|1≤ k ≤n}. (Variable col lect ion0 at every process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn} is
updated to include its own vote.) This again leadsR to propose 1 to consensus. A contradiction.
Next, we prove that every network-failure execution of INBAC satisﬁes the validity property,
and the termination property.
Validity. Clearly, the validity property can be separated into the commit-validity property: if a
process decides 1, then every process proposes 1; and the abort-validity property: if a process
decides 0, then some process proposes 0 or a failure occurs. The proof here (and the proofs
for the correctness of protocols later) proves that the protocol satisﬁes the commit-validity
property and the abort-validity property respectively.
Commit-Validity. Suppose that some process P decides 1. If P ’s decision is a result of the
decision of the consensus, then since consensus satisﬁes the validity property, some process
R (not necessarily P ) must propose 1 to consensus. Since variable proposal at R is equal to
the AND of the n votes, every process proposes 1 to inbac. If P ’s decision is not a result, then
variable deci sion at P is equal to the AND of the n votes, which implies that every process
proposes 1 to inbac.
Abort-Validity. Suppose that process P decides 0. If P ’s decision is equal to variable deci sion
at P or variable proposal at some other process R, then some process must propose 0 to
inbac. If not, then some process R (not necessarily P ) must have proposed 0 to consen-
sus in the case where some value is missing in variable col lect ion_help or the collection⋃
(p,c)∈col lect ion1 c at R. This indicates that some message does not arrive before the timer
issues a timeout event, which is set to the upper bound of the message delay. Then, in a
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network-failure system, we can safely conclude that a failure occurs. Thus the abort-validity
property is satisﬁed.
Termination. By contradiction. Suppose that some correct process P does not decide. P
assigns phase to 1 in ﬁnite time. Then P is triggered by the event that the timer issues a
timeout and phase = 1, when P has not proposed to consensus or decided in inbac. If
P ∈ {P1,P2, . . . ,Pf }, then since consensus iuc satisﬁes the termination property in a network-
failure system, P eventually decides in inbac. A contradiction. If P ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn},
then P assigns phase to 2 in ﬁnite time. In fact, every correct process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . , Pn}
assigns phase to 2 in ﬁnite time. Since P does not decide, thus by the termination property
of iuc in a network-failure system, P must assign wai t to TRUE and wait for the condition
cnt + cnt_help ≥ n− f to satisfy. If the condition is satisﬁed and the corresponding event
is triggered, then P eventually decides in inbac. In other words, for P to not decide, the
condition should never be satisﬁed.
However, when wai t is assigned to TRUE, cnt is 0. Only the message of [C, *] increments cnt .
Since P ∈ {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn}, then the message of [C, *] that arrives at P can only be from a
process in {P1,P2, . . . , Pf }, each correct process of which must send [C, *] to P . On the other
hand, cnt_help at P is incremented if a message from a process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn} arrives.
Every correct process in {Pf +1,Pf +2, . . . ,Pn} also must send message [HELPED, *] to P . As at
most f processes can crash and messages eventually arrive at their destinations respectively,
cnt +cnt_help is eventually equal to or greater than n− f . In other words, the condition is
eventually satisﬁed. A contradiction.
Finally, since consensus satisﬁes the termination property in an network-failure system (as-
suming a majority of correct processes), INBAC also satisﬁes the termination property in an
network-failure system (assuming a majority of correct processes).
Therefore, given that consensus can be implemented for a network-failure system, protocol
INBAC (i.e., instance inbac) solves indulgent atomic commit.
2.6 Related Work
2.6.1 Complexity of commit protocols
The formal study of atomic commit problems dates back to Skeen [16]. Later, substantial
reﬁnement [65, 68, 69] has been made, leading to the properties of Non-Blocking Atomic
Commit (NBAC) considered in Chapter 2. A comparison with previous deﬁnitions from the
literature is now in order. A synchronous NBAC protocol [16, 1] is a protocol which solves
NBAC in a crash-failure system (and thus the complexity is covered by our study). In previous
impossibility results [68, 83, 84, 75, 76], the deﬁnition of validity depended on which failure
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may occur. (Strong) validity was considered in the only case of crash failures, whereas a weak
form of validity, weak validity, was distinguished if a failure could be a network failure. In fact,
weak validity allows processes to abort a transaction (decide 0) even if none of them crashes
and all of them vote to commit (propose 1), as long as there is a network failure. Deﬁnition
1 uniﬁes validity and weak validity for presentation clarity and consistency with previous
impossibility results.
Complexity measures. We consider two measures of complexity: the classical notion of
number of messages, and the number of message delays, following the complexity study by
Lamport of consensus [57]. The use of this complexity measure (message delays) is justiﬁed
by the general context of an arbitrary (asynchronous) system (considering network-failure
executions) in [57] and in Chapter 2. Unlike [1, 70], we do not consider the number of steps
as a measure of time. In [1, 70], steps were deﬁned for synchronous systems and do not ﬁt
a general asynchronous setting. (In addition, since steps and message delays measure time
differently, even for the special case of synchronous NBAC, the results on number of steps in
[1, 70] and our results on message delays are incomparable.)
Complexity results. The most closely related works to our results are (a) Dwork and Skeen’s
lower bound on the number of messages [1, 25, 26] and (b) Charron-Bost and Schiper’s bound
on the number of rounds [86] (of which the tightness was shown by Dutta et al. [90]). Both
works focus on synchronous NBAC, while our study is for an arbitrary (asynchronous) system
as well as an arbitrary combination of properties of NBAC. For the special case of synchronous
NBAC, we are the ﬁrst to present a tight lower bound on both the number of messages and
that of message delays.
Compared with previous work, we generalize Dwork and Skeen’s necessary and sufﬁcient
number ofmessageswhen atmostn−1 processesmay crash among n processes to an arbitrary
number of crashes. Still for the special case of synchronous NBAC, we make Charron-Bost
and Schiper’s lower bound on time complexity more precise. They showed a lower bound
of two rounds. In their model, one round consists of one send phase and one receive phase
[86, 91]. Thus a lower bound of two rounds only says that the number of send phases or receive
phases is at least two: it does not articulate which one. Combined with our tight lower bound
of one message delay, we get a clear picture of the time complexity of synchronous NBAC
protocols: a process can decide at the earliest by the end of the ﬁrst message delay, and if
so, it has to send messages before its decision. In other words, for any synchronous NBAC
protocol, before any process decides, two send phases and one receive phase are necessary.
(The tight two-round protocol of [90] needs at least two message delays and thus does not help
to get such a picture.) Based on Charron-Bost and Schiper’s two-round lower bound, Gray
and Lamport [73] informally argued that two message delays should be optimal for indulgent
atomic commit. However, by the model of rounds [86, 91], two rounds only imply a bound of
one message delay.
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2.6.2 Commit protocols
Two-phase commit (2PC) [22] distinguishes one process as the leader, which is a single point of
failure in the sense that if it crashes, every other process is blocking in the fear of disagreement
[16]. To circumvent this, Skeen [16] proposed three-phase commit (3PC), which adds one
message delay and 2n−2 messages over 2PC, along with a termination protocol. However,
as several papers [71, 73] pointed out, 3PC (as well as many of its variants) does not solve
the potential conﬂict between two backup leaders at the same time given by the termination
protocol in crash-failure executions. Gray and Lamport [73] proposed PaxosCommit based
on Paxos consensus [24] to solve the disagreement of non-unique leaders in network-failure
executions. They also proposed faster PaxosCommit [73], an optimization of PaxosCommit,
removing one message delay.13 Both PaxosCommit [73] and faster PaxosCommit [73] solve
indulgent atomic commit.
Faster PaxosCommit and one of our protocols INBAC solve the same problem yet differ
signiﬁcantly in how they achieve two message delays on a technical level. Faster PaxosCommit
uses Paxos consensus in a non-black-box way in every execution. However, the design of
INBAC follows immediately the proof of our lower bound results (Lemma 1 and Lemma 5 in
Chapter 2) and hence does not invoke consensus in any nice execution.
2.6.3 Low-latency commit protocols with weak semantics
As observed in [92], 1-delay commit protocols proposed in [93, 94] assumes that all processes
propose 1 before an execution starts. Jiménez-Peris et al. proposed a commit service which
has the same latency as 2PC but allows a process to decide twice and differently. MDCC [95]
proposed a variant of Paxos to coordinate transactions assuming all processes vote the same.
Replicated Commit [96] executed also the Paxos protocol to commit transactions, assuming
here that the votes from a majority of processes are already sufﬁcient to commit. All these
protocols solve different (and weaker) problems than classical atomic commit.
Calvin [97] eliminated the explicit commit protocol by using a deterministic locking scheme,
using only one message to notify the decision; in fact, NBAC is only solved in failure-free
executions where one message delay is (not surprisingly) sufﬁcient. Helios [3] commits a
distributed transaction if no conﬂict involving the transaction is detected across datacenters.
Helios considers both failure-free and network-failure executions. In failure-free executions,
optimal commit latency is achieved. In network-failure executions, the scheme proposed is
far from the optimal in terms of complexity. Our INBAC protocol may be adapted to the needs
of Helios with better complexity.
13Gray and Lamport [73] pointed out a possible optimization (without details) for an atomic commit protocol,
MD3PC, proposed in [72]. Then MD3PC achieves the same number of message delays and messages as faster
PaxosCommit. As MD3PC and faster PaxosCommit are equally efﬁcient in nice executions, MD3PC is omitted
from the discussion.
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Table 2.4 – Complexity of Indulgent Atomic Commit, and Synchronous NBAC with f Crashes
Indulgent atomic commit Sync. NBAC Sync. NBAC
(our result) (our result) [1, 25, 26, 86, 90]
#delays 2 1 -
#messages 2n−2+ f (for f ≥ 2) n−1+ f 2n−2 (when f =n−1) [1, 25, 26]
Table 2.5 – Complexity of INBAC, (n-1+f)NBAC, 1NBAC, 2PC, PaxosCommit and faster Pax-
osCommit
1NBAC (n-1+f)- INBAC 2PC [22] Paxos- Faster Paxos-
NBAC Commit [73] Commit [73]
#delays 1 2 f +n−1 2 2 3 2
#messages n2−n f +n−1 2 f n 2n−2 n f +2n−2 2 f n+2n
−2 f −2
Atomic Sync. Sync. Indulgent Blocking Indulgent Indulgent
commit NBAC NBAC
2.7 Concluding Remarks
We present the ﬁrst systematic study of the (time and message) complexity of atomic commit.
Table 2.4 summarizes the complexity results of previous work and our result. The number
of message delays for previous work is left blank. We give a collection of lower bounds and
matching protocols, by which we also close many questions on atomic commit. For indulgent
atomic commit, the most robust among atomic commit problems we study, no (non-trivial)
lower bound on the number of message delays or the number of messages was known until
our work. Table 2.5 summarizes the time and message complexity of our INBAC, our two
optimal synchronous NBAC protocols: (n-1+f)NBAC and 1NBAC, 2PC, PaxosCommit, and
faster PaxosCommit.14 Clearly, our (n-1+f)NBAC and 1NBAC protocols are the best regarding
messages and message delays respectively. Among indulgent atomic commit protocols, in the
special case of f = 1, INBAC performs the best regarding both messages and message delays
(for n ≥ 2), and performs almost as efﬁciently as 2PC. Still among indulgent atomic commit
protocols, PaxosCommit and our INBAC protocol show a tradeoff between time and message
complexity: for f ≥ 2,n ≥ 3, PaxosCommit is better in messages while our INBAC protocol is
better in message delays. On satisfaction of properties, our (n-1+f)NBAC and 1NBAC protocols
and 2PC show a tradeoff between agreement and termination. 2PC guarantees agreement
in an arbitrary (asynchronous) system (considering a network-failure execution) but not
termination even if only crash failures are possible. On the other hand, (n-1+f)NBAC and
1NBAC terminate despite f crashes but an execution in an arbitrary (asynchronous) system
may violate agreement (due to the use of no-ops for (n-1+f)NBAC and due to the optimal delay
14To enable a fair comparison, we assume that each protocol involves only the n processes which vote and
decide, and each protocol starts when n processes send messages spontaneously. Thus 1 delay from 2PC and 2
delays from PaxosCommit and faster PaxosCommit are removed respectively, while n−1 messages are removed
from the three protocols respectively from their original counting.
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for 1NBAC respectively).
Some questions remain open. For example, for the tradeoff between time and message
complexity, the optimal number of messages given greater than two message delays for
indulgent atomic commit is not yet clear (although we close the question for two message
delays).
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3 The Complexity of Causal Transac-
tions1
3.1 Introduction
Transactional distributed storage systems have proliferated in the last decade: Amazon’s Dy-
namo [34], Facebook’s Cassandra [99], Linkedin’s Espresso [100], Google’s Megastore [101],
Walter [31] and Lynx [102] are seminal examples, to name a few. A lot of effort has been devoted
to optimizing their performance for their success heavily relies on their ability to execute trans-
actions in a fast manner [103]. Given the difﬁculty of the task, two major “strategic” decisions
have been made. The ﬁrst is to prioritize read-only transactions, which allow clients to read
multiple items at once from a consistent view of the data store. Because many workloads
are read-dominated, optimizing the performance of read-only transactions has been consid-
ered of primary importance. The second is the departure from strong consistency models
[104, 105] towards weaker ones [106, 107, 44, 108, 109, 110]. Among such weaker consistency
models, causal consistency has garnered a lot of attention for it avoids heavy synchronization
inherent to strong consistency and can be implemented in an always-available fashion in
geo-replicated settings (i.e., despite partitions), while providing sufﬁcient semantics for many
applications [35, 36, 111, 38, 39, 40, 41].
Despite the observation that two-round causal transactions double latency and halve through-
put compared with an even weaker consistency model, eventual consistency [36], causal
read-only transactions in most transactional storage [35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41] can induce more
than one-round communication. Even the performance of highly optimized state-of-the-art
causally consistent transactional storage systems has revealed disappointing. The recent
COPS-SNOW system [44] implements “fast” read-only transactions, i.e., transactions that com-
plete in one round of interaction between a client seeking to read the value of an object and the
server storing it. This design makes the assumption that write operations are supported only
outside the scope of a transaction.2 COPS-SNOW is designed to outperform COPS [35] and
its successor Eiger [36]. Both COPS and Eiger design non-fast read-only transactions yet the
1Preprint version of an article under submission: Diego Didona, Rachid Guerraoui, Jingjing Wang and Willy
Zwaenepoel. “Distributed Transactions: Dissecting the Nightmare” [98]
2Under this assumption, a single-object write and a transaction that only writes to one object are equivalent.
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evaluation of COPS-SNOW reveals that the latency of COPS-SNOW is sometimes higher than
that of COPS/Eiger [44]. In fact, the beneﬁts and implications of many designs are unclear, and
their overheads with respect to systems that provide no consistency are not well understood.
In this chapter, we investigate the overheads from a theoretical perspective with the aim of
identifying possible and impossible causal consistency designs in order to ultimately under-
stand their implications. We prove two impossibility results.
• First, we prove that no causally consistent system can support read-write transactions
and implement fast read-only transactions. This result unveils a fundamental tradeoff
between semantics (support for read-write transactions) and performance (latency of
read-only transactions).
• Second, we prove that fast read-only transactions must be “visible”, i.e., their execution
updates the states of the involved servers. The resulting overhead increases resource
utilization, which sheds light on the inherent overhead of fast read-only transactions
and explains the surprising result in the evaluation of COPS-SNOW.
The main idea behind our ﬁrst impossibility result is the following. One round-trip message
exchange disallows multiple servers to synchronize their responses to a client. Servers need to
be conservative and return possibly stale values to the client in order to preserve causality, with
the risk of jeopardizing progress. Servers have no choice but communicate outside read-only
transactions (i.e., helping each other) to make progress on the freshness of values. We show
that such message exchange can cause an inﬁnite loop and delay fresh values forever. The
intuition behind our second result is different. We show that a fast read-only transaction has
to “write” to some server for otherwise, a server can miss the information that a stale value has
been returned for some object by the transaction (which reads multiple objects), and can then
return a fresh value for some other object, violating causal consistency.
At the heart of our results lies essentially a fundamental tradeoff between causality and
(eventual) freshness of values.3 Understanding this tradeoff is key to paving the path towards
a new generation of transactional storage systems. Indeed, the relevance of our results goes
beyond the scope of causal consistency. They apply to any consistency model stronger than
causal consistency, e.g., linearizability [104, 105] and strict serializability [112, 113], and are
relevant also for systems that implement hybrid consistency models that include causal
consistency, e.g., Gemini [114] and Indigo [115].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents our model and deﬁnitions.
Section 3.3 presents the impossibility of fast read-only transactions. Section 3.4 presents the
impossibility of fast invisible read-only transactions (with restricted semantics, where writes
are outside the scope of a transaction). Section 3.6 extends the two impossibilities to partially
3This tradeoff is different from the traditional one in distributed computing between ensuring linearizability
(i.e., ﬁnding a linearization point) and ensuring wait-freedom, which refer to both rather strong properties.
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replicated storage systems. Section 3.5 discusses alternative protocols that circumvent the
impossibility results. Section 3.7 discusses related work. Section 3.8 discusses the implications
of our impossibility resutls to some existing causal consistency designs and concludes the
chapter.
3.2 Model and Deﬁnitions
3.2.1 Model
We assume an arbitrarily large number of clients C1,C2,C3, . . . (sometimes also denoted by C ),
and at least two servers PX ,PY (sometimes also denoted by P ). Clients and servers interact
by exchanging messages. We consider an asynchronous system where the delay on message
transmission is ﬁnite but arbitrarily large, and there is no global clock accessible to any process.
Clients and servers have access to their local clocks; however, there can be arbitrary clock
drift between any two local clocks. Communication channels do not lose, modify, inject, or
duplicate messages, but messages could be reordered.
A storage is a ﬁnite set of objects. Clients read and/or write objects in the storage via transac-
tions. Any transaction T consists of a read set RT and a write set WT on an arbitrary number of
objects (RT or WT could be empty). We denote T by (RT ,WT ). If T is read-only or write-only,
we denote T simply by RT or WT respectively. For the purpose of establishing results on
fast transactions (which are deﬁned later), we focus on such transactions that can issue all
operations simultaneously, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. For example, we do not consider the
transaction model where a transaction must ﬁrst read and then write upon the result of the
read, which intuitively falls out of the scope of fast transactions. Clearly, the transactions
which we focus on do not repeatedly read or write as well; therefore, the objects read by RT
are mutually different; so are the objects written by WT . Thus a client starts a transaction by
issuing all operations of the transaction to the storage. When a client returns from transaction
T , the client returns a value for each read in RT and ok for each write in WT . We say that a
client ends a transaction when the client returns from the transaction. Every transaction ends.
Here we note that when we later refer to the construction of an execution (of a few speciﬁed
transactions), we mean a sequence of message exchange events between clients and servers
in the asynchronous system (by which the transactions are executed). If we say some event
eventually occurs given a preﬁx of message exchange events, then in every sufﬁx, there is some
ﬁnite time when the event occurs. This ﬁnite time instant can depend on the sequence of
events and is not assumed to be known a priori (although for convenience, we might give it a
notation).
The storage is implemented by servers. For simplicity of presentation, we ﬁrst assume that
each server stores a different set of objects and the set is disjoint between servers and then
we show in Section 3.6 how our results apply to the non-disjoint case, or partially replicated
storage systems in general. Every server receiving a request from a client responds. A server
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Figure 3.1 – An example transaction
sends a message to a client only if the client requests the server via a transaction and has
not returned yet from the transaction; no server receives requests for objects not stored on
that server. Naturally, a server that does not store an object stores no information on values
written to that object; due to arbitrary clock drift, we consider a client request oblivious to the
client’s local clock, i.e., without any knowledge of the local clock. Moreover, we assume an
implementation where to respond to a read request, a server returns one and only one value
which has been written to the object in question.
3.2.2 Causality
We consider a transactional storage that ensures causality in the classical sense of [42, 43],
which we recall below.
The local history of client Ci , denoted Li , is a sequence of start and end events of the transac-
tions which Ci requests. We assume, w.l.o.g., that any client starts a new transaction after the
client has ended all previous transactions, i.e., any client is sequential. Hence any local history
Li can be viewed as a sequence of transactions as well.
We denote by r (x)v a read on object x which returns v , by r (x)∗ a read on object x for an
unknown return value (with symbol ∗ as a place-holder), and by w(x)v a write of v to object x.
For simplicity, we assume that every value written is unique. (Our results hold even when the
same values can be written.) Deﬁnition 6 captures the program-order and read-from causality
relation [42]. Assume that each object is initialized with a special symbol ⊥. (Thus a read can
be r (x)⊥.)
Deﬁnition 6 (Causality [42, 43]). Given local histories L1,L2,L3 . . ., for any two transactions
Ta , Tb , we say that Ta causally precedes Tb , which we denote by Ta Tb , if (1) ∃i such that
Ta is before Tb in Li ; or (2) ∃v,x such that α=w(x)v ∈WTa and β= r (x)v ∈RTb ; (3) ∃Tc such
that Ta Tc and Tc Tb .
Deﬁnition 7 ((Causally) legal transactions [42, 43]). Given local histories H = L1,L2,L3, . . ., we
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say that client Ci ’s history is legal and respects causality if we can totally order all transactions
that contain a write in H and all transactions in Li , such that
1. For every transaction T ∈ Li , for every read r = r (x)∗ ∈RT ,
(a) If r returns a non-⊥ value v and if Tx is the last transaction that contains a write
on object x and precedes T , then the write on x in Tx is w(x)v ;
(b) If r returns ⊥, then no transaction that precedes T contains w(x)∗;
2. For any Ta ,Tb such that Ta Tb , Ta is ordered before Tb .
Deﬁnition 8 (Causal consistency [42, 43]). We say that storage cc is causally consistent if for
any execution of clients with cc, each client’s local history is legal and respects causality.
As noted by Raynal et al. [43], when every transaction contains a single read or a single write,
then the deﬁnition of causal consistency is identical to the deﬁnition of causal memory in [42].
For two writes α,β in two transactions Ta ,Tb respectively, if Ta Tb , then we also say that
αβ and α causally precedes β.
3.2.3 Progress
Progress is necessary to make any storage useful. Without progress, we may devise a trivial
implementation which returns ⊥ for a read if a client has not written to the object in question,
and the most recent value written byC otherwise. The implementation trivially satisﬁes causal
consistency.
To ensure progress, we require any value written to be eventually visible. While rather weak,
this deﬁnition is strong enough for our impossibility results, which apply to stronger deﬁ-
nitions. If compared with the deﬁnitions of eventual consistency [111, 116], the deﬁnition
of eventual visibility below is not conditioned on the absence of new writes or based on the
occurrence of underlying message exchange events, but focuses on clients’ progress in reads.
Different from convergence property [35] which focuses on transactions that are not causally
related, the deﬁnition of progress here is decoupled from the deﬁnition of causal transactions.
In addition, time τx,v in Deﬁnition 9 only notates eventually when a write or a value is visible
rather than imply its exact clock-time a priori.
As assumed before, Deﬁnition 9 is based on the setting where each server stores a different set
of objects and the set is disjoint between servers. In this setting, all writes of the same object
thus happen on the same server; thus Deﬁnition 9 also assumes that the last writer of the
same object wins, which is the most natural rule here, when deciding progress. For example, if
(the transaction that includes) w(x)a ends before (the transaction that includes) w(x)b starts
and for any arbitrary time T , some read which starts after T returns a, then Deﬁnition 9 is
violated. We adapt the deﬁnition later to cover the case where multiple servers may store the
same object and the writes of the same object can happen on different servers.
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Deﬁnition 9 (Eventual visibility). If we say a write w =w(x)v of transaction T is eventually
visible (or v is eventually visible as unique written values are assumed), then there exists some
ﬁnite time τx,v such that for any transaction Tr x which starts no earlier than τx,v and has
r (x)vnew ∈RTr x , then either vnew = v or w(x)vnew ∈WTwx where transaction Twx returns no
earlier than T starts.
Deﬁnition 10 (Progress). A (causally consistent) storage guarantees progress if every write is
eventually visible.
3.3 The Impossibility of Fast Transactions
In this section, we present and prove our ﬁrst theoretical result, Theorem 7. We ﬁrst deﬁne
formally the notion of fast transactions. In short, a fast transaction is one of which each
operation executes in (at most) one communication round between a client and a server.
3.3.1 Deﬁnitions
Fast transactions
Deﬁnition 11 below focuses on the message exchange in the presence of arbitrary, indeﬁnitely
long message delay between servers. Clearly, if in the presence of arbitrary, indeﬁnitely long
message delay between servers, every transaction can be fast (by a protocol that ﬁnishes
communication in at most one round-trip), then every transaction can be fast when message
delay is known or upper bounded by a known value.4
Deﬁnition 11 (Fast transaction). We say that a transactional storage provides fast transaction
T if for any client C , C ’s invocation I of T is fast.
If C ’s invocation I of T is fast, then no matter what execution precedes I , the following
execution of T is allowed:
• C sends at most one message to any server P and receives at most one message from
any server P ;
• If C sends a message to server P , then after the reception of that message, any message
which P sends to a server is delayed arbitrarily; moreover, after the reception of that
message, P receives no message from any server;
• Eventually C still returns I .
4A protocol can be designed to communicate more among servers when the servers are conﬁdent about an
upper bound on the message delay in order to, for example, return fresher values for transactional reads. Such
protocol still satisﬁes Deﬁnition 11 if it falls back to ﬁnish in one communication round when the servers ﬁnd the
upper bound on message delay is violated.
66
3.3. The Impossibility of Fast Transactions
In the last condition of Deﬁnition 11, the eventual return of a client refers to two possibilities:
either the client needs not to receive a message from some server to return, or the server
eventually replies to the client. Thus Deﬁnition 11 excludes implementations where a server
waits for the reception of messages from another server (whether the server is one which C
sends a message to or not) to reply to a client. Deﬁnition 11 allows multiple clients to request
the same server so that the duration of two transactions (at least one of which is fast) invoked
by different clients can overlap. A ﬁnal remark is that in Deﬁnition 11, if client C sends a
message to server P , then no matter what execution precedes the reception of that message at
P , the execution of transaction T above should be allowed.
One version
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we assume that a server returns one and only one value for a
transactional read, a property whichwe formally deﬁne below as one-version. In this chapter, a
version of an object is one value written to the object. When we mention two or more versions,
these versions are written to the same object if we do not state otherwise. To ensure that every
implementation with one-version property cannot work around the limit on the number of
versions, the formal deﬁnition considers the implementation as a curious “adversary” whose
goal is to output some version other than the allowed one version.
Consider all possible implementations. If some implementation instructs some process P
to calculate some version at some point, then w.l.o.g., the version is the result of a certain
algorithm which takes the messages and events at P before this point. W.l.o.g., any execution
can be considered as a set of events (with their corresponding messages). Thus we may model
the curious “adversary” by an algorithm which takes a subset of messages and events in a given
execution (as these messages and events appear only at the process in question) and outputs
a set of versions. To model that the curious “adversary” indeed outputs versions (rather than
arbitrary values), we must bind each version in the output to the write in the given execution.
We name such “adversary” as successful algorithms and deﬁne it in Deﬁnition 12. As the
transactional storage considered here is independent from a speciﬁc application, we assume
those implementations to be independent from the speciﬁc values written. Hence the binding
in Deﬁnition 12 covers all possible implementations.
Deﬁnition 12 (Successful algorithms). Consider any algorithm, denoted by A , whose input is
some information iE (events and messages) of execution E . The output of A is denoted by
A (iE ). We say that A is successful
• If v ∈A (iEv ), then in Ev , ∃a, w(a)v occurs; and
• For any value u, let Eu be the resulting execution from Ev where w(a)v is replaced by
w(a)u (and the corresponding messages are replaced accordingly). Then u ∈A (iEu ).
Since any local computation of a client (server) is based on all message exchange events so
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far at the client (server),5 Deﬁnition 12 and the deﬁnitions that follow represent the potential
return value of a transactional read as an output of a client’s local computation based on all
message exchange events at the client until the read (inclusive). Therefore with more messages
received at the client side, the client is able to infer more values written to any object. However,
one-version property focuses on the messages sent by servers during a transaction. This
leads to Deﬁnition 13, which counts the increment of versions brought by the increment of
messages received.
Deﬁnition 13 (Versions revealed). Consider execution E , client C and C ’s invocation I of
some transaction. Denote by M any non-empty subset of message receiving events that occur
at C (including message contents) during I . We say that M reveals (n2−n1) version(s) of an
object a if
• Among all successful algorithms whose input is vC ,I , n1 is the maximum number of
values in the output that are also values written to a before the start of I ;
• Among all successful algorithms whose input is vC ,I and M , n2 is the maximum number
of values in the output that are also values written to a before the end of I ;
where vC ,I is C ’s view, or all events that have occurred at C (including the message content if
an event is message receiving), before the start of I .
Finally, Deﬁnition 14 combines Deﬁnition 12 and Deﬁnition 13 and deﬁnes formally one-
version property. As Deﬁnition 13 shows, we let the curious “adversary” try its best in out-
putting versions. Then in Deﬁnition 14, we enforce that despite such effort, only one version
can be obtained for each object in question for a given transaction. In this sense, one-version
property is the property of messages and events, rather than the client-side algorithm that cal-
culates the versions. As a result, by Deﬁnition 14, we deﬁne the property in a way independent
from message formats. For example, if messages m1 and m2 are from two different servers PX
and PY and m1 = (x,ﬁrst 8 bits of z XOR c), m2 = (y,other bits of z XOR c), where z is a value
written to another object Z , then (m1,m2) can return more values x, y,z than expected. Such
messages should be excluded and are indeed so by Deﬁnition 14.
Deﬁnition 14 (One-version property). Consider any execution E , any client C and C ’s invo-
cation I of an arbitrary transaction T with non-empty read set R. For any non-empty set
of servers A, let ΛI ,A = R ∩ {objects stored on P |∀P ∈ A} and denote by MI ,A the events of C
receiving messages from any server in A (including message contents) during I . Then an
implementation satisﬁes one-version property if
• ∀E ,∀I ,∀A, MI ,A reveals at most one version for each object inΛI ,A , and no version of
any object not inΛI ,A ; and
5A speciﬁc protocol can surely take only a subset of these events, but cannot take more as input.
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• ∀E ,∀I , when A includes all servers, then MI ,A reveals exactly one version for each object
in R, and no version of any object not in R.
(If MI ,A reveals exactly one version of an object a, we may also specify the version v and say
that MI ,A reveals v .)
One ﬁnal remark is that one-version property is deﬁned in a general way, independent from fast
transactions. Consider an implementation of transaction which contains intuitively one round
but rather than sending a single message as Deﬁnition 11, the server sends several messages
to the same client. If each of these messages reveals one version, then our impossibility
results can be circumvented. The one-version property here however is deﬁned on all message
receiving events during a transaction, and thus covers such intuitively one-round protocol.
3.3.2 Result
Theorem 7 says that it is impossible to implement fast transactions (even if just read-only ones
are fast).
Theorem 7. A causally consistent transactional storage that supports transactions which can
read and/or write multiple objects does not provide fast read-only transactions.
The intuition behind Theorem 7 is the following. Consider a server PX that stores object X
and a server PY that stores object Y . Suppose that a transaction writes some new values to X
and Y and another transaction reads X and Y . There is a risk of violating causality for PY if
PX returns an old value to the read-only transaction; furthermore, in this case, PY must return
an old value (to the same transaction). The statement is also true if we swap PX and PY . By
the deﬁnition of fast transactions, PX and PY must be able to avoid the risk without help from
other servers and thus have to be conservative, i.e., returning old values if there is a risk. As a
result, PX and PY take turns in creating causality violation risks for each other, and preventing
each other from returning new values forever, jeopardizing thereby progress. Below we ﬁrst
sketch our proof of Theorem 7 and then present the full proof.
3.3.3 Proof by induction
The proof of Theorem 7 is by construction of a contradictory execution Eimp which, to satisfy
causality, contains an inﬁnite number of messages the reception of which is necessary for
some value to be visible. The reception of an inﬁnite number of messages violates progress.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2a, some non-⊥ values of X and Y are already visible before our
construction of Eimp ; then client Cw issues transaction WOT = (w(X )x,w(Y )y) which starts
at time tw ; since tw , WOT is the only executing transaction. We make no assumption on the
distributed protocol of WOT .
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We show the number of messages is inﬁnite by showing that no matter how many k messages
have been sent and received, an additional message is necessary for x and y to be visible.
Let m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk be the sequence of k messages. Then ∀k ≥ 1, the (k+1)th message
mk+1 is sent after mk is received, while mk+1 must be received before x and y are visible. Our
detailed proof proves the statement for each natural number k and thus shows the number
of messages goes to inﬁnity. As every message is sent after previous messages are received
and messages are not received instantaneously, the delay to return x or y accumulates and
progress (Deﬁnition 10) is violated.
As we make no assumption on the underlying distributed protocol of transactions, the commu-
nication between PX and PY can be via a third server or not. Deﬁnition 15 on the precedence
relation of two messages uniﬁes the description of the two types of communication above.
Following Deﬁnition 15, we simply say that PX (PY ) sends a message which precedes some
message that arrives at PY (PX ) in the proofs hereafter.
Deﬁnition 15. Message m1 precedes message m2 if (1) m1 = m2, or (2) a process sends m2
after it receives m1 or (3) there exists message m such that m1 precedes m and m precedes
m2.
(a) Construction of Eimp
(b) Contradictory execution for the existence of
the ﬁrst two messages
Figure 3.2 – Illustration of Eimp and the base case
3.3.4 Construction of Eimp
The construction of Eimp is based on the following notations and execution Epre f i x . Recall
that we denote by PX the server which stores object X , and PY the server which stores object
Y . Let Epre f i x be any execution where X and Y have been written at least once and some
non-⊥ values of X and Y are visible. Let x∗ and y∗ be the visible values respectively. Suppose
that at time tstar t , x∗ and y∗ are visible in Epre f i x .
Starting from tstar t , we construct execution Eimp . In Eimp , clientCw does transaction WOT =
(w(X )x,w(Y )y) which starts at some time tw > tstar t , while all other clients do no transaction.
For Eimp , since tw , WOT is the only transaction. The construction continues as long as at
least one between x and y is not visible.
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As mentioned in Section 3.3.3, the construction adds one message at a time (except for the ﬁrst
two messages). For any positive number k, we construct Eimp such that k speciﬁc messages
are sent and received after tw , we prove that (S) before x and y are visible, another message,
the (k+1)th message must be sent and received (after the reception of previous k messages)
and therefore, the construction of Eimp must continue. If we consider statement (S) as a
property P (k), then we essentially prove that P (k) holds for all natural numbers 0,1,2,3, . . ..
Our proof naturally goes by induction. Proposition 1 presents the base case and Proposition 2
presents the inductive step on case k. As the base case shows two messages are sent, we index
the sequence of messages starting from 0: m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk and then the ﬁrst inductive
step is from case 1 to case 2. As shown in Proposition 1, let PX and PY send mX and mY after
tw that precede some message which arrive at PY and PX respectively. We deﬁne m0 and m1
as follows: one server between PX and PY sends m0 before receiving any message which is
preceded by m1 for {m0,m1}= {mX ,mY }.
It is easy to see that these k messages for any positive number k are not k arbitrary mes-
sages but speciﬁcally deﬁned by the proof. Therefore, the proof of Proposition 1 and that of
Proposition 2 actually belong to the construction of Eimp (at least partially). The proofs are,
however, deferred to later sections after some helper proposition and helper lemmas for a
better presentation of the complete proof.
Proposition 1 (Additional message in the base case). After tw , any P ∈ {PX ,PY } must send at
least one message that precedes some message which arrives at Q for {P,Q}= {PX ,PY }.
Proposition 2 (Additional message in case k). In Eimp, m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1 have been sent. Let
Dk−1 be the source of mk−1. Let {Dk−1,Dk } = {PX ,PY }. Let Tk−1 be the time when the ﬁrst
message preceded by mk−1 arrives at Dk. After Tk−1, Dk must send at least one message mk that
precedes some message which arrives at Dk−1.
3.3.5 Proof of Theorem 7
Our proof consists of three steps. First, we note that to prove Proposition 2 for each positive
number k+1, we do not only need the correctness of Proposition 2 but also the correctness
of another proposition (Proposition 3) for each k. The latter proposition is a property of the
construction of Eimp in case k and does not add any message to the construction.
Then we prove two helper lemmas, Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, in order to prove all propositions.
Lemma 8 is helpful for the proof of both the base case and case k, and thus proven additionally
to avoid repetition, while Lemma 7 shows a property of write-only transactions. As Lemma 8
is based on Lemma 7, we prove the latter ﬁrst.
Finally, we prove Theorem 7. Our complete proof necessarily shows the construction of an
inﬁnite number of necessary messages by induction (through our proof of the base case
Proposition 1, the inductive step from case k to case k+1 Proposition 2 and Proposition 3),
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and relates the reception of the sequence of this inﬁnite number of messages to the violation
of progress property.
Another proposition in case k
To help prove Proposition 2 for case k+1, Proposition 3 shows that in case k, if at some point,
some client reads X and Y in one transaction, then the client cannot return the values x and
y written by WOT . Proposition 3 is intuitively necessary, as it relates our induction to the
eventual visibility of x and y .
Proposition 3 shares the same notations as Proposition 2, for the sequence of messages
m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk , time Tk , and the source of message Dk−1. The client Cr and the read-
only transaction ROT issued by Cr are explained below.
Proposition 3 (Case k). In Eimp, m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1,mk have been sent. Then for any t in
[Tk−1,Tk ), if Cr starts ROT at some time in [Tk−1, t ) and tDk−1 = t , then ROT may not return x
or y.
Client Cr is a client that requests no transaction if Cr does not request ROT . We note that in
the construction of Eimp , Cr indeed requests no transaction. Let ROT = (r (X )∗,r (Y )∗). By
Deﬁnition 11, for ROT , we schedule messages such that every message which Cr sends to
either P ∈ {PX ,PY } during ROT arrives at the same time tP at P . After tP and before P has
sent one message to Cr (during ROT ), P receives no message and any message sent by P to
a process other than Cr is delayed to arrive after ROT ends. For either P , we denote these
messages which P sends to Cr after tP (during ROT ) by mresp,P .
In fact, in the later statements and proofs (especially for Lemma 8 and its proof), ROT refers
to a read-only transaction that reads X and Y in general and Cr is its client which does not
request any other transaction if we do not explicitly say so. The message schedule of ROT (as
well as the notations that follow) is the same as mentioned above to take advantage of the
property of fast transactions.
Helper lemmas
Lemma 7. In Eimp, no write (including writes in a transaction) occurs other than WOT since
tw . If some client Cr requests ROT , then ROT returns x if and only if ROT returns y.
Proof of Lemma 7. By contradiction. Suppose that for some execution Eimp and some read-
only transaction ROT , ROT returns (x∗, y), or (x, y∗). By symmetry, we need only to a contra-
diction for the former.
As ROT returns (x∗, y), by causal consistency, for Cr , there is serialization S that orders Cr ’s
transaction ROT and all transactions including a write such that the last preceding writes of
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X and Y before ROT in S are w(X )x∗ and w(Y )y respectively. Therefore any S must order
WOT before w(X )x∗. By progress, x and y are eventually visible. W.l.o.g., let τ(X ,Y ),(x,y) be
some time (possibly in the future) when x and y are visible. If Cr requests another read-only
transaction ROT2 = (r (X )∗,r (Y )∗) after τ(X ,Y ),(x,y) , then as no write occurs other than WOT
since tw , ROT2 returns (x, y).
Now that Cr requests two read-only transactions, ROT2 after ROT , S must include both
transactions and order ROT2 after ROT . As a result, the last preceding writes of X and Y
before ROT2 in S cannot be w(X )x and w(Y )y respectively, contradictory to the property of
causal consistency.
Lemma 8 (Communication prevents latest values). Suppose that Eimp has been extended to
some time A and there is no other write than contained inWOT since tstar t . Let {P,Q}= {PX ,PY }
where P can be either PX or PY . Denote by time B > A when one speciﬁc event6 occurs in Eimp.
Given P, assume that if Cr starts ROT at some time in [A, tP ), then for any tP ∈ [A,B), ROT may
not return x or y (no matter how messages are scheduled after time A).7 We have:
1. After B, P must send at least one message which precedes some message that arrives at Q;
2. Let t be the time when Q receives the ﬁrst message which is preceded by some message
which P sends after B. For any τ ∈ [B , t ), if Cr starts ROT at some time in [B ,τ) and
tQ = τ,8 then ROT may not return x or y (no matter how messages are scheduled after
time B except for time t as well as its precedence).
Proof of Lemma 8. We prove both statements by contradiction. Let us start with the proof of
the ﬁrst statement by contradiction. Suppose that after B , P sends no message that precedes
any message that arrives atQ. In the proof by contradiction of the ﬁrst statement, we construct
two executions: E1 and E2 where E2 is ﬁrst a mere copy of Eimp to time A and ensures the
same event to occur at time B , and continues without any transaction until both x and y are
eventually visible. Suppose that x and y are visible after time tev in E2. Then based on the
assumption in Lemma 8, tev ≥B . We continue the construction of E2 by Cr requesting ROT
after tev . By progress, no matter how the messages of ROT are scheduled, Cr returns (x, y) to
ROT . Recall notations mresp,P and mresp,Q previously deﬁned. The client-side algorithm A
of Cr to output the return value of ROT is a successful algorithm. In E2, given mresp,P and
mresp,Q (no matter when they are received and what are their contents), A outputs (x, y).
Then by one-version property, mresp,Q reveals one and only one between x and y . (Otherwise,
if mresp,Q can reveal another value v other than x and y , then we can obtain a successful
algorithm which outputs x, y,v given mresp,P and mresp,Q , violating one-version property.)
6For the presentation of this lemma, it is not necessary to know the exact event.
7Recall notation tP and the message schedule of ROT previously deﬁned. The message schedule in the
assumption can be arbitrary after A as long as the message schedule of ROT is respected.
8If needed, by the asynchronous communication, we may delay t after ROT ends to respect the message
schedule of ROT that Q receives no message during ROT .
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Let ts be the latest time before B such that P sends a message that precedes some message
which arrives at Q in E1. If ts < A or ts does not exist, then we take ts = A. We now turn to
construct E1 (and we resume the construction of E2 later, which needs not to be complete
for this proof). We construct E1 based on E2 starting from ts . We delay any message which P
sends after ts in E1. If S is a server which receives a message preceded by any message sent
from P after ts in E2, then we let tS be the time when S ﬁrst receive such message in E2 and
delay any message sent from S after tS in E1. In E1, Cr starts ROT after ts and before B . Recall
notations tP and tQ in the message schedule of ROT . In E1, we schedule message events of
ROT such that tP ∈ [A,B). Furthermore, in E1 and E2, we schedule message events of ROT
such that tQ takes the same value greater than tev .
According to our deﬁnition of ts , after ts , P does not send any message which precedes some
message that arrives at Q in E2. As we delay the messages which P sends after ts in E1, thus
before tQ , Q is unable to distinguish between E1 and E2. After tQ (inclusive), according to the
message schedule of ROT , by the time when Q sends one message to Cr during ROT , Q is still
unable to distinguish between E1 and E2. By Q’s indistinguishability between E1 and E2, in E1,
mresp,Q is the same content as in E2 and reveals one and only one between x and y . W.l.o.g.,
let mresp,Q reveal x.
By the deﬁnition of Epre f i x , the return value of ROT in E1 cannot include ⊥. As Cr has not
requested any transaction before, then in E1, the return value depends solely on mresp,P and
mresp,Q . Therefore, by one-version property, A cannot output a value other than x for object
X . As a result, ROT returns x in E1. A contradiction to the assumption that if tP ∈ [A,B) (which
matches E1), then ROT may not return x or y .
We now prove the second statement by contradiction. The proof by contradiction is similar
to that of the ﬁrst statement. Suppose that in some Eimp , for some τ ∈ [B , t ), some ROT such
that tQ = τ returns x or y . By Lemma 7, ROT returns (x, y). With an abuse of notations, let ts
be the latest time before B such that P sends a message that precedes some message which
arrives at Q in Eimp . If ts <B or ts does not exist, then we take ts =B .
We construct Eold based on Eimp by Cr requesting ROT at earlier time. Furthermore, Eold
is the same as Eimp until Cr starts ROT . In Eold , the message schedule of ROT satisﬁes
tP ∈ (ts ,B) and tQ = τ. All messages sent by P after ts are delayed. If S is a server which receives
a message preceded by any message sent from P after ts in Eimp , then we let tS be the time
when S ﬁrst receive such message in Eimp and delay any message sent from S after tS in
Eold . Thus Q is unable to distinguish between Eold and Eimp by the time when Q sends one
message to Cr (for ROT ). Since ROT returns (x, y) in Eimp , then mresp,Q reveals x or y in Eold .
By the deﬁnition of Epre f i x , the return value of ROT in Eold cannot include ⊥. As Cr has not
requested any transaction before, then in Eold , the return value depends solely on mresp,P
and mresp,Q , which must include x or y . A contradiction to the assumption in the statement
of the lemma.
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Figure 3.3 – Timeline in Lemma 8
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, Lemma 8 is based on an assumption that before B , old versions
are returned to ROT and shows that B can be prolonged to time t . However, Lemma 8 makes
no assumption on the underlying distributed protocol of WOT and the detailed schedule of
message events except for some explicit references in the statement of Lemma 8.
Full proof
What remains is the complete proof of Theorem 7, which proves Proposition 1, Proposition 3
and Proposition 2 by induction, and relates the conclusion of the induction, i.e., the reception
of the sequence of this inﬁnite number of messages, to the violation of progress property.
Proof of Theorem 7. By mathematical induction, we start with the base case, i.e., Proposition
1 and Proposition 3 for k = 1. Let A = tstar t and let B = tw . By symmetry, we need only to
prove Proposition 1 for P = PX . To start with, we show that given P , for any tP ∈ [A,B), if Cr
starts ROT before tP , then ROT may not return x or y , in order to apply Lemma 8 later. As
illustrated in Figure 3.2b, at tP , as WOT has not yet started. Since by the time when P sends
one message to Cr during ROT , P receives no message, thus mresp,P cannot reveal x or y . By
one-version property, mresp,P reveals at most one version v1 of X and {mresp,P ,mresp,Q } also
reveals at most one version v2 of X . Therefore v1 = v2 = x. As Cr has requested no transaction
before, the return value of ROT solely depends on mresp,P and mresp,Q . As the client-side
algorithm of Cr for the return value of ROT is a successful algorithm, ROT returns v1 = v2 = x
for object X . (Due to Epre f i x , ROT cannot return⊥.) Then by Lemma 7, ROT may not return
x or y . Figure 3.2b illustrates the execution that contradicts Lemma 7. Thus Lemma 8 applies.
By Lemma 8, after B = tw , P must send at least one message that precedes some message
that arrives at Q, which concludes that Proposition 1 is true for either P ∈ {PX ,PY }. Following
Proposition 1, recall the deﬁnition of m0 and m1. We construct Eimp by letting m0 and m1 be
sent. Recall that T1 is the time when the ﬁrst message preceded by m1 arrives at D0. According
to Lemma 8, for any t ∈ [B ,T1), if Cr starts ROT at some time in [B , t ) and tD0 = t , then ROT
may not return x or y , which proves Proposition 3 for k = 1.
We continue with the inductive step from case k to case k+1. We assume that Proposition 2
and Proposition 3 are correct for case k and prove that Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are
correct for case k+1. Let A = Tk−1, B = Tk , P =Dk−1 and Q =Dk . According to the deﬁnition
of Tk , Tk is at least the time when mk is received. By Proposition 2 for case k, mk is sent at
least after Tk−1. Therefore, Tk > Tk−1, or B > A. Thus Lemma 8 applies again. By Lemma 8,
we thus have: (1) after Tk , Dk+1 =Dk−1 must send at least one message mk+1 which precedes
some message that arrives at Dk ; we construct Eimp by letting mk+1 be sent; and (2) for any
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t ∈ [Tk ,Tk+1), if Cr starts ROT at some time in [Tk , t ) and TDk = t , then ROT may not return x
or y . I.e., we prove Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 for case k+1. Therefore, we conclude that
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are correct for any positive number k. Clearly, by the proof
by induction above, we include an inﬁnitely long sequence of messages m0,m1,m2, . . . in our
construction of Eimp .
Next we show that Eimp violates progress by contradiction. Suppose that Eimp does not violate
progress. As there is no other write since the start of WOT , then in Eimp there is ﬁnite time
τ such that any read of object X (or Y ) which starts at any time t ≥ τ returns x (or y). We
have shown that Tk+1 > Tk for any positive k. Thus for any ﬁnite time τ, there exists K such
that for any k ≥K , Tk > τ. By Proposition 3, if Cr starts ROT at some time [Tk , t ) and tDk = t ,
then ROT may not return x or y . Since Tk > τ, we reach a contradiction. Therefore we ﬁnd
an execution Eimp where two values of the same write-only transaction can never be visible,
violating progress.
3.4 The Impossibility of Fast Invisible Transactions
As we pointed out in the introduction, some systems considered a restricted model where
all transactions are read-only and write operations are supported only outside the scope of a
transaction. This restricted model also circumvents the impossibility result of Theorem 7. In
this model, we present our second theoretical result, Theorem 8, stating that fast read-only
transactions (while indeed possible) need to be visible (need to actually write).
We ﬁrst formally deﬁne the notion of (in)visible fast transactions in Deﬁnition 16 and then
present and prove Theorem 8.
3.4.1 Deﬁnitions
For simplicity of presentation as well as our proof, we deﬁne invisible transactions based on
our deﬁnition of fast transactions.
Deﬁnition 16 (Invisible fast transactions). We say that fast transaction T is invisible if for no
client C , C ’s invocation I of T is both fast and visible.
Deﬁnition 16 is thus based on the visibility of I . Let some C ’s invocation I be fast. For any
execution E that includes I , we schedule I according to Deﬁnition 11 and let M be the message
exchange events betweenC and all servers to whichC sends a message according to Deﬁnition
11. Then Deﬁnition 17 shows the visibility of I .
Deﬁnition 17. If for some E which schedules I as above, in addition to M , every execution E−
where C does not invoke I is still different from E , then we say I is visible.
Deﬁnition 17 deﬁnes the visibility of a transaction from the point of view of message exchange
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events. The intuition behind Deﬁnition 17 is that if no matter whether a client requests a trans-
action or not, in addition to the message exchange events required by the distributed protocol
of the transaction, every message exchange event remains the same, then the transaction is
indeed invisible to the storage system.
Here the deﬁnition of visible transactions covers two possibilities: (1) a server writes locally,
which affects the messages sent later by the server; and (2) upon the transaction request, a
server sends messages to other servers, for example, to notify them of the transaction. For
the latter, even if a server sends empty messages, the transaction is considered visible (if
these empty messages would not be sent without the occurrence of this transaction), as these
messages add complexity to the storage system. From our proof of Theorem 8, however, we
show that fast transactions send more than empty messages.
3.4.2 Result
Theorem8. A causally consistent transactional storage that supports fast read-only transactions
does not provide invisible fast read-only transactions.
The intuition of Theorem 8 goes back to that of Theorem 7. Consider a server PX that stores
object X and a server PY that stores object Y . Suppose that some client writes some new
value to X and then to Y , while another client requests a read-only transaction that reads X
and Y . There is a risk of violating causality for PY if PX returns an old value to the read-only
transaction. By the deﬁnition of fast transactions, PY must be able to avoid the risk without
help from other servers and thus have to conservative, i.e., returning an old value as well.
To ensure progress, PX surely needs to notify PY of when PY can stop being conservative.
However, due to asynchronous communication, PX ’s notiﬁcation can arrive earlier at PY than
some transaction T where PX has already returned an old value. This leads to the fact that PX
must send more than empty messages: PX ’s notiﬁcation needs to include some identiﬁer of T
in order for PY to satisfy causal consistency.
3.4.3 Proof by contradiction
Here we formalize our intuition and introduce the organization of the full proof.
We prove Theorem8 by contradiction. I.e., suppose that some causally consistent transactional
storage provides invisible fast read-only transactions. Then the assumption for contradiction
is equivalent to say that for any C and C ’s invocation that is fast, for any E which schedules I
by fast transactions, some execution E− where C does not invoke I is the same as E except
that E includes additional message exchange events between a client and severs of I . To
prove Theorem 8, we choose executions where (1) for each object, some non-⊥ value is
visible; (2) client C which invokes I has not done any transaction (including single-object
write transactions and read-only transactions) before I .
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As mentioned in the intuition of our proof, PX ’s notiﬁcation needs to include some identiﬁer
of a transaction to satisfy causal consistency. It is counter-intuitive that PX only notiﬁes
the existence of one transaction rather than its identiﬁer. We formalize the necessity of the
identiﬁer as follows.
LetD be some sets of clientswhich has not done any transaction before a read-only transaction.
Let D1 be any subset of D. Let S1 be a set of invocations (1) which are fast, (2) each of which is
issued by a different client in D1, and (3) which start at the same time t0 and end at the same
time T2. We schedule each invocation of S1 according to Deﬁnition 11. Let M1 be the message
exchange events between a client in D1 and all servers to which a client inD1 sends a message
according to the ﬁrst entry of Deﬁnition 11. We denote by D2 a different subset from D1, and
S2, M2, the invocations and message exchange events that follow.
Proposition 4 (Assumption for contradiction). For any execution E1 which schedules S1 by fast
transactions, for some D2, some execution E2 where (1) D1 does not invoke S1 but D2 invokes S2
is the same as E1 except for the message exchange events M1 and M2.
Proposition 4 captures our intuition on the identiﬁer in that if PX ’s notiﬁcation does not
identify an invocation, then some other invocation can be an substitute and as a result, the
message exchange events that follow are the same after the substitution.
Proposition 4 is a necessary condition for the assumption that no fast I is visible. To see this,
we start with the assumption that no fast I is visible. Then given D1 and any E1, we apply the
assumption that no fast I is visible to clients in D1 one by one. After |D1| times, all clients and
their invocations are removed from E1, the resulting execution is E2 for an empty set of clients
D2, which proves Proposition 4.
As a result, our proof of contradiction is organized as follows. First, we assume Proposition
4 for contradiction so that if Proposition 4 is violated, then the assumption that no fast I is
visible is also violated. Then we present more details of the two executions E1 and E2 in the
assumption for contradiction. Next, we construct another execution E1,2 based on E1 and E2
which takes advantage of the same message exchange events in the assumption. Finally, we
show that E1,2 violates causal consistency. As Proposition 4 is a strictly weaker assumption
than the assumption that no fast I is visible, by the contradictory execution E1,2, we conclude
that Theorem 8 is true.
3.4.4 Construction of executions
We consider a speciﬁc read-only transaction ROT = (r (X )∗,r (Y )∗). Let S1 be a set of invo-
cations of ROT . Let E1, D1 and M1 follow the deﬁnitions in Proposition 4. Then in E1, every
invocation in S1 starts at the same time t0 and ends at the same time T2. Both t0 and T2 are
notations rather than take speciﬁc values. For S1, w.l.o.g., we further schedule every message
which a client in D1 sends (to a server) to arrive at the same time T1. According to Deﬁnition
11, each client in D1 receives at most one message. If any, we say that message is a critical
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message. After T1 and as long as PX (PY ) is still about to send a critical message to some client
in D1, PX (PY ) receives no message from any other server. Each client in D1 receives at most
one message from each of PX and PY and returns ROT at time T2.
By Proposition 4, for E1, ∃D2, such that some E2 whereD2 invokes S2 instead is the same as E1
except for message exchange betweenD and {PX ,PY }. Then we can schedule every invocation
in S2 in a similar way as S1. Since for each server P ∈ {PX ,PY }, P receives no message from
any other server after T1 (before P is still about to send a critical message to some client in
D1) in E1, we let every invocation in S2 start at the same time t0, and every message which a
client in D2 sends (to a server) be received at the same time T1 in E2. After T1, although in E2,
PX (PY ) can delay or advance the time when PX (PY ) replies to a client in D2, the time period
when PX (PY ) receives no message from any other server is the same as in E1 by Proposition 4.
Therefore, w.l.o.g., we assume that the time when PX (PY ) sends the last critical message to
a client in D is the same in E1 and E2. By the property of fast transactions, each client in D2
receives at most one message from each of PX and PY and returns ROT , w.l.o.g., at the same
time T2.
The two executions E1 and E2 are illustrated in Figure 3.4a. Since after T2, by Proposition 4,
E1 and E2 are the same, then we construct both executions as follows. We let another client
C ∉D perform two writes w(X )x and w(Y )y after T2 to establish w(X )xw(Y )y according
to Deﬁnition 6. As we assume an arbitrarily large number of clients, C exists. By the schedule
of fast read-only transactions, i.e., Deﬁnition 11, in E1 and E2, some messages may be delayed
but need not to be delayed indeﬁnitely. (Moreover, if the delayed message is between two
servers, then it is received at the same time in E1 and E2 by Proposition 4; if the delayed
message is from a server to a client, which is not a critical message, then it is received after
the client returns, i.e., time T2 by Deﬁnition 11.) In both executions, no message is delayed
indeﬁnitely and therefore y is eventually visible. We denote by τ the time instant after which y
is visible in both executions.
(a) Message schedule of Ei (b) Message schedule of E1,2
Figure 3.4 – Construction and extension of Ei
As promised, we now construct execution E1,2 based on E1 and E2. The goal is to let E1,2 =
E1 = E2 except for the communication with D until τ. For i ∈ {1,2}, let Ci be any client in
Di . W.l.o.g., we assume that D1\D2 = . In E1,2, every client in D1 ∪D2 invokes ROT at t0.
As illustrated in Figure 3.4b, while every client C1 ∈D1 invokes ROT , PX receives the same
message from C1 at the same time T1 and no message from a server after T1 in a same way
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as in E1, and sends the same message to C1 at the same time as in E1. Similarly, while every
client C2 ∈D2 invokes ROT , PY receives the same message from C2 at the same time T1 and
no message from a server after T1 in a same way as in E2, and sends the same message to C2
at the same time as in E2. The construction so far only completes the message schedule of
invocations of D1∩D2.
Let us now consider clients in D1\D2 and D2\D1 respectively. While every client in D1\D2
invokes ROT , PY does not receive the message from the client. Similarly, while every client in
D2\D1 invokes ROT , PX does not receive the message from the client. Due to asynchronous
communication, the reception of these messages may be delayed by a ﬁnite but unbounded
amount of time. We explain later the exact amount. The construction so far is illustrated in
Figure 3.4b. Based on the construction so far, by T2, PX is unable to distinguish between E1
and E1,2 while PY is unable to distinguish between E2 and E1,2.
In our previous construction of E1 and E2, after T2, E1 and E2 are the same. By the indistin-
guishability of PX and PY here, we are allowed to continue the construction of E1,2 so that
after T2, E1, E2 and E1,2 are the same. In particular, in E1,2, after T2, the same client C ∉D
performs two writes w(X )x and w(Y )y after T2 to establish w(X )xw(Y )y in the same way
as E1 and E2. To keep the respective indistinguishability of PX and PY , these messages that
are delayed in the construction so far are received after time τ. We explain later the exact
time regarding reception of some of these delayed messages. We recall that τ takes a value
determined by our previous construction of E1 and E2. Then as a result, we achieve our goal
of construction that E1,2 = E1 = E2 except for the communication with D until τ.
3.4.5 Proof of Theorem 8
The main idea of our proof is as follows. We continue to construct the two executions E2 and
E1,2 starting from time τ so that PY continues to be unable to distinguish between E2 and
E1,2, and then replies to a client a value in E1,2 that breaks causal consistency. As we reach
a contradiction, we show that our assumption for contradiction, namely, Proposition 4 is
violated. Thus we conclude that Theorem 8 is correct. After we prove E1,2 is a contradictory
execution below, we do not repeat this conclusion.
Our proof by contradiction surely relies on the indistinguishability of servers (PX ,PY ) between
executions (E1,E2,E1,2). Hence to circumvent the impossibility result of Theorem 8, one has
to break the indistinguishability for servers in the construction above, implying the necessity
of some write to some server (i.e., writing to a client without the client forwarding the write to
any server is not an option). This is consistent with our expectation of what Theorem 8 shows
at the beginning of Section 3.4, i.e., fast read-only transactions need to actually write to the
storage system.
Proposition 5 (Contradictory execution). Execution E1,2 can violate causal consistency.
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(a) Extension of E2 (b) Extension of E1,2.
Figure 3.5 – Extension of two executions
Proof of Proposition 5. We ﬁrst extend E2 and E1,2 after τ, as illustrated in Figure 3.5 and we
present the details below. To start with, we let any client Cr in D1\D2 start ROT immediately
after τ in E2. Thus in E2, every Cr sends a message to PY .
Recall that in our previous construction of E1,2, every Cr sends a message to PY as well yet the
reception is delayed. Here we construct E2 and E1,2 together for the communication between
every Cr and PY as follows. For each Cr , we schedule the message which Cr sends to PY to
arrive at some same time (which is after τ) in both E2 and E1,2. W.l.o.g., we schedule the time
to be the same for all clientsCr inD1\D2. We also schedule PY to receive no message from any
other server after receiving a message from each Cr in both E2 and E1,2. Then by fast read-only
transactions, PY still eventually replies to each Cr in both E2 and E1,2.
For the completeness of the construction of E2, we include the schedule of every Cr ’s commu-
nication with PX below. In E2, every Cr sends a message to PX . For each Cr , we schedule the
message whichCr sends to PX to arrive at the same time as the message whichCr sends to PY .
We also schedule PX to receive no message from any other server after receiving a message
from each Cr , and PX to eventually reply to each Cr in E2.
Now w.l.o.g., we assume that PX ,PY in E2 and PY in E1,2 send their reply (as deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 11) to each Cr at the same time. By fast read-only transactions, each Cr receives
at most one message from each of PX and PY before Cr returns. As illustrated in Figure 3.5,
w.l.o.g., we assume these messages arrive at each Cr at some same time, Cr receives at most
one message from each of PX and PY , and every Cr returns to ROT at the same time t in both
E2 and E1,2.
Now that we have constructed E2 and E1,2, we compute the return value of ROT in E2 and E1,2
below. Denote the message which Cr receives from PY at t by mresp,Y . Denote by mresp,X ,
the message which Cr receives from PX at t . Therefore based on our extension of E2 and E1,2,
since by the time when PY sends a message to eachCr , PY is unable to distinguish between E2
and E1,2, mresp,Y takes the same content in E2 and E1,2 (yet mresp,X can take different content
in E2 and E1,2).
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We focus on mresp,Y . By progress, in E2, Cr returns y for r (Y )∗ in ROT . By one-version
property, mresp,Y reveals exactly one version of Y , and mresp,X reveals no version of Y . Since
mresp,X reveals no version of Y , mresp,Y cannot reveal a version of Y different from y . In
other words, mresp,Y must reveal y . In E1,2, mresp,X cannot reveal x as w(X )x starts after T2.
Then mresp,X must reveal some value x∗ = x and x∗ = ⊥. As mresp,Y has already revealed y ,
messages {mresp,X ,mresp,Y } cannot reveal other versions of X or Y . In E1,2, since every Cr
does not issue any other transaction before ROT , the return value of ROT solely depends on
{mresp,X ,mresp,Y }, which is then (x∗, y).
Finally, we show that the return value (x∗, y) in E1,2 violates causal consistency by contradic-
tion. Suppose that E1,2 satisﬁes causal consistency. Then by Deﬁnition 8, for any Cr , we can
totally order all Cr ’s transactions and all write operations such that the last preceding writes of
X and Y before Cr ’s ROT are w(X )x∗ and w(Y )y respectively. Since w(X )xw(Y )y , then
w(X )x must be ordered before w(Y )y . This leads w(X )x∗ to be ordered after w(X )x. We
now extend E1,2 so that (1) every previously delayed message is received after time t , and no
other message is delayed; (2) x is thus visible; and (3) Cr invokes ROT1 = (r (X )∗,r (Y )∗) after
x is visible. In E1,2, ROT1 returns (x, y) by Deﬁnition 10. According to Deﬁnition 8, the last
preceding write of X before ROT1 must be w(X )x. However, w(X )x∗ has already been ordered
after w(X )x and thus the last preceding write of X before ROT1 is w(X )x∗. A contradiction.
We thus conclude that E1,2 indeed violates causal consistency.
3.5 Alternative Protocols
To complement our theorems, we here present two alternative protocols which provides
fast causal transactions. To show the feasibility of fast read-only transactions, we describe
a protocol which makes fast read-only transactions visible by asynchronous propagation of
transaction identiﬁers. (Recall that in the proof of Theorem 8, we mention the intuition that
some kind of transaction identiﬁer is necessary.) To discuss the impossibility results under
different assumptions on the underlying system (asynchronous or not) and the global clock
(accessible or not), we present a timestamp-based implementation of causally consistent
transactional storage. As we consider an accessible global clock, we remove the assumption of
oblivious algorithms previously in the timestamp-based implementation to take advantage of
the clock.
3.5.1 Visible fast read-only transactions
We present below a suite of algorithms, A , for fast read-only transactions. To comply with our
Theorem 7, we restrict all transactions to be read-only and updates to be outside transactions
(or equivalently be considered as single-object write transactions). The goal ofA is to better
understand our Theorem 8. Theorem 8 shows that fast read-only transactions are visible.
The intuition of Theorem 8 is that after a fast read-only transaction T , servers may need to
communicate the information of T among themselves. However, it is not clear when such
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communication occurs. The COPS-SNOW [44] algorithm shows that the communication can
take place during one client request of write. A below shows that the communication can
actually take place outside any client request of write and asynchronously. Different from
COPS-SNOW where a value written is visible immediately after the write, A guarantees only
eventual visibility.
Algorithm 8 Client-side read/write algorithms
1: local variables
2: lc, logical clock
3: ctx, context
4: end local variables
5: function WRITE(ob j , val )
6: Identify server S by ob j
7: ctxS , lcS ← S.write(lc, ctx, ob j , val )
8: update_lc(lcS)
9: update_context(ob j , l cS , ctxS)
10: return OK
11: end function
12: function READ(ob j s)
13: txID ← generate_txID()
14: f i xedCtx ← ctx
15: for ob j in ob j s do
16: val , ver , ctxS , lcS ← S.read(lc, f i xedCtx, ob j , txID)
17: save val to val s
18: update_lc(lcS)
19: update_context(ob j , ver , ctxS)
20: end for
21: return val s
22: end function
Protocol
We describe ﬁrst the data structure which each process maintains. All processes maintain
locally their logical timestamps and update their timestamps whenever they ﬁnd their local
ones lag behind. They also move their logical timestamps forward when some communication
with other processes is made. (The function call in A is update_lc of which the details are
omitted for the simplicity of presentation.) Every client additionally maintains the causal
dependencies of the current transaction (i.e., the transactions each of which causally precedes
the current one). The maintenance of causal dependencies can be done in a similar way as
in COPS [35] and COPS-SNOW [44]. (Our algorithm A maintains causal dependencies in
variable ctx by function calls of update_context and ctx.update. The details are the same as
COPS [35] and COPS-SNOW [44] and thus omitted.) Every client is able to generate transaction
identiﬁers (by a function call of generate_txID in A ). Every server needs to store the causal
dependencies which a client passes as an argument during its write. Every server additionally
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Algorithm 9 Server-side read/write algorithms
1: local variables
2: lc, logical clock
3: vi s, visible versions in tuples <ob j , ver>
4: oldT x and cur rT x, storage of tuples <ob j , ver , ctx, txID> for each object
5: end local variables
6: function WRITE(lcC , ctxC , ob j , val )
7: update_lc(lcC )
8: ctx ← the context of ob j with the highest version in the storage
9: ctx.update(ctxC )
10: update_storage(ob j , val , lc, ctx)
11: return ctx, lc
12: end function
13: function READ(lcC , ctxC , ob j , txID)
14: update_lc(lcC )
15: if txID ∈ oldT x then
16: ver ← the version identiﬁed by txID in oldT x
17: else
18: vvi s ← the highest version of ob j in vi s
19: if <ob j , v> is in ctxC and v > vvi s then
20: ver ← v
21: else
22: ver ← vvi s
23: end if
24: end if
25: save <ob j , ver , ctxC , txID> to cur rT x
26: val ← the value identiﬁed by ver of ob j in the storage
27: ctx ← the context identiﬁed by ver of ob j in the storage
28: return val , ver , ctx, lc
29: end function
maintains a data structure called oldT x for each object stored.
We next sketch how writes and read-only transactions are handled. The full algorithms are
shown in Algorithm 8 and Algorithm 9.
• Every client sends its logical timestamp as well as causal dependencies when requesting
a write of object ob j . A server uses the server’s updated logical timestamp as the version
ver of the value val written, stores the version and the value along with the causal
dependencies ctx (by a function call update_storage(ob j , val , ver , ctx) in Algorithm
9), and returns the version number to the client.
• Every clientC sends its logical timestamp when requesting a read-only transaction t x. A
server ﬁrst searches t x in oldT x, and returns a pre-computed value according to entry
t x in oldT x if t x ∈ oldT x. Otherwise, a server returns some value previously observed
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Algorithm 10 Server-side asynchronous check
1: local variables
2: Same as in Algorithm 9
3: end local variables
4: when all versions of ob j below ver are in vi s, invoke async_check
5: procedure ASYNC_CHECK(ob j , ver )
6: identify ctx by ob j , ver in the storage
7: for ob jd , verd in ctx do
8: identify server D by ob jd
9: oldT xD , lcD ← D .async_checkVis(ob jd , verd , lc)
10: update_lc(lcD )
11: save oldT xD to oldT x as follows:
12: for txID in oldT xD do
13: if txID ∉ oldT x then
14: get tuple <ob jd , ∗, ctxd , txID> from oldT xD
15: identify version vprev as the highest version below ver of ob j in the storage
16: if <ob j , v> is in ctxd and v > vprev then
17: save tuple <ob j , v , −, txID> into oldT x
18: else
19: save tuple <ob j , vprev , −, txID> into oldT x
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: end for
24: for txID in cur rT x do
25: if <ob j , v , ∗, txID> is in cur rT x and v < ver then
26: move the tuple identiﬁed by txID from cur rT x to oldT x
27: end if
28: end for
29: save < ob j ,ver > into vi s
30: end procedure
31: function ASYNC_CHECKVIS(ob jd , verd , lcS)
32: update_lc(lcS)
33: when < ob jd ,verd > is in vi s, return oldT x, lc
34: end function
by C or some value marked as “visible”.
We here sketch how oldT x is maintained and communicated (during asynchronous propaga-
tion). The full algorithm is shown in Algorithm 10.
• After a server S responds to a client’s write request of value w for some object o, S sends
a request to every server which stores some value v such that w(o)v  w(o)w . Any
server responds such request with its local oldT x when v is marked as “visible”.
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• After S receives a response from all servers which store some value that causally precedes
w , S stores their oldT xs into S’s local one, chooses a value w∗ which is written before
w9
Any read-only transaction is stored and marked as “current” during its execution at any server.
A “current” transaction T is put in oldT x when some value w is “visible” and T has returned
a value written before w of the same object.
Proof of correctness
Our suite of algorithms A above provides fast read-only transactions. As every message
eventually arrives at its destination (and therefore asynchronous propagation eventually
ends), A satisﬁes progress. As asynchronous propagation carries transaction identiﬁers, A is
visible. In what follows, we show that A satisﬁes causal consistency.
In Algorithm 9, when a server stores a value, the server chooses a version number strictly
greater than all values of the same object previously written. Therefore in addition to relation
, we also enforce an ordering on all writes of the same object by their version numbers. In
what follows, we say that two writes w1 →w2, if (1) w1 is of a lower version number than w2
and w1, w2 write the same object; or (2) w1w2; or (3) ∃ some write w3 such that w1 →w3
and w3 → w2. We ﬁrst show a property for any read-only transaction in Lemma 9. We then
prove the correctness of A based on Lemma 9.
Lemma 9 (A correct snapshot for visible fast read-only transactions). Let T be any transaction
that contains at least two reads. Given any two reads r (a)u,r (o)v∗ ∈RT , if ∃w(a)u∗ such that
w(a)u is of a lower version number than w(a)u∗, then w(a)u∗ →w(o)v∗ does not hold.
Proof of Lemma 9. By contradiction. Suppose that r (a)u,r (o)v∗ ∈RT and w(a)u∗ →w(o)v∗
holds. According to Algorithm 9, there are three possibilities when the server Po that stores
object o returns val = v∗ at txID = T :
1. txID ∈ oldT x;
2. txID ∉ oldT x but for object o, ctxC speciﬁes a version v , higher than the highest
version vvi s in vi s of the same object;
3. txID ∉ oldT x; and for object o, ctxC does not specify a version or any speciﬁed version
v is lower than vvi s .
Let us examine each possibility. First, we look at the second possibility. Then < o,v >∈ ctxC ,
v corresponds to val = v∗ at Po , and v > vvi s . The maintenance of variable ctx maintains
9In order to choose a value correctly, in the algorithm, S actually sends a request after all values written before
w (of the same object) are marked as “visible”. Also, S does not choose a value for some t x which S has chosen
before.
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the precedences of a transaction (a single-object write transaction or a read-only transaction)
according to relation→. We sometimes also say a write is in ctx if the pair of the corresponding
object and version number is in ctx. By the maintenance of ctxC , since w(a)u∗ → w(o)v∗,
then w(a)u∗ ∈ ctxC . However, according to Line 16 of Algorithm 10 and Line 19 of Algorithm
9, if w(a)u∗ ∈ ctxC , then the server Pa which stores object a is unable to return val = u of
which the version is lower than that of u∗ at txID = T .
Next, we look at the third possibility. Then txID ∉ oldT x. In addition, for object o, ctxC
does not specify a version or any speciﬁed version v is lower than vvi s ; in either case, vvi s
corresponds to val = v∗ at Po . According to Line 4 and Line 33 of Algorithm 10, when T reads
o at Po , u and u∗ are visible (i.e., in vi s) at Pa . Clearly, if T reads a at Pa before Pa replies to
async_checkV i s(a,u∗,∗), then Pa sends T to Po during async_checkV i s(a,u∗,∗) and Po
could have T ∈ oldT x when T reads o at Po , which gives a contradiction. Therefore, T must
read a after Pa replies to async_checkV i s(a,u∗,∗), i.e., after u∗ is visible. Thus according to
Line 19 of Algorithm 9, Pa must ﬁnd T ∈ oldT x when T reads a. Similarly, due to Pa ’s reply to
Po ’s call of async_checkV i s(a,u∗,∗), the ﬁrst time when Pa receives T must be also after u∗
is visible (while Pa invokes async_check(a,u1) for some version u1 after the version of u∗).
Then according to Line 16 of Algorithm 10, Pa pre-determines a version no smaller than the
version of u∗ for T , which contradicts the return value val =u of Pa .
Finally, we look at the ﬁrst possibility. txID ∈ oldT x. Since Po pre-determines val = v∗ for T ,
then either ctxC speciﬁes v∗ for object o or v∗ is visible the ﬁrst time when Po receives T . The
two cases are similar to the second and third possibilities, leading to contradictions against
the return value of Pa . As a result, we conclude that if w(a)u∗ →w(o)v∗ holds, then T cannot
have both r (a)u and r (o)v∗, which is equivalent to Lemma 9.
Proof of causal consistency. By contradiction. Suppose that some execution E violates causal
consistency. Then in E , some client C ’s local history cannot be totally ordered to satisfy
Deﬁnition 7. Clearly, without any read-only transaction, we can order all writes in a way that
respects relation→ deﬁned previously (which includes the relation of causality between
any two writes). Therefore C does at least one read-only transaction. In order to incorporate
C ’s read-only transactions, we extend the relation → deﬁned previously. Consider the set T X
of transactions that consist of all writes in E and all C ’s read-only transaction. For any two
transactions t x1 and t x2, we say that t x1 → t x2, if (1) t x1 and t x2 are two writes, t x1 is of a
lower version number than t x2 and t x1, t x2 write the same object; or (2) t x1 t x2; or (3) ∃
some t x3 ∈ T X such that t x1 → t x3 and t x3 → t x2.
Let tow be any ordering that respects relation→. We then add C ’s read-only transactions in
tow one by one. Since we suppose that E violates causal consistency, we let T be the ﬁrst
read-only transaction such that some tow exists which can include C ’s read-only transactions
before T but for any tow , C ’s read-only transactions up to and including T cannot be placed
in tow to satisfy Deﬁnition 7.
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Let A be the set of such ordering tow that can include C ’s read-only transactions before T and
let to1 be any ordering in A. We ﬁrst show that T must read at least two objects, the proof
of which is by contradiction. Suppose otherwise that RT = {r (a)u}. Let the last transaction
(which can be a read-only transaction or a write) done by C before T is α. Let the ﬁrst write
done by C after T is β. Then in any to1 where all C ’s read-only transactions before T are
included, either (1) w(a)u is before α, or (2) β is before w(a)u, or (3) w(a)u is between α and
β. In the third case, we put T immediately after w(a)u. In the second case, β→w(a)u does
not hold. (Suppose otherwise that β→ w(a)u holds. Then the logical timestamp l1 which
the client of w(a)u receives from Pa during w(a)u is higher than the logical timestamp l2
which C receives from the server that stores the object written by β during β. However, when
T reads a, the logical timestamp which C receives from Pa is at least l1, and as a result, the
value of l2 ≥ l1, a contradiction.) We move β and its successors of relation→ after w(a)u. The
resulting ordering is still in A. We then put T immediately after w(a)u. In the ﬁrst case, there
are two possibilities: (i) between w(a)u and α, there is some write w(a)u∗; (ii) between w(a)u
and α, there is no write w(a)u∗. For the latter, we put T immediately after α. For the former,
let w(a)u∗ be the ﬁrst write of object a after w(a)u in to1. Then w(a)u∗ →α does not hold.
(Suppose otherwise that w(a)u∗ →α holds. Then w(a)u∗ is in the variable ctx maintained
by C before T starts. As a result, when T reads a, Pa sees w(a)u∗ ∈ ctxC and thus returns
a value with a version number no smaller than that u∗, a contradiction.) We move w(a)u∗
and its successors of relation → after α. The resulting ordering is still in A. We then put T
immediately after α.
Now we continue in the case where T reads at least two different objects. We consider Lemma
9 as a property of any read-transaction. Based on Lemma 9 and to1, we construct another
ordering to2 ∈ A as follows. For any r (a)u ∈RT , consider Wu be the set of such write w(o)v∗
that (1) in to1, some write w(a)u∗ is after w(a)u and w(o)v∗ is after w(a)u∗ and (2) r (o)v∗ ∈
RT . If Wu =, then we do nothing for r (a)u; otherwise, we let w(a)u∗ be the ﬁrst write of a
after w(a)u in to1. We then augment Wu by adding the precedence of each element according
to relation →, and we do this until no more write after w(a)u∗ in to1 can be added. Let ss
be the subsequence of to1 which contains all writes in Wu . We move ss immediately before
w(a)u∗.
Below we verify that the resulting ordering tou (after the construction for r (a)u) falls in A.
By the construction based on relation →, tou still respects relation →. Thus we only need
to verify that C ’s read-only transactions before T can be placed in tou . We know that in to1,
all C ’s read-only transactions before T can be placed. Then while moving ss, we may move
some of C ’s read-only transactions as well. Namely, for any to1, given a way to put all C ’s
read-only transactions before T so that they are legal, we include in Wu the last read-only
transaction r txlast done by C before T that is put after w(a)u
∗; then we still augment Wu by
adding the precedence of each element according to relation→ and stop the addition when
no more write or read-only transaction after w(a)u∗ in to1 can be added. Now consider ss
as the subsequence of to1 which contains all writes and read-only transactions in Wu . Since
w(a)u∗r i ghtar rowr txlast does not hold, we still move ss immediately before w(a)u∗ and
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the resulting tou respects relation→. Thus if ss includes any read-only transaction, then in tou ,
the position of the read-only transaction is still legal. In addition, C ’s read-only transactions
that are put before w(a)u∗ remain unchanged. Therefore, tou ﬁnds a way to place all C ’s
read-only transactions before T and falls in A.
Since ss is only a subsequence of to1, the move of ss creates no new pair w(a)u and w(o)v∗
such that r (a)u,r (o)v∗ ∈RT and w(o)v∗ is after w(a)u∗ and w(a)u∗ is after w(a)u for some
w(a)u∗. Then after a ﬁnite number of moves, we can construct an ordering to2 ∈ A such
that for any r (a)u ∈RT , Wu =. We now turn to the placement of T in to2. Let α be C ’s last
transaction before T . Let β be C ’s ﬁrst write after T . Let wlast be the last write in to2 that
corresponds to some read in T . Since during the construction of to2, we move the positions of
some read-only transactions as well, after the construction of to2, we have also constructed
a way to place all C ’s read-only transactions before T in to2. For this placement, there are
three possibilities: (1) wlast is between α and β, (2) wlast is before α, and (3) wlast is after
β. We show that in all these possibilities, we can place T possibly after some rearrangement
so that all C ’s transactions up to and including T are legal, which gives a contradiction. In
the ﬁrst possibility, we place T after wlast and we ﬁnd all preceding writes of T correct, a
contradiction. In the second possibility, if there is any w(a)u∗ between w(a)u and α, then
according to Line 19 and Line 16 of Algorithm 10, no w(a)u∗ exists such that (1) w(a)u∗ →α
and (2) r (a)u ∈RT ; therefore we can move w(a)u∗ and its successors of relation→ after α in
to2; after the possible rearrangement, we place T after α and ﬁnd all preceding writes of T
correct, a contradiction. In the third possibility, for any r (a)u ∈RT , β→w(a)u does not hold.
We thus move β and its successors of relation → after wlast in to2; after the rearrangement,
we place T after wlast and ﬁnd all preceding writes of T correct, a contradiction. As T is able
to be placed in some ordering in A, we reach a contradiction against our assumption, and we
must therefore conclude that our algorithm A satisﬁes causal consistency.
3.5.2 Timestamp-based implementation
We present here some timestamp-based implementation of causally consistent transactional
storage to show that our impossibility results (Theorem 7 and Theorem 8) can be circumvented
under different assumptions on the underlying system. As we show later, the timestamp-based
implementation is invisible and the complexity of a server processing a client request is low,
w.l.o.g., we assume that the local computation at any server takes negligible time (compared
with communication delay) in our timestamp-based implementation.
Invisible fast read-only transactions
The algorithm B here relies on the assumption that all processes can access a global accurate
clock. The algorithm considered here is non-oblivious and thus takes advantage of accurate
timestamps. The description of B is as follows.
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• Before any client starts a transaction, the client accesses the clock and stamps the
transaction with the current time;
• Every client sends the accurate timestamp while requesting a transaction;
• If an operation writes a value to an object, then the server that stores the object attaches
the timestamp to the value;
• If an operation reads a value from an object, then the server that stores the object returns
the value with the highest timestamp which is still smaller than the timestamp of the
transaction. (If two or more values are attached with the same highest timestamp, then
we break the tie by returning the value written with the highest client ID.)
Each transaction induces one communication round and is thus fast. Each read-only trans-
action is also invisible. Algorithm B guarantees progress as the global accurate clock makes
progress.
Given the accurate global clock, B is correct when a transaction is not allowed to write more
than one object. Below is its proof of correctness (which is actually similar to the proof of
correctness of A ).
First, we construct an acyclic graph of all writes according to causality. If two writes are on
the same object, then we add a directed edge from the write with the lower timestamp to the
higher one. If two writes can happen at the same timestamp, then we augment timestamps by
breaking the tie using client IDs. After the addition, the graph is still acyclic. We consider all
possible topological sorts of the graph. We also deﬁne the relation→ between any two writes
w1,w2 as follows. If w1 → w2, then either w1 w2, or w1 and w2 are on the same object
while w1 is of a lower timestamp, or there exists w3 such that w1 →w3 and w3 →w2. Clearly,
relation→ captures the order between two writes in topological sorts.
Second, for each client C , if we add C ’s read-only transactions one by one, then either we
succeed in one topological sort, or we ﬁnd the ﬁrst transaction T such that all topological
sorts are incorrect. To examine C ’s read-only transactions, we augment relation→ by adding
(t x1, t x2) if at least one transaction between t x1 and t x2 is done by C and t x1 t x2, and
by transitivity. The relation is still acyclic. Suppose that for some client C , all topological
sorts are incorrect. Let T be the ﬁrst transaction such that all topological sorts are incorrect.
There are two possibilities: (1) T reads a single object; (2) T reads multiple objects. In the ﬁrst
possibility, let RT = {r (a)u}. In any topological sort where C ’s read-only transactions before T
are put legally, either some of C ’s transaction (a single-object write transaction or a read-only
transaction) done before T is put after w(a)u∗, or some of C ’s write done after T is put before
w(a)u. For the former, for any transaction t x done by C before T that is ordered after w(a)u∗
in a topological sort, w(a)u∗ → t x does not hold. (Suppose otherwise that w(a)u∗ → t x holds.
If t x writes a, by the deﬁnition of→, t x is of a higher timestamp than a. If t x reads a, still by
the deﬁnition of→, there exists some write w(a)u∗∗ of a timestamp no smaller than w(a)u∗
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such that t x returns u∗∗. If t x neither writes nor reads a, again by the deﬁnition of→, either
w(a)u∗ ends before t x starts (by program-order causality) or u∗ is readable at the server
before t x starts (by read-from causality). In any of the cases above, T which follows t x should
return a value of a with a higher timestamp than that of u. A contradiction.) As a result, we
can move t x as well as its precedence according to relation → before the ﬁrst w(a)u∗ after
w(a)u in a given topological sort, and reach a contradiction: the resulting sort respects →
and T can be put immediately before w(a)u∗ to be legal. For the latter, for any write w done
by C after T that is ordered before w(a)u in a given topological sort, w → w(a)u does not
hold. (Suppose otherwise that w →w(a)u holds. Then the timestamp of w is lower than that
of w(a)u. Therefore the timestamp of T is also lower than that of w(a)u, which leads T to
be unable to return u. A contradiction.) As a result, we can move w as well as its successors
according to relation→ after w(a)u, and reach a contradiction: the resulting sort respects→
and T can be put immediately after w(a)u to be legal.
Thus we exclude the ﬁrst possibility. In the second possibility, we ﬁrst prove that every
transaction T satisﬁes Lemma 10. Then given a topological sort, given any read r (a)u ∈RT ,
we collect set Wu of such write w(o)v∗ that (1) w(a)u is of a smaller timestamp than w(a)u∗
and w(a)u∗ is ordered before w(o)v∗ in the sort, and (2) r (o)v∗ ∈RT . We also collect in Wu
the read-only transactions of C done before T which are put after any w(a)u∗ of a higher
timestamp than w(a)u in the sort. Any such read-only transaction t x satisﬁes w(a)u∗ → t x
does not hold for any w(a)u∗. We move Wu as well as its precedence according to relation
→ before the ﬁrst w(a)u∗ after w(a)u in the sort. In the resulting sort, all C ’s read-only
transactions before T are put legally.
Lemma 10 (A correct snapshot for the timestamp-based implementation). Let T be any
transaction that contains at least two reads. Given any two reads r (a)u,r (o)v∗ ∈RT , if ∃w(a)u∗
such that w(a)u is of a smaller timestamp than w(a)u∗, then w(a)u∗ →w(o)v∗ does not hold.
Proof of Lemma 10. By contradiction. Suppose that w(a)u∗ → w(o)v∗ holds. Then before
w(o)v∗ starts, a write on object a with a timestamp no lower than the timestamp of w(a)u∗
has ended. Therefore when T starts, since the global accurate clock is accessible to every
process, the server which stores object a has a value u∗∗ with a timestamp no lower than the
timestamp of w(a)u yet lower than the timestamp of T . This leads T to return u∗∗ rather than
u, a contradiction.
Given a topological sort, we repeat the procedure above from the ﬁrst write which corresponds
to a read in RT to the last one. We then obtain a topological sort which respects→, where every
read-only transaction done by C before T is legal and no write w(a)u∗ of a higher timestamp
than w(a)u is before w(o)v∗ for any r (a)u,r (o)v∗ ∈ RT . Let α be C ’s last transaction before
T . Let β be C ’s ﬁrst write after T . There are three possibilities in the resulting sort for the
position of the last write wlast which corresponds to a read in RT : (1) wlast is before α; (2)
wlast is between α and β; and (3) wlast is after β. In the ﬁrst case, if there is any write we of
the same object as wlast between wlast and α, then we further move the ﬁrst we (which is
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between wlast and α) as well as its successors according to relation → after α; then we put
T immediately after α, a contradiction. In the second case, we simply put T after wlast , a
contradiction. In the third case, by the use of accurate global clock, β→wlast does not hold;
we can move β as well as its successors according to relation → after wlast ; then we put T
immediately after wlast , a contradiction. Therefore, B is correct given the access to a global
accurate clock.
As a result, B shows that Theorem 8 can be circumvented given the access to a global clock
and the use of non-oblivious algorithms. In addition, as shown by B, the access to the global
clock guaranteed for clients is sufﬁcient for the circumvention of Theorem 8. On the other
hand, it is also necessary: the proof of Theorem 8 holds if only servers can access the global
clock (while a client request is still oblivious to its local clock). Although the access to a global
accurate clock circumvents the impossibility result of Theorem 8, the proof of Theorem 8 still
holds even if the global accurate clock is accessible to all processes.
Invisible fast read-write transactions
We next show that given the access to a global accurate clock and an upper bound u on the
communication delay, we can adapt our algorithmB above towork for read-write transactions.
In other words, given the access to a global accurate clock and an upper bound u on the
communication delay, Theorem 7 can be circumvented. Let us call the modiﬁed algorithm by
B+. Now given the upper bound u, a client imposes that every transaction is executed for a
time period of 2u; when returning a value to some read of an object o, instead of comparing
with the timestamp t s of the transaction in question, the server compares the timestamp of
each value of o with t s−2u.
Now to prove the correctness of B+, we deﬁne relation → between any two transactions
t x1, t x2 which contain a non-empty set of writes as follows. If t x1 → t x2, then either t x1 t x2,
or t x1 and t x2 have their write set overlap on the same object while the timestamp t s1 of t x1
and t s2 of t x2 satisfy t s1 < t s2−2u, or there exists t x3 such that t x1 → t x3 and t x3 → t x2. The
proof starts with all topological sorts of a graph that represents the relation → deﬁned here
and continues with the examination of each transaction that includes a non-empty set of
reads done by a client. The proof of B+ is similar to that of B and therefore omitted.
3.6 Storage Assumptions
For presentation simplicity, we made an assumption that servers store disjoint sets of objects.
In this section, we show how our results apply to the non-disjoint case. A general model of
servers’ storing objects can be deﬁned as follows. Each server still stores a set of objects, but
no server stores all objects. For any server S, there exists object o such that S does not store
o. In this general model, when a client reads or writes some object o, the client can possibly
request multiple servers all of which store o. Below we ﬁrst adapt progress property to the
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general model in a way that is decoupled from the underlying distributed protocols of the
storage system. Then w.l.o.g., we may assume that when client C accesses o, C requests all
servers that store o.
3.6.1 Weak progress property
As promised previously, we adapt our previous deﬁnition of progress property (Deﬁnition 9
and Deﬁnition 10) to the general model of servers’ storing objects. As shown in Deﬁnition
18 and Deﬁnition 19, weak progress only guarantees that if one write causally precedes the
other, then the former one is eventually overwritten. Such weakness in the deﬁnition is to
avoid any speciﬁc assumption on the underlying distributed protocol of the storage system in
the general model. In the general model, a distributed protocol may choose an arbitrary rule
in deciding which value is visible depending on the application (different from the application
of the natural rule that the last writer wins under the previous assumption), especially for
causally related writes. Hence it is necessary to deﬁne weak progress to cover all such rules. As
a result of weaker progress guarantee in the general model, as we show later, the constructions
of executions for the proofs of two impossibility results are more speciﬁc than those for our
previous proofs.
Deﬁnition 18 (Weak eventual visibility). If we say a write w in transaction T is weakly even-
tually visible, then there exists some ﬁnite time τx,v such that for any transaction Tr x which
starts no earlier than τx,v and has r (x)vnew ∈ RTr x , vnew = ⊥ and any transaction Twx such
that w(x)vnew ∈ WTwx does not satisfy Twx  T . (Here Twx can be T , and if T is the only
transaction so far, then Twx = T .)
Deﬁnition 19 (Weak progress). A causally consistent storage guarantees weak progress if
every write is weakly eventually visible.
3.6.2 Impossibility of fast transactions
We sketch here the correctness of Theorem 7 in the general model. In the general model, the
proof of Theorem 7 still constructs a contradictory execution Eimp . The construction goes by
induction as shown in Proposition 6. To satisfy causality, by induction, there is a sequence of
an inﬁnite number of messages in the construction Eimp , which thus violates progress and
shows the correctness of this impossibility result. We sketch below only the construction of
Eimp . The proof of the violation of progress is the same as the previous proof of Theorem 7
and is then omitted.
Different from the previous construction, the construction of Eimp starts with no transaction.
Client Cw writes a ﬁrst transaction that writes to all objects and reads no object. Suppose that
at time tstar t , the writes of the ﬁrst transaction are all visible. After tstar t , Cw does a second
transaction WOT that writes to all objects (to have the transaction span multiple servers) and
reads no object at time tw . All other clients do no transaction. Similarly with the previous
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construction, the construction of Eimp goes as long as at least one write of WOT is not visible.
Proposition 6 (Induction under the general storage assumption). After tw , at least one server
must send one message. Let M0 be the set of messages which a server sends after tw . For the ﬁrst
server which receives a message in M0, denote the message by m0. Thus we construct Eimp to
send m0 after tw .
For any positive number k, assume that in Eimp, m0,m1, . . . ,mk−1 have been sent. Then after
the reception of mk−1, at least one server must send one message. Let Mk be the set of messages
which a server sends after the reception of mk−1. For the ﬁrst server which receives a message in
Mk, denote the message by mk. Thus we construct Eimp to send mk after the reception of mk−1.
Proof of Proposition 6. Proposition 6 clearly consists of the base case and the inductive step.
The proof of the base case is by contradiction. Suppose that after tw , no server sends any
message and eventually all writes of WOT are visible. Then we can construct an execution E+
based on Eimp . In E+, we let client Cr do a read-only transaction ROT that reads all objects,
send a message to each server, and receive at most one message from each server. We schedule
the message exchange betweenCr and all servers according to Deﬁnition 11. By weak eventual
visibility, in some execution E+, ROT returns all values written byWOT . We call this execution
by E . In E , for each server S, let mresp,S be the message which Cr receives from S. Let ss be
the set of such server S that mresp,S reveals some version written by WOT . Let R be a server in
ss. We then construct an execution Enew based on E . In Enew , we let client Cr do a read-only
transaction ROT that reads all objects while we change the schedule of message exchange
between Cr and all servers. More speciﬁcally, we let R receive Cr ’s message at the same time
as in E but different from E , we let all servers except for R receive Cr ’s message at some same
time before tw , and the rest of the schedule follows Deﬁnition 11. Therefore, R still replies to
Cr the same message as inE , which reveals some version written by WOT ; however, all servers
except for R reply with messages that reveal some version written by the ﬁrst transaction of
Cw . As a result, the return value of ROT in Enew breaks causal consistency, which leads to a
contradiction. We then conclude the correctness of the base case; i.e., after tw , at least one
server sends some message before eventually all writes of WOT are visible, and we construct
Eimp to send m0 after tw .
The proof of the inductive step is similar and also by contradiction. Suppose that after the
reception of mk−1, no server sends any message and eventually all writes of WOT are visible.
We construct an execution E+ based on Eimp , of which the construction is similar to that
in the base case. By weak eventual visibility, in some execution E+, ROT returns all values
written by WOT . We still call this execution by E , deﬁne mresp,S for each server S, and use
the notation ss. Let P be the sender of mk−1. If P ∈ ss, then we let R = P ; otherwise, R is a
server in ss. We then construct an execution Enew based on E . In Enew , we let client Cr do a
read-only transaction ROT that reads all objects while we change the schedule of message
exchange between Cr and all servers. More speciﬁcally, we let {R,P } receive Cr ’s message
at the same time as in E but different from E , we let all servers except for {R,P } receive Cr ’s
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message at some same time between the reception of mk−2 (if there is one) and the reception
of mk−1, and the rest of the schedule follows Deﬁnition 11. In addition, if mk−1 is not sent to
R, then we delay mk−1 from being received in Enew ; otherwise, we allow mk−1 to be received
at the same time as in E . Then {R,P } still replies to Cr the same message as inE , which reveals
some version written by WOT . However, according to the correctness of case k−1 (i.e., the
assumption for the correctness of case k), all servers except for {R,P } are unable to distinguish
between whether message mk−1 is sent or not. As a result, all servers except for {R,P } reply
with messages that reveal some version written by the ﬁrst transaction of Cw . The return value
of ROT in Enew breaks causal consistency, which leads to a contradiction. We thus conclude
that after the reception of mk−1, at least one server sends some message before eventually all
writes of WOT are visible, and we construct Eimp to send mk after the reception of mk−1.
3.6.3 Impossibility of fast invisible transactions
We sketch here the correctness of Theorem 8 in the general model. In the general model,
the proof of Theorem 8 still goes by contradiction and we use the same assumption for
contradiction, Proposition 4, recalled in Proposition 7. The notations D, D1, S1, M1, t0, T2 and
D2, S2, M2 follow the same deﬁnitions. The main steps remain the same: (1) we construct two
executions E1 and E2 following Proposition 7; (2) we construct execution E1,2 based on E1 and
E2; and (3) we show that E1,2 violates causal consistency. Our sketch below focuses on the
construction of E1, E2 and E1,2.
Proposition 7 (Assumption for contradiction). For any execution E1 which schedules S1 by fast
transactions, for some D2, some execution E2 where (1) D1 does not invoke S1 but D2 invokes S2
is the same as E1 except for the message exchange events M1 and M2.
Different from the previous construction, the construction of E1 (E2) starts with no transaction.
Some client C ∉D writes, ﬁrstly, each object once. Suppose that at time tstar t , these writes are
all visible. Then we construct E1 (E2) starting from tstar t . We consider a read-only transaction
ROT which reads all objects. For i ∈ {1,2}, in Ei , every invocation in Si of ROT starts at the
same time t0 and ends at the same time T2. Every message which a client in Di sends (to a
server) arrives at some same time T1. For each server, after T1 and as long as this server is
still about to send a message to a client in Di , the server receives no message from any other
server. This time period for each server P while P receives no message from any other server
is the same in E1 and E2. Each client in Di receives at most one message from each server and
returns ROT at time T2.
After T2, C writes again all objects. Let o1,o2, . . . ,onob j be the set of all objects. Then C executes
writes w = w(oi )vi , i = 1,2, . . . ,nob j sequentially, which establishes ∀k ∈ Z, 2 ≤ k ≤ nob j ,
w(ok−1)vk−1  w(ok)vk . All writes in w are eventually visible. Let τ be the time when
v1,v2, . . . ,vnob j are visible in both E1 and E2.
W.l.o.g., assume that D1\D2 = . After τ, in both E1 and E2, one same client Cr in D1\D2 = 
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requests the same read-only transaction ROT that reads all objects. (In E1, Cr has requested
ROT once, while in E2, Cr has not.) We schedule these transactions according to Deﬁnition 11
and moreover, any message which Cr send to a server arrives at the same time. In either E1 or
E2, for each server S, let mresp,S be the message which Cr receives from S. Let ss be the set of
such server S that mresp,S reveals some version written by some write in w . Let R be a server
in ss. Note that ss\{R} = . LetΠ be the set of all servers. The construction of E1,2 is the same
as that in the previous proof of Theorem 8 by substituting {R} for PY andΠ\{R} for PX , which
we sketch below.
The execution E1,2 is based on E1 and E2 starting from t0. Every client in D1∪D2 requests
ROT that reads all objects at time t0, Π\{R} receives the messages which D1 sends at the
same time T1 as in E1, and R receives the messages which D2 sends at the same time as in
E2. (Clearly, those messages which D1\D2 sends to R are delayed as well as those messages
which D2\D1 sends to Π\{R}.) Therefore, by Proposition 7, Π\{R} and R reply to a client in
D in the same way as in E1 and E2 respectively. The critical messages which Π\{R} sends to
Cr ∈D1\D2 are received at the same time as in E1. IfΠ\{R} sends a non-critical message to Cr ,
then the non-critical message is delayed after the construction of E1,2 completes. The rest of
the schedule regarding messages between servers is the same as E1 (E2). Furthermore, after
T2, C issues w sequentially which is the same as E1 (E2).
After τ, R receives a message from Cr (a message previously delayed) at the same time as in E2
while Cr requests ROT . By τ, R is unable to distinguish between E1,2 and E2 and thus by the
time when R sends a critical message toCr , R is still unable to distinguish between E1,2 and E2.
As a result, R sends the same mresp,R to Cr in E1,2 as E2, which reveals some version written
by some write in w . We schedule Cr to receive mresp,R at the same time as in E2 as well. Since
Cr has not requested ROT before, the return value of ROT solely depends on these critical
messages fromΠ. However, the critical messages received fromΠ\{R} are sent before w occurs
and therefore may only reveal versions written byC in the ﬁrst pass of writes to all objects. The
return value of Cr ’s ROT then violates causal consistency. This gives a contradiction, showing
that Proposition 7 is incorrect and therefore Theorem 8 is correct in the general model.
3.7 Related Work
3.7.1 Causal consistency
Ahamad et al. [42] were the ﬁrst to propose causal consistency for a memory accessed by
read/write operations. Raynal et al. [43] formally deﬁned causal transactions. Bouajjani
et al. [117] formalized the veriﬁcation of causal consistency. A large number of systems
[35, 118, 37, 36, 38, 41] implemented transactional causal consistency, while some [35] deﬁned
formally and strengthened causal consistency to include convergence property, which concerns
the conﬂict resolution of two updates that are not causally related. Our results also hold for
this strengthened causal consistency.
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In the literature, extended notions of causal consistency are also proposed, considering
non-transactional systems. These notions include real time causal consistency [119], which
additionally respects the real-time order of any two operations. To formalize the consistency
model of replication schemes (an issue orthogonal to the problem considered in this chapter),
Attiya et al. [120] and Xiang and Vaidya [121] proposed related notions of causal consistency
based on the events that are executed at the servers (rather than the histories of operations
issued by the clients). More speciﬁcally, Attiya et al. [120] deﬁned observable causal consis-
tency for servers where (1) the program-order causality relation is tracked between clients’
operations at the same server, but (2) there is no read-from causality relation deﬁned and (3)
the concurrent writes to the same object at different servers are resolved. Xiang and Vaidya
[121] introduced replica-centric causal consistency where the causality relation is between
the following two types of events at the servers: (1) the update issued by a server (meaning
that the server receives the update from a client and then starts to propagate the update to
other servers) and (2) the update applied by a server (meaning that the server receives the
propagation of the update from another server).
3.7.2 Causal read-only transactions
Most implementations do not provide fast (read-only) transactions. COPS [35] and Eiger [36]
provide a two-round protocol for read-only transactions. Read-only transactions in Orbe [37],
GentleRain [38], Cure [40] and Occult [41] can induce more than one-round communication.
Read-only transactions in ChainReaction [118] can induce more than one-round communica-
tion as well as abort and retry, resulting in more communication. Eiger-PS [44] provides fast
transactions and satisﬁes process-ordered serializability [44], stronger than causal consistency;
yet in addition to the request-response of a transaction, each client periodically communicates
with every server. Our Theorem 7 explains Eiger-PS’s additional communication. COPS-SNOW
[44] provides fast read-only transactions but writes can only be performed outside a trans-
action; moreover, any read-only transaction in COPS-SNOW is visible, complying with our
Theorem 7 and Theorem 8. If each data center is modelled as a process which stores a copy of
all objects, then a transactional store, SwiftCloud [39], can provide fast read-only transactions
(between a data center and a client). However, in addition to the request-response of a trans-
action, a data center can send a client a stream of update notiﬁcations [39]. Our Theorem 7
explains at least one of the two designs (the full copy and out-of-scope communication) is
necessary.
3.7.3 Impossibility results
Existing impossibility results on storage systems have typically considered stronger consis-
tency properties than causality or stronger progress conditions than eventual visibility. Brewer
[106] conjectured the CAP theorem that no implementation guarantees consistency, and avail-
ability despite network partitions. Gilbert and Lynch [107] formalized and proved Brewer’s
conjecture in partially synchronous systems. They formalized consistency by atomic objects
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[105] (which satisfy linearizability [104], stronger than causal consistency). Considering a
storage implemented by data centers (clusters of servers), if any value written is immediately
visible to the reads at the same data center (to which the write request is sent), and some client
can access two objects at two data centers respectively, then Roohitavaf et al. [122] proved
the impossibility of ensuring causal consistency and availability despite network partitions.
Their proof (as well as the proof of the CAP Theorem) relies on message loss in face of network
partition. On the contrary, our impossibility results do not assume message loss, and thus are
not implied by their proof.10 Lu et al. [44] proved the SNOW theorem, saying that fast strict
serializable transactions [112, 113] (satisfying stronger consistency than causal consistency)
are impossible. As strict serializability is stronger than causal consistency, the SNOW theorem
does not imply our results.
The impossibility result, the CAC theorem [119] states that no implementation guarantees one-
way convergence, availability, and any consistency stronger than real time causal consistency
assuming inﬁnite local clock events and arbitrary message loss, in the model where each pair
of processes can communicate. (By contrast, in our model, we assume two clients do not
communicate.) Here one-way convergence [119] is a progress property conditioned on the
communication between each pair of processes (rather than a progress property of a client’s
read, different from our deﬁnition of eventual visibility). This turns the CAC theorem an
impossibility result for replication schemes (an issue orthogonal to the problem considered in
this chapter). As mentioned earlier, Attiya et al. [120] and Xiang and Vaidya [121] formalized
some related notions of causal consistency in the context of replication schemes. According
to their notions, Attiya et al. [120] proved that a replicated store implementing multi-valued
registers cannot satisfy any consistency strictly stronger than observable causal consistency,
while Xiang and Vaidya [121] proved that for replica-centric causal consistency, it is necessary
to track down writes.
3.7.4 Transactional memory
In the context of transactional memory, if the implementation of a read-only operation (in a
transaction) writes a base shared object, then the read-only operation is said to be visible and
invisible otherwise [123]. Known impossibility results on invisible reads of TMassume stronger
consistency than causal consistency. Attiya et al. [124] showed that no TM implementation
ensures strict serializability, disjoint-access parallelism [124]11 and uses invisible reads, the
proof of which shows that if writes are frequent, then a read-only transaction can not terminate
in a ﬁnite number of steps. Peluso et al. [125] considered any consistency that respects the
real-time order of transactions (which causal consistency does not necessarily respect), and
proved a similar impossibility result. Perelman et al. [126] proved an impossibility result for a
10Although the CAP theorem can be considered as an impossibility result of a strongly consistent replication
system, as we do not assume message loss, even in our extended model of replicated storage systems, our
impossibility results are not implied by the CAP theorem or its proof.
11Disjoint-access parallelism [124] requires two transactions accessing different application objects to also
access different base objects.
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multi-version TM implementation which provides invisible read-only transactions, ensures
strict serializability and maintains only a necessary number of versions; the proof of this
impossibility result focuses on garbage collection of versions [126]. None of the results or
proofs above imply our impossibility results.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
Our impossibility results establish fundamental limitations on the performance on transac-
tional storage systems. The ﬁrst impossibility basically says that fast read-only transactions
are impossible in a general setting where writes can also be performed within transactions.
The second impossibility says that in a setting where all transactions are read-only, they can
be fast, but they need to visible. A system like COPS-SNOW [44] implements such visible
read-only transactions that leave traces when they execute, and these traces are propagated
on the servers during writes. Recall that we provide in Section 3.5 a variant algorithm where
these traces are propagated outside writes, demonstrating that the complexity of these traces
does not arise due to writes.
Clearly, our impossibilities apply to causal consistency and hence to any stronger consistency
criteria. They hold without assuming any message or node failures and hence hold for failure-
prone systems. In Section 3.3 and Section 3.4, for presentation simplicity, we assumed that
servers store disjoint sets of objects, but our impossibility results hold without this assumption
as shown in Section 3.6. Some design choices could circumvent these impossibilities like
imposing a full copy of all objects on each server (as in SwiftCloud [39]), or periodic communi-
cation between servers and clients (as in Eiger-PS [44]). Each of these choices clearly hampers
scalability.
We considered an asynchronous system where messages can be delayed arbitrarily and there
is no global clock. One might ask what happens with synchrony assumptions. If we assume a
fully synchronous system where message delays are bounded and all processes can access a
global accurate clock, then our impossibility results can both be circumvented. We give such a
timestamp-based algorithm in Section 3.5. If we consider however a system where communi-
cation delays are unbounded and all processes can access a global accurate clock, then only
our Theorem 7 holds (while our timestamp-based algorithm can still circumvent Theorem 8).
In this sense, message delay is key to the impossibility of fast read-only transactions, but not
to the requirement that they need to be visible in the restricted model where all transactions
are read-only (and writes are outside the scope of a transaction).
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4 The Complexity of Optimistic Secure
Transactions1
4.1 Introduction
In fair computation (of a deterministic function) [48, 6], n parties possess n pieces of informa-
tion and need to output the function of these n pieces of information (the inputs) atomically.
Namely, a party obtains the output of the function if and only if the other n−1 parties obtain
the same output. A prominent example is auctions: after n parties offer a price for some item,
they wish to determine the highest price and the winner without ambiguity, e.g., when more
than one party claims to win the item. A solution is the fair computation of the n bids (prices).
The difﬁculty of fair computation stems from the fact that a party might be malicious (dishon-
est) and try to obtain other parties’ inputs, twist other parties’ output, or arbitrarily delay other
parties from obtaining an output. Still, honest parties should eventually obtain an output
in a fair manner: they should all obtain the function of the n inputs, or all obtain a speciﬁc
value⊥ (denoted abort in [48]). In an asynchronous context, rather than waiting forever for
some message, any party may decide to stop the computation. Such ability of a party to stop
at any time without jeopardizing fairness has been called timely termination [48]. As a matter
of fact, fair computation is in general impossible without a trusted third party [50]. Yet, this
third party is not needed in every execution of a fair computation protocol.
Optimistic fair computation stipulates that the third party does not need to be invoked if all n
parties are honest [48, 6, 128]. An execution where n honest parties output without invoking
the third party is called an optimistic execution [48, 128]. Given that cheating is seldom and
the third party is considered a bottleneck, optimism is practically appealing. To claim true
practicality, however, optimistic executions should be efﬁcient. To be speciﬁc, the number of
messages exchanged among n honest parties (which compute the function without resorting
to the third party) should not be prohibitive. Until our work (presented in this chapter), the
optimal number of messages was unknown.
1Postprint version of the article published in DISC 2016: Rachid Guerraoui and Jingjing Wang. “Optimal Fair
Computation” [127]
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We prove in this chapter that +2n−3 is the optimal number of messages that an optimistic
execution of optimistic fair computation may achieve in the presence of n−1 potentially mali-
cious parties in an asynchronous network, where  is the length of the shortest sequence that
contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences [129]. Given recent results in combi-
natorics [58, 59, 60, 130], the optimal number of messages for optimistic fair computation is 4
for n = 2, n2+1 for 3≤n ≤ 7, and asymptoticallyΘ(n2) for n ≥ 8.2
The main idea behind our proof of the +2n−3 lower bound is the identiﬁcation of a decision
propagation pattern according to which an honest party reaches an agreement with the others.
The decision propagation occurs when some party decides to stop the computation. The
pattern can be between any two parties P and Q. To get an intuition, consider an optimistic
execution E , let event EP =“P receives message mP” and let event EQ =“Q receives message
mQ”. Let e¯ be the complement of an event e. To ensure timely termination in an asynchronous
network, an honest party P (Q)’s stop could result from E¯P (E¯Q ). However, a malicious P ’s
stop can impose an honest Q’s stop by pretending E¯P . If when P and Q complete E , EP
occurs before EQ and Q does not receive any message between EP and EQ , then before EQ
happens,Q is unable to distinguishwhetherEP or E¯P occurs. As a result, maliciousP ’s decision
may propagate to honest Q here. To prevent fairness from being jeopardized by malicious
propagation, in the context of possibly n−1 malicious parties, every party should participate
in this propagation so that none has a chance to pretend being honest.
This yields a subsequence of n events EP (one for each party P ) and n messages (whose
destinations are the n parties) in E . Clearly, the order of the parties does not matter and
therefore, any permutation of the n events must occur as a subsequence in E . Hence we
establish a relation between the least number ofmessages of an optimistic execution and , the
length of the shortest sequence that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences.
Our lower bound on the number of messages is tight in the following sense. We present an
(+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme of some function f given a shortest
permutation sequence s. Our protocol, where the n parties are honest and compute without
the third party, consists of three phases: (a) the n parties send veriﬁable encryption [133] of
their n inputs respectively, in case they recover those inputs (if needed) in the non-optimistic
execution, which deﬁnes the ﬁrst n messages; (b) the n parties exchange − 2 messages
deﬁned by s; and (c) the n parties exchange the concatenation of the n inputs, which deﬁnes
the last n−1 messages. The −2 messages m1m2 . . .m−2 in phase (b) have their sources
and destinations deﬁned by the sequence s = s1s2 . . . s as follows. The party represented by
symbol s j is the source of mj−1 for j = 2, . . . ,−1, and the destination of mj−2 for j = 3,4, . . . ,.
(s1 is the source of the last message m0 of phase (a) and s2 is the destination of m0.) When a
party resorts to T in a non-optimistic execution, T follows the idea of decision propagation to
2Newey [58] (and then many others [59, 60, 130, 131, 132]) studied the length  of the shortest permutation
sequence. Although Newey [58] showed that = 3 for n = 2, and = n2−2n+4 for 3≤ n ≤ 7, the exact  for n ≥ 8
is still considered as an open problem [59, 60]. Up until now, the best upper bound is n2− 73n+ 193  for n ≥ 7 [60],
while a lower bound of  is of the form n2−cn7/4+ for some constant c and some > 0 [130].
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decide an output. The pattern is the same as shown in our proof of the lower bound so that
the number of messages in every optimistic execution is minimal.
As we will explain in Section 5, many results have been published on problems related to
fair computation [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56]. None implies our lower bound. On the other hand,
our (+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme can be used to implement fair
exchange of certain digital signatures (including Schnorr signatures [134], DSS signatures [135],
Fiat-Shamir signatures [136], Ong-Schnorr signatures [137], GQ signatures [138]). Thus, our
scheme is also a message-optimal optimistic fair exchange scheme [48]. Moreover, combined
with our proof of the lower bound, this optimistic fair exchange scheme of digital signatures
also implies that +2n−3 is the optimal number of messages for optimistic fair contract
signing [54].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents our general model and
deﬁnes optimistic fair computation. Section 4.3 presents our lower bound on the number of
messages. Section 4.4 presents our (+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme.
Section 4.5 discusses related work.
4.2 Model and Deﬁnitions
4.2.1 The parties
We consider a setΩ of n parties P1,P2, . . . ,Pn (sometimes also denoted by P , Q). These parties
are all interactive in the sense that they can communicate with each other by exchanging
messages. All parties are computationally-bounded [139] in the sense that they run in time
polynomial in some security parameter s.3
In addition to the n parties, we also assume a trusted third party T . T follows the protocol
assigned to it. The communication with T is such that when T is communicating with Pi ,
Pj needs to wait for Pj ’s turn to communicate with T for any two parties Pi ,Pj ∈ Ω, i , j ∈
{1,2, . . . ,n}. We assume that T is also computationally bounded.
At most n−1 parties can be malicious. A malicious party could deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol assigned to it. The malicious party could interact arbitrarily with the others as well as
T . For example, a malicious party may drop certain messages. A party that crashes at some
point in time is considered as a malicious party that drops all the messages from that point.
Malicious parties may also collude. (The goal of malicious parties and their collusion can
be breaking fairness, e.g., to obtain an output for themselves and to prevent an output to an
honest party. Fairness is deﬁned formally later in Deﬁnition 22.)
Communication channels do not modify, inject, duplicate or lose messages. Every message
3Hereafter, when we say that a probability is negligible, we mean that the probability is a negligible function g (s)
of the security parameter s; i.e., ∀c ∈N, ∃C ∈N such that ∀s >C , g (s)< 1sc . The deﬁnition of negligible function is
later repeated in Deﬁnition 24.
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sent eventually reaches its destination. Any modiﬁed, injected, duplicate, or lost message is
considered to be due to malicious parties. The delay on message transmission is ﬁnite but
unbounded. Messages could be reordered. Communication channels are authenticated and
made secure by Transport Layer Security [140]. No party can be masqueraded and no message
can be eavesdropped.
4.2.2 Fair computation
We consider the problem of optimistic fair computation in the classical sense of [6, 48]. The
problem involves a deterministic function f to be computed by the n parties. Function f is
agreed upon by the n parties in advance. We assume that f takes n strings x1 ∈ {0,1}1 ,x2 ∈
{0,1}2 , . . . ,xn ∈ {0,1}n as inputs and returns z ∈ {0,1}z as its output.
Deﬁnition 20 (Computation). A computation scheme for f is a collection (P1,P2, . . . ,Pn) of n
algorithms. The algorithms can carry out two interactive protocols:4
• Compute: Pi , i = 1,2, . . . ,n is initialized with a local input xi . If Pi ﬁnishes this protocol,
Pi returns a local output oi which can take the following values: z ∈ {0,1}z or ⊥. If
Compute is interrupted by Stop (which we introduce below), Compute returns the same
output as Stop.
• Stop: This is the protocol invoked by Pi when Pi wants to stop the computation. Pi
can invoke this protocol at any point in time. Pi obtains Pi ’s status of Compute so far
(i.e., the sequence of messages that have arrived at Pi so far) as a local input to Stop. Pi
makes a local output oi which can take the following values: z ∈ {0,1}z , or ⊥.
In the classical deﬁnition of fair computation [6], the problem is deﬁned in the simulatability
paradigm [5], which basically expresses a correct solution to fair computation in terms of
a simulation of the ideal process. In what follows, we recall the notion of the ideal process
(Deﬁnition 21), and then fair computation (Deﬁnition 22).
Deﬁnition 21 (Ideal process [6]). The ideal process for fair computation of f is a collection
(P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n ,U ) of n+1 deterministic algorithms. P¯i , i = 1,2, . . . ,n is initialized with a local
input xi . U is parameterized by f . P¯i sends message ai = xi to U . Messages are delivered
instantly. U returns a message mi to Pi according to Equation (4.1) as soon as a1,a2, . . . ,an
have arrived atU or one message of ⊥ has arrived atU . P¯i outputs whateverU returns to it.
∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n},mi =
⎧⎨
⎩
f (a1,a2, . . . ,an) if a1 = ⊥,a2 = ⊥, . . . ,an = ⊥
⊥ if ⊥∈ {a1,a2, . . . ,an}
(4.1)
4We consider Compute and Stop as such type of protocols that a party does not randomly choose whether to
send a message or not, or the party to whom a message is sent. Nevertheless, the contents of messages exchanged
are allowed to be randomized.
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The process is ideal in the sense that among n+1 parties, the information of a private input
is only exposed to the universally trusted U . We explain the meaning of this universal trust
when we present Deﬁnition 22. In Deﬁnition 22, collusion between malicious parties is
represented as malicious parties controlled by an adversarial algorithmA . In this case,A also
controls the communication in the sense that A can delay messages arbitrarily. In addition,
Deﬁnition 22 distinguishes between the case where all parties are honest, for which we deﬁne
the completeness property, and the case where at least one party is malicious, for which we
deﬁne the fairness property. We remark that the fairness property here encompasses both
fairness and privacy. As shown by Deﬁnition 22, even malicious parties who try to obtain other
parties’ private inputs do not learn any information beyond whatever an honest party can, i.e.,
whatever is revealed by the computation result of the function.
Deﬁnition 22 (Fair computation5). A computation scheme α solves fair computation for f
[6] if it satisﬁes the following properties:
• Fairness: for any e ∈N,1≤ e ≤ n−1 and any e malicious parties Pd1 ,Pd2 , . . . ,Pde , for any
computationally bounded algorithm A that controls the e malicious parties6, there
exists a computationally bounded algorithm S that controls P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de
7 such
that for any x1,x2, . . . ,xn , OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are
computationally indistinguishable [141, 142];
• Termination: If an honest party Pi invokes Stop, then Pi eventually outputs.
• Completeness: ∀x1,x2, . . . ,xn , if P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all
parties output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn); if P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and some invokes Stop,
then either all parties output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn), or all parties output ⊥.
• Non-triviality: There is at least one execution in which P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and
none invokes Stop.
Assumptions and notations:
• w.l.o.g., Pd1 ,Pd2 , . . . ,Pde output nothing but A may output arbitrarily
8, and similarly,
P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de output nothing but S may output arbitrarily; and
5The original deﬁnition in [6] is ambiguous when all parties are honest: (1) if the asynchronous network delays
every message, then to ensure termination, every honest party should output ⊥ at some point in time; however, by
the original deﬁnition, all honest parties output z, except with negligible probability, which yields a contradiction;
and (2) if in a protocol, all parties send no message and only outputs⊥, then by the original deﬁnition, this protocol
also matches the ideal process, which however is a trivial protocol.
6A also plays the role of the asynchronous network as deﬁned in Section 4.2. The probability of the joint output
between honest parties and an adversarial algorithm is taken over the randomness of the adversarial algorithm.
7In the ideal process, S sees xd1 ,xd2 , . . . ,xde , may change ad1 ,ad2 , . . . ,ade and also sees md1 ,md2 , . . . ,mde but
S cannot see other messages from or toU , orU ’s internal state (which makesU universally trusted).
8The assumption that a malicious party outputs nothing is for deﬁnition only. In practice, a malicious party
may output arbitrarily.
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• OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) denotes the joint output of P1,P2, . . . ,Pn ,A when running α
for x1,x2, . . . ,xn , andOP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) denotes the joint output of P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n ,S
when running the ideal process for x1,x2, . . . ,xn .
Deﬁnition 23 (Optimistic fair computation). A fair computation scheme is optimistic [48] if it
satisﬁes the following property.
• Optimism: ∀x1,x2, . . . ,xn , if P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all
parties output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) without interacting with T .
When P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, P1,P2, . . . ,Pn carry out Compute only.
In this case, an optimistic execution is an execution of Compute, where every party ﬁnishes all
communication steps of Compute and outputs.
We focus on the class C of function f such that for any x1 ∈ {0,1}1 ,x2 ∈ {0,1}2 , . . . ,xn ∈
{0,1}n , given any n−1 out of n strings, there are at least two possibilities for the evaluation
of f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) considering all possibilities of the missing string (e.g., if x1,x2, . . . ,xn−1 are
given, then xn is the missing string). For a function f in the complement of C , a protocol
that solves optimistic fair computation can still be vulnerable to the following attack: a subset
of parties colludes, leaves with the evaluation of f immediately but an honest party outputs
⊥. In the literature [143, 144], fair protocols for the complement of C are considered, but
they ensure fairness different from Deﬁnition 21 and Deﬁnition 22 and are not the focus
here. We also assume that T does not have prior knowledge of x1,x2, . . . ,xn . Therefore no
computationally bounded algorithm, even with the help of T , is able to evaluate f from any
n−1 out of the n inputs of P1,P2, . . . ,Pn for any missing input with non-negligible probability.
We call this assumption the no prior knowledge of T .
4.3 Lower Bound
In this section, we prove our lower bound on the number of messages exchanged during an
optimistic execution of optimistic fair computation. We ﬁrst present an overview of our proof
and then formally prove our lower bound. Our proof of lower bound starts with preliminaries
(including a formal deﬁnition of indistinguishability) and follows the main idea presented in
the overview.
Recall that we consider those functions that cannot be evaluated by only a subset of n parties,
e.g., we do not consider constant functions. In addition, a scheme (or the Compute protocol
of a scheme) which sends no message, invokes Stop and outputs ⊥ only is excluded by the
non-triviality property (Deﬁnition 22). Thus the lower-bound is non-zero.
In Theorem 9, we express our lower bound in terms of n and , the length of the shortest
sequence that contains all permutations of n symbols as subsequences.
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Theorem 9 (Message complexity). For any function f ∈C , for any optimistic fair computation
scheme for f (for n parties, among which n−1 can be malicious), the n parties exchange at
least +2n−3 messages in every optimistic execution.
4.3.1 Proof overview and intuition
To have a better understanding of our proof of lower bound, we present an overview as well as
intuition which covers the main points of our proof. A detailed proof is presented later. To
prove Theorem 9, we count the number of messages in every optimistic execution. We view
every optimistic execution E as a sequence of messages ordered according to when they reach
their destinations respectively. We ﬁrst pinpoint two necessary messages in E , and then we
show that between these two messages, there must exist certain patterns of messages.
Intuitively, when starting E , no party knows anything about other parties’ inputs; there is a
border-line message m∗1 such that, after m
∗
1 reaches its destination, one and only one party
knows something about all the other parties’ inputs. If any honest party Pi ∈Ω stops before
m∗1 arrives at its destination, then Pi has no hope of outputting z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) even with
the help of T , by the no prior knowledge of T .
By the end of E , every party receives sufﬁcient messages to compute z (by the optimism
property); there is another border-line message m∗2 such that, after m
∗
2 reaches its destination,
one and only one party has sufﬁcient messages to compute z. If any honest party Pi stops
after m∗2 arrives at its destination, Pi outputs z by the completeness property (with or without
the help of T ). Figure 4.1a illustrates the two messages.
(a) Pi outputs ⊥ if Pi stops before m∗1 ; and z if
Pi stops after m∗2
(b) Pi decides the same value v after Pj if Pi
stops between m∗1 and m
∗
2 .
Figure 4.1 – The output of Pi if Pi stops at some point in execution E
What Pi should output if it stops between m∗1 and m
∗
2 requires a closer look. Suppose that
when Pi wants to stop, Pi has not received some message mi . (We clarify some terminology
here. When we say that Pi has not received or does not receive some message mi , we mean
that Pi has not received mi but received every message with destination Pi before mi in E .
The terminology applies to any party hereafter.) When Pi wants to stop, either no other party
has decided an output (and then Pi can easily decide), or some party Pj ∈Ω, j = i has decided.
If Pj claims that it has not received message mj and mi is the ﬁrst message with destination Pi
after mj in E , then Pj ’s decision propagates to Pi . Clearly, if Pj is honest, then Pi has to decide
the same output as Pj (except with negligible probability) by the fairness property. Figure 4.1b
illustrates this agreement.
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This agreement between two parties induces a decision propagation pattern, which gives rise to
a certain pattern ofmessages inE . WhenPj is honest and stops due to themissingmessagemj ,
Pj needs to enforce Pi to stop and agree on their decisions. Thus in the sequence of messages
(ordered at the beginning of our proof overview), after a message mj with destination Pj , there
must exist a message mi with destination Pi so that Pj could enforce Pi on the same output if
(a) Pj does not receive mj , (b) Pj invokes Stop and outputs⊥, and (c) Pi does not receive mi
and invokes Stop.
Because n−1 parties can be malicious, we use this decision propagation pattern to build the
following scenario. The scenario also connects a party’s output before m∗1 and a party’s output
after m∗2 to the decision propagation. Suppose one party P1 stops before m
∗
1 arrives at its
destination and then the other n−1 parties stop following the decision propagation pattern
above: for k = 1, we denote by m1 the message which P1 has not received when P1 stops; then
for k = 2,3, . . . ,n, if there is a message mk in E that is the ﬁrst message with destination Pk
between mk−1 and m∗2 , then Pk stops when Pk has not received mk , and if not, Pk stops after
m∗2 arrives at its destination.
Clearly, if the pattern of the n messages whose destinations are P1,P2, . . . ,Pn does not exist
between m∗1 and m
∗
2 in E , then Pn would output z by the property of m
∗
2 . However, P1, as
well as other parties P2,P3, . . . ,Pk−1 for which messages m2,m3, . . . ,mk−1 exist, would output
⊥ by the property of m∗1 and decision propagation. As Pk−1 can be an honest party, this would
violate the fairness property. Therefore, the pattern of the n messages whose destinations are
n parties, or in fact any permutation of the n parties must exist as a subsequence of E between
between m∗1 and m
∗
2 .
Thus, the number of messages between m∗1 and m
∗
2 (inclusive) of E is at least . In the
meantime, in E , before m∗1 , there are at least n−1 messages to meet the deﬁnition of m∗1 and
after m∗2 , there are at least n−2 messages to meet the deﬁnition of m∗2 . We add together the
minimum numbers of messages before m∗1 , after m
∗
2 and between m
∗
1 and m
∗
2 , and then have
+2n−3 as the ﬁnal minimum number of messages during every optimistic execution.
4.3.2 Full proof of Theorem 9
We now give a detailed proof of Theorem 9. The full proof is organized as follows. First we give
the (weak) fairness property that we use repeatedly in the proof. To show this property, we
recall the formal deﬁnition of computational indistinguishability to elaborate the deﬁnition of
fairness in Section 4.2. Second, we present some preliminary assumptions, without the loss
of generality, on Stop for the simplicity of the presentation of of our proof. Finally, we show
the main part of our proof. The proof overview captures the main idea of our proof. Thus not
surprisingly, the main part of our proof starts with two necessary messages m∗1 and m
∗
2 , and
then proceeds to show that between these two messages, there must exist certain patterns
of messages. We next count all the necessary messages before m∗1 , after m
∗
2 and messages in
between respectively and complete our proof.
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(Weak) fairness
First, we give the (weak) fairness property that we use repeatedly in the proof.
Lemma 11 ((Weak) fairness). If a computation scheme α solves fair computation, then it
satisﬁes the following propety. For any e ∈N, any 1≤ e ≤n−2, any e malicious parties and any
computationally bounded algorithmA that controls the e malicious parties,∀x1,x2, . . . ,xn, any
two honest parties Pi ,Pj , i , j ,∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} output the same except with negligible probability.
We show that this property is implied by the fairness property in Deﬁnition 22. Before proving
the property, we recall formal deﬁnitions and terminologies used in Deﬁnition 22 such as
computational indistinguishability and a negligible function from their classical deﬁnitions in
[141, 142].
Deﬁnition 24 (Computational indistinguishability). If function g is a negligible function of
variable s, then ∀c ∈N, ∃C ∈N such that ∀s >C , g (s)< 1sc .
Let A = {A(1s ,a)} be a distribution ensemble, i.e., random variables indexed by 1s and a.
Let B(1s ,a)= {B(1s ,a)} be also a distribution ensemble. Then A and B are computationally
indistinguishable, if for any computationally bounded algorithm D(1s ,a,w,D) that takes q
independently identically distributed random variables following the distribution D ,
|Pr [D(1s ,a,w, A(1s ,a))= 1]−Pr [D(1s ,a,w,B(1s ,a))= 1]| = neg l (s),∀a,∀w
where neg l (s) is a negligible function of s, q = q(s) is a polynomial of s and the probabilities
are taken over the random choices of D and q random variables of D .
In the context of Deﬁnition 22, s is the security parameter of the fair computation scheme.
Recall that in Deﬁnition 22, we say that the joint outputs O =OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and
O¯ =OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are computationally indistinguishable. This means that for any
computationally bounded algorithm D(1s ,a,w,D),
|Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O)= 1]−Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O¯)= 1]| = neg l (s),∀a,∀w
where a = x1||x2|| · · · ||xn , w may be arbitrary auxiliary information which is publicly known
and both O and O¯ are indexed by 1s and a.
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider a computationally bounded algorithm A that does not control
Pi or Pj . Let oi ,oj be the random variables that represent Pi and Pj ’s outputs in the joint out-
put O respectively. Suppose that A controls e,1≤ e ≤ n−1 malicious parties Pd1 ,Pd2 , . . . ,Pde .
ByDeﬁnition 22, there exists a computationally bounded algorithmS that controls P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . ,
P¯de such that O and O¯ are computationally indistinguishable. Let o¯i and o¯ j be the random
variables that represent P¯i and P¯ j ’s outputs in the joint output O¯ respectively. Since S does
not control P¯i or P¯ j , o¯i = o¯ j with probability 1.
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Consider a computationally bounded algorithm D that tries to distinguish O and O¯ as follows.
D takes one sample from the given distribution D. If in the sample, the i th element and the
j th element are the same, then D outputs 1; if not, D outputs 0. Then there exists a negligible
function neg l (s) such that
|Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O)= 1]−Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O¯)= 1]| = neg l (s),∀a
where a = x1||x2|| · · · ||xn and w is an empty string.
Since o¯i = o¯ j with probability 1, Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O¯) = 1] = 1. Let ρ be the probability such
that oi = oj . Then Pr [D(1s ,a,w,O) = 1] = ρ. Thus ρ = 1−neg l (s). I.e., for any algorithm
A , any two honest parties Pi ,Pj , i , j ,∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} output the same except with negligible
probability.
Then, we discuss some essential properties/convention of Stop, which we use later in the
proof.
Preliminaries
Here we make some assumption on Stop.
If P invokes Stop several times, Stop returns the same value as the ﬁrst time.
P may communicate with T in Stop, but P does not communicate with T in Compute. This is
consistent to the optimism property.
When P invokes Stop, either P does not send messages to any other party including T and
simply terminates, or P communicates with T and then terminates. If P communicates with
T , P sends only one stop request. T does not ask any party (including P9) for additional
messages when computing an output for P . This is due to the atomicity of the communication
with T and the termination property.
When P communicates with T and then terminates, T sends a response only to P . In the
asynchronous network, even if T sends messages to parties other than P , they might receive
the messages after they complete Compute or Stop in the worst case. Thus we consider that T
does not send messages to other parties.
We say that an optimistic execution E is initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn , if n parties in E are
initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn . When we discuss any optimistic execution E , E must have been
initialized with some n strings. Thus the term E initialized with (some) x1,x2, . . . ,xn does not
lose generality.
9Since P communicates only with T , then in this case, P can simply send P ’s status and P ’s local input to T and
T does not need to ask P for additional messages.
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Sometimes we denote a party by O, P , Q, R, with an abuse of notations on O and R (as their
meaning is clear in the context).
Full proof
Recall the intuition (Section 4.3.1) that there are two necessary messages (of every optimistic
execution). Here we precisely deﬁne the two messages, m∗1 and m
∗
2 , and show their basic
properties. Lemma 12 and Corollary 1 deﬁne m∗1 and prove a property of m
∗
1 ; Lemma 13
deﬁnes m∗2 and Corollary 3 and Lemma 14 show properties of m
∗
2 . Corollary 2 conﬁrms the
intuition of the order between two events: the arrival of m∗1 and the arrival of m
∗
2 .
Lemma 12. For any optimistic execution E, for any two parties P and Q, we say that P contacts
Q in E if one of the two properties below holds: (a) P sends m to Q and Q receives m; or (b) there
exists a party O such that P contacts O and subsequently O contacts Q.
Then for any optimistic execution E and any P ∈Ω, there exists a message m such that before m
arrives at its destination, ∃Q ∈Ω\{P } such that Q has not contacted P yet and after m arrives at
its destination, ∀Q ∈Ω\{P }, Q has contacted P.
Thus P is the destination of m. Let t be any status of P before P receives m in E. Then if P
invokes Stop with t and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to P.
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. We ﬁrst prove the existence of message m. By contra-
diction. Suppose that for some optimistic execution E initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn and some
P ∈Ω, after E ﬁnishes, ∃Q ∈Ω\{P } has not contacted P yet. Then by the optimism property,
P performs a computationally bounded algorithm that computes f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) given only
Ω\{Q}’s inputs. A contradiction.
Second, we prove that if P invokes Stop with t and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop
returns ⊥ to P . Since no other party has invoked Stop, Stop is only able to return to P a value
based on t , P ’s input and T ’s input. Let E be initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn . Since t is P ’s status in
E before P receives m, ∃Q ∈Ω\{P } has not contacted P yet and thus t can be constructed given
onlyΩ\{Q}’s inputs. Since E is an optimistic execution, then by the completeness property, if
Stop returns a non-⊥ value, Stop returns z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn). Suppose that Stop returns z to
P . Then there is a computationally bounded algorithm that evaluates f given only Ω\{Q}’s
inputs and T ’s inputs, which gives a contradiction.
Corollary 1. For any optimistic execution E, there exists message m∗1 such that (a) before m
∗
1
arrives at its destination, ∀P ∈Ω, ∃Q ∈Ω\{P } such that Q has not contacted P yet and (b) after
m∗1 arrives at its destination, there exists the destination R of m
∗
1 such that ∀Q ∈Ω\{R}, Q has
contacted R.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 12.
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Lemma 13. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn, there exists message
m∗2 such that (a) before m
∗
2 arrives at its destination R, no P computes z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) from
P’s status and P’s input (according to the protocol underlying E) and (b) after m∗2 arrives at R,
R computes z from R’s status and R’s input (according to the protocol underlying E).
In E, before R receives m∗2 , ∀P ∈Ω\{R}, P has been contacted by Q, ∀Q ∈Ω\{P }.
Proof. The lemma contains two parts. The existence of message m∗2 follows from the optimism
property.
We prove the second part by contradiction. Suppose that in E , ∃O ∈Ω\{R},Q ∈Ω\{O} such
that when R receives m∗2 , O has not been contacted by Q. Consider an execution F that is the
same as E for the preﬁx that ends at the event of m∗2 arriving at its destination (inclusive); in
F , after R receives m∗2 , O invokes Stop, and Stop returns before any other party invokes Stop.
In F , O is honest. By Lemma 12, O outputs⊥. However, an honest party R outputs z, which
violates the completeness property. A contradiction.
Corollary 2. For any optimistic execution E, let m∗1 be deﬁned as in Corollary 1 and let m
∗
2 be
deﬁned as in Lemma 13; then the event of m∗1 arriving at its destination precedes the event of
m∗2 arriving at its destination.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 13, the class of function f considered and n ≥
2.
Corollary 3. For any optimistic execution E, let m∗2 be deﬁned as in Lemma 13 and let R be
the destination of m∗2 ; then in E, before R receives m
∗
2 , ∀P ∈Ω\{R}, P has received at least one
message.
Proof. The correctness follows from Lemma 13 and n ≥ 2.
We have now deﬁned the two messages: m∗1 and m
∗
2 . Here they are deﬁned for any certain
optimistic execution E . (If it is clear in the context, we omit the re-deﬁnition in the statements
of the following lemmas.) Lemma 12 above shows the output of an honest party if it stops
before the arrival of m∗1 . Below Lemma 14 shows the output of an honest party if it stops after
the arrival of m∗2 .
Lemma 14. For any optimistic execution E initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn, let R be the destination
of m∗2 ; for any P ∈Ω\{R}, let m be the last message received by P before message m∗2 arrives R in
E. By Corollary 3, m exists.
Let t be the status of P in E right after P receives m. Then for any execution E (P ) such that E (P )
is the same as E for P until P invokes Stop, and P invokes Stop with t after P receives m (and
before P’s next receipt of some message), Stop returns z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) to P.
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Proof. For any E(P ), P ’s behavior is the same as an honest P to the parties in Ω\{P } and T ,
w.l.o.g., we say that in E(P ), P is honest.
Let MP be the set of messages which P sends before m∗2 arrives at R in E . Then the event of
P receiving m is the last event in E that might trigger P to send some message in MP . Due
to the arbitrary delay of communication channels and the arbitrary time instant of invoking
Stop, there exists such an execution E(P ) that P has sent all the messages in MP before P ’s
next receipt of some message and before P invokes Stop with t . For any such execution E(P ),
the parties inΩ\{P } may continue E without noticing P ’s invocation of Stop up to the point
when m∗2 arrives at its destination R, and then an honest party R outputs z. Therefore, Stop
should return z to P , for otherwise, as all parties are honest here, the return of⊥ violates the
completeness property.
Now due to the arbitrary time instant of invoking Stop, it is indistinguishable for T whether P ,
invoking Stop with t , has sent all the messages in MP or not. Therefore, for any E (P ), Stop has
to return z to P .
Following our proof overview, after the properties of m∗1 and m
∗
2 , what an honest party should
output if it stops between m∗1 and m
∗
2 is shown in Lemma 15. In Lemma 15, we assume a
subsequence of messages in an optimistic execution; roughly speaking, we assume that the
honest party stops after this subsequence and investigate its output. We later combine Lemma
15 and the properties of m∗1 and m
∗
2 into Lemma 16, which relates the sequence of messages
ordered by when they are received in an optimistic execution to the permutation sequence.
Lemma 15. For any optimistic execution E and any k,2≤ k ≤ n, w.l.o.g., let m1,m2, . . . ,mk be
k messages in E such that (a) the destination of mi ,1≤ i ≤ k is Pi ; (b) mi+1,1≤ i ≤ k−1 is the
ﬁrst message received by Pi+1 after Pi receives mi in E. Let ti ,1≤ i ≤ k be the status of Pi in E
right before Pi receives mi .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, deﬁne execution E(Pi ) such that E(Pi ) is the same as E for Pi until Pi invokes
Stop; in E(Pi ), Pi invokes Stop with ti right before message mi arrives at Pi .
Assume that for any E(P1), if no other party invokes Stop before P1, then Stop returns ⊥ to P1.
Then
• for k = 1, for any E(Pk), when Pk invokes Stop, if no other party has invoked Stop, then
Stop returns ⊥ to Pk.
• for k = 2, for any E(Pk ), when Pk invokes Stop, if Pk−1 has invoked Stop with tk−1, Stop
has returned ⊥ to Pk−1 and no other party has invoked Stop, then Stop returns ⊥ to Pk
except with negligible probability.
• for 3≤ k ≤ n, for any E(Pk), when Pk invokes Stop if P1,P2, . . . ,Pk−1 have invoked Stop
with t1, t2, . . . , tk−1 respectively and for 2≤ i ≤ k−1, Pi invokes Stop after Stop returns to
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Pi−1, and Stop has returned ⊥ to P1, . . . ,Pk−1, and no other party has invoked Stop, then
Stop returns ⊥ to Pk except with negligible probability.
Proof. Let E be initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn . We prove the lemma by induction. The base case,
for which k = 1, is trivial.
Suppose the statement is true for k−1,2≤ k ≤ n. Assume any E (Pk ) as an execution such that
when Pk invokes Stop, P1, . . . ,Pk−1 have invoked Stop with t1, . . . , tk−1 respectively according to
the statement, Stop has returned P1, . . . ,Pk−1 ⊥ and no other party has invoked Stop, and Stop
returns r to Pk , where r is a random variable. (The randomness comes from that of P1, . . . ,Pk
and T .) Figure 4.2a illustrates E(Pk ).
For any E(Pk), let E
∗(Pk) be an execution that is the same as E(Pk) for P1,P2, . . . ,Pn until Pk
invokes Stop right before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1. If Pj , . . . ,Pk−1 for some j ,1≤ j ≤ k−1
do not invoke Stop before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1 in E(Pk ), let Pj , . . . ,Pk−1 invoke Stop
right before message mk−1 arrives at Pk−1 in the same order with the same status as in E∗(Pk ).
Also, let Pk invoke Stop after Stop has returned Pk−1 ⊥.
Due to the arbitrary delay of communication channels, in bothE (Pk ) andE
∗(Pk ), Pk ’s behavior
is the same as an honest Pk toΩ\Pk and T . Hereafter we say that Pk is honest. Again due to
the arbitrary delay of communication channels, to Pk and T , any E
∗(Pk ) is indistinguishable
from any E (Pk ) at the point when Pk invokes Stop. Furthermore, since mk is the ﬁrst message
received by Pk after Pk−1 receives mk−1 in E , the status of Pk in E∗(Pk) is also tk . Thus in
any E∗(Pk ), Stop returns r to Pk (where the distribution of r remains the same). Figure 4.2b
illustrates E(Pk ).
For any E(Pk−1) and for any E∗(Pk), we deﬁne an execution F such that (a) F is the same as
E(Pk−1) for Pk−1 until Pk−1 invokes Stop with tk−1 right before mk−1 arrives at Pk−1; (b) F
is the same as E∗(Pk) for Pk until Pk invokes Stop with tk right before mk−1 arrives at Pk−1;
(c) when Pk invokes Stop, P1, . . . ,Pk−1 have invoked Stop with t1, . . . , tk−1 respectively and
Pi ,2≤ i ≤ k−1 invokes Stop after Stop returns to Pi−1, Stop has returned⊥ to P1, . . . ,Pk−2 and
no other party has invoked Stop. Figure 4.2c illustrates our construction F .
In F , Pk−1’s behavior is the same as an honest Pk−1 toΩ\{Pk−1} and T . Hereafter, we say that
Pk−1 is honest in F . According to n, there are two possibilities. First, if n = 2, then k = 2 and
all parties are honest. Since the statement is true for k−1, Stop returns⊥ to Pk−1 in F . Then
by the completeness property, r =⊥with probability 1. Second, if n > 2, since the statement
is true for k −1, then Stop returns ⊥ to Pk−1 except with negligible probability. When Stop
returns⊥ to Pk−1, E∗(Pk ) and F are indistinguishable to T and Pk due to the arbitrary delay of
communication channels. As a result, Stop returns r to Pk (where the distribution of r remains
the same).
Then for the second possibility, by the (weak) fairness property, r =⊥ except with negligible
probability. We can show this by contradiction. Suppose that r = ⊥ with non-negligible
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probability. We build an algorithm A such that (1) A controls all parties except for Pk−1
and Pk , and (2) A plays the asynchronous network and the roles of the malicious parties so
that the resulting execution among P1,P2, . . . ,Pn ,T is F . A is a computationally bounded
algorithm such that two honest parties Pk−1 and Pk output differently with non-negligible
probability. This violates the (weak) fairness property. A contradiction.
As a result, if the statement is true for k−1,2≤ k ≤ n, the statement is true for k. Therefore,
the lemma is true for any k,2≤ k ≤n.
(a) Execution E(Pk ) (b) Execution E
∗(Pk )
(c) Execution F
Figure 4.2 – The three key executions in the proof of Lemma 15. A dot line means that any
event might occur. A dashed line means that an event does not occur. A solid line means that
the same event as in E occurs.
Lemma 16. For any optimistic execution E, let R, a sequence ofΩ, be the sequence of destina-
tions of the messages ordered by when they are received between the two events: the event of m∗1
arriving at its destination and the event of m∗2 arriving at its destination, inclusive.
Then R contains all the permutations ofΩ as subsequences.
Proof. Let E be initialized with x1,x2, . . . ,xn . We prove by contradiction. Suppose that, w.l.o.g.,
R does not include P1,P2, . . . ,Pn as a subsequence.
By Corollary 2, R starts at the destination of m∗1 and ends at the destination of m
∗
2 ; and
R includes P1 as a subsequence, which is also true for P2, . . . ,Pn . Then there exists some
k,2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 such that R includes P1,P2, . . . ,Pk as a subsequence and does not include
P1,P2, . . . ,Pk+1 as a subsequence.
As a result, there exists a sequence m1,m2, . . . ,mk of k messages in E such that (a) the desti-
nation of mi ,1≤ i ≤ k is Pi ; (b) mi+1,1≤ i ≤ k −1 is the ﬁrst message received by Pi+1 after
Pi receives mi and (c) m1 =m∗1 , or m1 is the ﬁrst message received by P1 after m∗1 arrives at
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its destination; and (d) the event of mk arriving at Pk precedes the event of m
∗
2 arriving at its
destination. (The event of mk may also be the event of m
∗
2 .)
Let t1 be the status of P1 right before P1 receives m1 in E . Deﬁne execution E(P1) such that
E(P1) is the same as E for P1 until P1 invokes Stop with t1 right before m1 arrives at P1. By
Lemma 12, for any E(P1), if no other party invokes Stop before P1, then Stop returns ⊥ to P1.
Let ti ,2≤ i ≤ k be the status of Pi right before Pi receives mi in E . Deﬁne execution E (Pk ) such
that (a) E(Pk) is the same as E for Pk until Pk invokes Stop with tk right before message mk
arrives at Pk ; (b) P1,P2, . . . ,Pk−1 invoke Stop with t1, t2, . . . , tk−1 respectively; (c) for 2≤ i ≤ k, Pi
invokes Stop after Stop returns to Pi−1; (d) Stop returns⊥ to P1,P2, . . . ,Pk−1; and (5) no other
party has invoked Stop. By Lemma 15, Stop returns ⊥ to Pk in E(Pk) except with negligible
probability. Figure 4.3a illustrates E(Pk ).
Let m be the last message received by Pk+1 before message m∗2 arrives at its destination in E
(inclusive). By Corollary 3, m exists if Pk+1 is not the destination of m∗2 . Therefore, if Pk+1 is
not the destination of m∗2 , then the event of m arriving at its destination precedes the event of
mk arriving at Pk in E (for otherwise, we have a subsequence P1,P2, . . . ,Pk+1, which gives a
contradiction). Moreover, Pk+1 can not be the destination of m∗2 (for otherwise, we again have
a subsequence P1,P2, . . . ,Pk+1, which gives a contradiction).
Let tk+1 be the status ofPk+1 right afterPk+1 receivesm inE . Consider an executionE (Pk ,Pk+1)
that is the same as E (Pk ) for all the parties inΩ\{Pk+1} and is the same as E for Pk+1 until Pk+1
invokes Stop with tk+1, which is after Stop has returned to Pk . Since the event of m arriving
at its destination precedes the event of message mk arriving at Pk , in E(Pk ,Pk+1), we let Pk+1
invoke Stop with tk+1 also after Pk+1 receives m. Figure 4.3b illustrates our construction
E(Pk ,Pk+1).
In E(Pk ,Pk+1), Pk ’s behavior is the same as an honest Pk toΩ\{Pk } and T ; Pk+1’s behavior is
the same as an honest Pk+1 toΩ\{Pk+1} and T . Hereafter, we say that Pk and Pk+1 are honest
in E (Pk ,Pk+1). Moreover, until Stop returns to Pk , E (Pk ,Pk+1) and E (Pk ) are indistinguishable
to Pk and T and therefore Stop returns ⊥ to Pk except with negligible probability also in
E(Pk ,Pk+1). However, by Lemma 14, Stop returns z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) to Pk+1.
Now we build an algorithm A such that (1) A controls all parties except for Pk−1 and Pk ,
and (2) A plays the asynchronous network and the roles of the malicious parties such that
every execution among P1,P2, . . . ,Pn satisﬁes E(Pk .Pk+1). A is a computationally bounded
algorithm such that two honest parties Pk and Pk+1 output differently with non-negligible
probability. This violates the (weak) fairness property. A contradiction.
Now that we have all the necessary properties of any optimistic execution, we are ready to
prove Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9. Let R be deﬁned as in Lemma 16. Recall that  is the length of the shortest
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(a) Execution E(Pk ) (b) Execution E(Pk ,Pk+1)
Figure 4.3 – Two key executions in the proof of Lemma 16. A dot line means that any event
might occur. A dashed line means that an event does not occur. A solid line means that the
same event as in E occurs.
sequence which contains, as subsequences, all permutations of n different symbols. Then
by Lemma 16,  lower bounds the length of R. By the deﬁnition of m∗1 , there are at least
n−2 messages that precede m∗1 in E ; otherwise, at least one party has not yet contacted the
destination of m∗1 . By the deﬁnition of m
∗
2 , there are at least n−1 messages that follow m∗2 in
E ; otherwise, at least one party P cannot compute z from P ’s input and P ’s status.
Therefore, during any optimistic execution E , the number of messages sent is at least +2n−
3.
Remark 1 (Honest behavior in an execution). Usually without a protocol speciﬁcation, we
cannot deﬁne any honest behavior. In the proof of Theorem 9, the honest behavior is relative
to an optimistic execution.
4.4 An Optimal Protocol
To prove that +2n−3 is a tight lower bound, we describe in this section an (+2n−3)-message
optimistic fair computation scheme for the function that implements fair exchange of certain
items. This shows that the optimal message complexity can be achieved for some optimistic
fair computation scheme.
Our optimal protocol relies on a publicly veriﬁable transcript. I.e., each destination (i.e., each
party that receives a certain message) can verify whether the previous messages have arrived
at their destinations correctly. This is realized by adding digital signatures [139, 145]. In order
to help T recover the n inputs (if necessary) when some party invokes Stop, the n parties
exchange veriﬁable encryption [133] of the n inputs in the protocol that computes without the
third party. Section 4.1 recalls the basics of digital signatures and veriﬁable encryption, before
describing our optimal protocol.
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4.4.1 Preliminaries
We denote a digital signature on message m by σ= Si gsk (m), and the veriﬁcation algorithm of
a digital signature by Verpk (σ,m), where pk is a public key and sk is the corresponding secret
key. Sometimes we denote the signature of a party Pi , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} simply by Si gi (m).
Recall that s is the security parameter of the fair computation scheme. Then roughly speaking,
a digital signature scheme is secure if any adversary (of running time polynomial in the security
parameter s) is able to forge a valid signature on some new message even after seeing many
valid signatures on other messages (chosen by the adversary and of a number polynomial in
s), only with negligible probability. (See [139, 145] for a formal deﬁnition of digital signature
schemes and their security.)
A veriﬁable encryption scheme is a recovery algorithm D and a two-party protocol between
prover P and veriﬁer V [133]. Their common inputs are public key vk, public value x, condi-
tion κ10 and binary relation R. Prover P takes witness w as an extra input. Veriﬁer V rejects
and outputs ⊥ if (x,w) ∉R; otherwise V not only accepts but also obtains string α such that
D(sk,κ,α)=w and (x,w) ∈R.
We denote an instance of veriﬁable encryption by V E(vk,κ,w,x,R). Roughly speaking, a
veriﬁable encryption scheme is secure, if no malicious veriﬁer is able to learn w without sk
and no malicious prover is able to make V accept αˆ such that (D(sk,κ, αˆ), wˆ) ∉R. The formal
deﬁnition and deﬁnition of security for veriﬁable encryption schemes are recalled later when
weprove the correctness of the optimal protocol. A prominent example of veriﬁable encryption
is Asokan et al.’s non-interactive construction of veriﬁable encryption so that in the two-party
protocol between P and V , only P sends a message to V and this message is considered as the
string α if V accepts the message. Asokan et al.’s non-interactive construction of veriﬁable
encryption can be used to veriﬁably encrypt a list of digital signature schemes, which includes
Schnorr signatures, DSS signatures, Fiat-Shamir signatures, Ong-Schnorr signatures and GQ
signatures [48].
4.4.2 Protocol description
In this section, we now present an (+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme
for function f (Equation 4.3) and thereby, prove that the lower bound of +2n−3 messages is
tight (Theorem 10). In other words, we show the tightness in a constructive way.
Theorem 10. There exists an optimistic fair computation scheme for some function f where n
honest parties can evaluate f after they exchange exactly +2n−3 messages without resorting
to T (i.e., in every optimistic execution).
10Condition κ usually represents the instance ID of the protocol, the public value and the binary relation to be
veriﬁed. In our fair computation scheme later, the resulting string of the two-party protocol between P and V can
only be decrypted by a trusted party. The trusted party decrypts the string only if the following condition holds:
the decrypted witness satisiﬁes the binary relation with the public value.
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Algorithm 11 Compute π
Require: a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1,2, . . . ,n}
Ensure: (l +2n−3)-message Compute π
1: Build sequence j :
j1, j2, . . . , jn−2, i , jn+l−1, jn+l , . . . , jl+2n−3
where (a) j1, j2, . . . , jn−2, i1 are n−1 different symbols; and (b) il , jn+l−1, jn+l , . . . , jl+2n−3
are n different symbols.
2: Set j0 = {1,2, . . . ,n}\{i1, j1, j2, . . . , jn−2}
3: In π, Pjk−1 sends a message mk−1 to Pjk upon receiving mk−2 for k = 1,2, . . . , l + 2n − 3
(except Pj0 who sends m0 =V E j0 upon initialization) where
mk−1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
mk−2||V E jk−1 ||Si g jk−1 (mk−2||V E jk−1 ) 2≤ k ≤ n
mk−2||Si g jk−1 (mk−2) n+1≤ k ≤ end( jk−1)
mk−2||x jk−1 ||Si g jk−1 (mk−2||x jk−1 ) end( jk−1)+1≤ k ≤ l +n−2
(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) l +n−1≤ k ≤ l +2n−3
(4.2)
and
V E jk−1 =V E(vkT ,κ,x jk−1 ,ajk−1 ,Rjk−1 );
κ= (a1,R1), (a2,R2), . . . , (an ,Rn), which identiﬁes the intended x1,x2, . . . ,xn ;
end( jk−1)= max
K∈{1,2,...,l }
{K |iK = jk−1}+n−2
4: P1,P2, . . . ,Pn outputs z = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn)
We build our protocol with Compute π (Algorithm 11) and Stop μ (Algorithm 12) given any
sequence that contains all the permutations of {1,2, . . . ,n}. Let l be the length of the sequence.
We then show in Theorem 11 that our protocol is an (l + 2n − 3)-message optimistic fair
computation scheme for the following function:
f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn)=
⎧⎨
⎩
(x1,x2, . . . ,xn) (ai ,xi ) ∈Ri for i = 1,2, . . . ,n
⊥ otherwise
(4.3)
where R1,R2, . . . ,Rn are n relations that allow the non-interactive construction of veriﬁable
encryption and a1,a2, . . . ,an are n public values.11 R1,R2, . . . ,Rn ,a1,a2, . . . ,an are included in
the public description of f .
The one-time setup of the protocol is not included in Algorithm 11 and Algorithm 12. Before
π and μ are carried out, a one-time setup (a) distributes necessary keys: T ’s public key vkT
11We also assume that for i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, given ai , any computationally bounded algorithm outputs xi with
negligible probability, and given (ai ,xi ) such that (ai ,xi ) ∈Ri , any computationally bounded algorithm outputs
yi , yi = xi such that (ai , yi ) ∈Ri with negligible probability.
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Algorithm 12 Stop μ
Require: sequence j of length l +2n−3 built for π
Ensure: Stop μ that accompanies π
1: For any k ∈ {0,1 . . . , l+2n−3}, Pjk invokes μwhen Pjk wants to stop in π; otherwise, if π has
not started, the n parties output⊥, or if π has ﬁnished, the n parties output (x1,x2, . . . ,xn).
2: For k = 0, when invoking μ, if Pjk has not sent mk , Pjk quietly leaves π and μ and outputs
⊥.
3: For 1≤ k ≤n−1, when invoking μ, if Pjk has not received mk−1 correctly, Pjk quietly leaves
π and μ and outputs⊥.
4: For n ≤ k ≤ l+2n−3, let Ik = {index| jindex = jk , index ∈ {1,2, . . . ,k−1}}, let l astk =max Ik
when Ik =  and let l astk = 0 when Ik =, and deﬁne m−1 as an empty string. Then, for
n ≤ k ≤ l +2n−3, when invoking μ, if Pjk has not received mk−1 correctly and has received
mlastk−1, then Pjk sends to T message reqk =mlastk . By sending reqk , Pjk claims that Pjk
does not receive mk−1.
5: T veriﬁes that reqk is consistent with Pjk ’s claim; and T calculates response
resp =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
“aborted” if reqk and Pjk ’s claim are not consistent
or Pjk has sent a request before
z = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) else if variable z (which is initialized to ⊥) is not⊥
“aborted” else if reqk does not contain V E1,V E2, . . . ,V En
z ← (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) else if k >minindex∈{progress+1,...,l+2n−3}{index| jindex = jk }
and xi ←D(skT ,κ,V Ei ) for i = 1,2, . . . ,n
z ← (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) else if k ≥ l +n−1
and xi ←D(skT ,κ,V Ei ) for i = 1,2, . . . ,n
“aborted” otherwise
T updates progress (which is initialized to 0) to k if k > progress, reqk and Pjk ’s claim
are consistent and Pjk has not sent a request before. T then sends resp to Pjk .
6: Pjk outputs ⊥ if resp =“aborted”; and Pjk outputs z if resp = z.
and secret key skT , n parties’ public and secret keys correctly; (b) distributes the public
description of f correctly; and (c) executes the one-time setup of the veriﬁable encryption. (If
implemented, a trusted party Certiﬁcate Authority [146] can do this one-time setup.)
Some remarks on μ are in order: (a) as each part of the request message is publicly veriﬁable, T
is able to efﬁciently verify whether a party P ’s request and P ’s claim are consistent by following
Equation (4.2); and (b) P may invoke Stop at any point in time12, e.g., when a message received
by P in π is incorrect, or when P is impatient while waiting for some message; our protocol
allows every party to deﬁne their own strategy of invoking Stop, independent of the other n−1
parties.
We prove that this protocol (consisting of π and μ), given a shortest permutation sequence, is
12If messages are delivered instantly, P does not invoke Stop.
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an (+2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme (of which the proof is in Section
4.4.3). This implies Theorem 10. Combined with Theorem 9, +2n−3 is thus a tight lower-
bound on the number of messages for optimistic fair computation.
Theorem 11. Given a sequence i of length l that contains all the permutations of {1,2, . . . ,n},
the protocol consisting of π and μ is an (l +2n−3)-message optimistic fair computation scheme
for function f in Equation (4.3) in an asynchronous network with n−1 potentially malicious
parties.
In fact, function f implements fair exchange among n parties for items x1,x2, . . . ,xn that
satisfy relations R1,R2, . . . ,Rn . Then Algorithm 11 and Algorithm 12 form a compiler that
can transform a shortest permutation sequence into an (+2n−3)-message optimistic fair
exchange scheme. An application is a message-optimal optimistic fair exchange scheme of
digital signatures [48].13
4.4.3 Correctness proof of our protocol
We give here a detailed proof of correctness for our optimistic fair computation scheme for
function f , and thereby, prove Theorem 11. We note that this is a proof of a stand-alone execu-
tion. This is consistent with Deﬁnition 22, which considers a single execution of optimistic
fair computation in isolation among n+1 parties (including the trusted party T ).
Before we present the proof, we recall the formal deﬁnition and security guarantee of veriﬁable
encryption from [133].
Deﬁnition 25 (Veriﬁable encryption [133]). Let (G ,E ,D) be the key generation, encryption
and decryption algorithms of a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme. Let (vk, sk)
be one key pair generated by G where vk is the public key and sk is the secret key. Let R be
a relation and let LR = {x|∃w such that (x,w) ∈R}. Then a veriﬁable encryption scheme for a
relation R consists of a two-party protocol (P,V ) and a recovery algorithm D . P and V take as
common inputs: vk, x, R (and some condition κ to open string α). P takes witness w such
that (x,w) ∈R as an extra input. V rejects (i.e., outputs ⊥), or accepts and obtains string α. D
takes as inputs: sk, α (and κ). D outputs a witness wˆ (if the condition κ holds for wˆ).
A veriﬁable encryption scheme is secure if it satisﬁes the following properties:
• Completeness: If P and V are honest, then V accepts in the two-party protocol for all
(vk, sk) and for all x ∈ LR .
13In the application of fair exchange of digital signatures, Ri is some homomorphism θ depending on a given
digital signature scheme [48], and each of the ﬁrst n messages of π is appended with an image of θ such that the
pre-image produces a correct signature. See [48] the non-interactive construction of veriﬁable encryption on
digital signatures on the details of how to choose θ and produce a correct signature by a pre-image of θ. We remark
here that the non-interactive construction of veriﬁable encryption on digital signatures in [48] uses part of the
correct signature as the pre-image of θ or as the input to the function f (rather than use the signing key of the give
digital signature scheme).
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• Validity: For any computationally bounded algorithm Pˆ , for all (vk, sk), if V accepts
and obtains string α in the two-party protocol with Pˆ , then given α and sk, D outputs a
witness wˆ such that (x, wˆ) ∉R with negligible probability.
• Computational zero-knowledge: For every algorithm Vˆ , there exists an expected polyno-
mial-time simulator S given vk and x as well as R and κ, and with black-box access to Vˆ
such that for all x ∈ LR , the output of S is computationally indistinguishable from the
output of Vˆ after the two-party protocol with an honest P (which is given vk, x, R, κ
and some witness w such that (x,w) ∈R).
Furthermore, for the simplicity of the proof, we consider the particular veriﬁable encryption
scheme proposed in [133]. In particular, their construction of veriﬁable encryption includes
a three-move protocol (between the prover P and veriﬁer V ), where the second move is V
sending a random bit string. Hence, as [133] pointed out, this protocol can be made non-
interactive via Fiat-Shamir heuristic [147]: P uses a hash function to generate the random bit
string. Therefore the resulting non-interactive variant is one message sent by P considered as
the string α, and secure in the random oracle model [148]. For the non-interactive variant,
it is easy to see that the algorithm V in the scheme can be deterministic; i.e., given the one
message sent by Pˆ , either V rejects (with probability 1) or V accepts (with probability 1); and
the recovery algorithm D in the scheme is also deterministic; i.e., given sk, κ and α, either D
rejects (with probability 1) or D outputs a witness (with probability 1).
Proof of Theorem 11. As shown in Algorithm 11, the number of messages is equal to the length
of sequence j which is l +2n−3. Thus the n parties exchange exactly l +2n−3 messages in π.
In what follows, we verify that our protocol satisﬁes Deﬁnition 22 and Deﬁnition 23.
Optimism. If P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow π in which
all parties output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) without interacting with T .
Non-triviality. As shown in Algorithm 11, if messages are delivered instantly, then P1,P2, . . . ,Pn
do not invoke Stop; therefore, we ﬁnd one execution of π that P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and
none invokes Stop.
Completeness. If P1,P2, . . . ,Pn are honest and none invokes Stop, then all parties follow π and
output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn). Next, we show by contradiction that if all parties are honest and
some invokes Stop, then either all parties output ⊥ or all parties output z = f (x1,x2, . . . ,xn).
Suppose that an honest party P outputs⊥ and an honest party Q outputs z. Since P outputs
⊥, then either (1) π has not started, or (2) P = Pjk and 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, or (3) P = Pjk and
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n ≤ k ≤ l +2n−3 For cases (1) and (2), since by Equation (4.2),
mk =
⎧⎨
⎩
mk−1||V E jk ||Si g jk (mk−1||V E jk ) 1≤ k ≤n−1
V E j0 k = 0,
P has not sentV E jk . Again by Equation (4.2), mend( jk ) =mend( jk )−1||x jk ||Si g jk (mend( jk )−1||x jk ).
Since end( jk) > n−1, P has not sent x jk . Since all parties are honest, Q does not output z
from running π or μ in cases (1) and (2).
In case (3), since all parties are honest, by the completeness property of veriﬁable encryption,
and the deﬁnition of digital signatures, T accepts that reqk and P = Pjk ’s claim are consistent.
As P is honest, P has not sent a request before. In case (3), we consider two disjoint cases: (a)
∃i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, V Ei is not in reqk , and (b) ∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, V Ei is in reqk .
Consider case (3.a). By Equation (4.2), ∀index ≥ n−1, mindex contains V E1,V E2, . . . ,V En .
Then 0≤ l astk ≤ n−2. Since j0, j1, . . . , jn−1 are different from each other, jk = jn−1. Moreover,
k =minindex∈{n,n+1,...,l+2n−3}{index| jindex = jk }≤ end( jk ). Therefore, P has not sent x jk , and
Q cannot output x jk following π.
Clearly, if Q does not interact with T , then Q outputs⊥, and furthermore, if Q interacts with
T before P interacts with T , then Q also outputs ⊥. If Q interacts with T after P interacts
with T , then we assume that Q sends a request reqq to T . Since Q is honest, T accepts that
reqq is consistent with Q’s claim that Q has not received mq−1 (but has received mlastq−1). By
the deﬁnition of i , q ≤ end jq . (Otherwise, we do not have jk , jq as a subsequence of i ). In
addition, since Q is honest, q ≤minindex∈{k+1,k+2,...,l+2n−3}{index| jindex = jq }. Therefore, T
sends “aborted” to Q.
In case (3.b), w.l.o.g., assume that P is the earliest process that sends to T a request and
receives “aborted”. Then variable progress is 0 at T when P sends reqk . Then we have
k ≤ min
index∈{1,2,...,l+2n−3}
{index| jindex = jk } f i r st ( jk ).
If jk = j0, k ≤ n−1, which gives a contradiction. If jk = j0, then since k ≤ f i r st ( jk ), l astk = 0;
thus reqk =mlastk =V E j0 , which also gives a contradiction for n ≥ 2.
Termination. As shown in Algorithm 11 and Algorithm 12, an honest party either follows π
and outputs, or wants to stop, follows μ and outputs. Since any message between an honest
party and T eventually reaches its destination, an honest party eventually outputs.
Fairness. We prove that for any e ∈N, 1≤ e ≤n−1, any e malicious parties Pd1 ,Pd2 , . . . ,Pde , and
any computationally bounded algorithmA , there exists a computationally bounded algorithm
S such that the joint outputs OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are
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computationally indistinguishable for any x1,x2, . . . ,xn .
We construct S that runs A as a black-box as follows.
1. S generates n + 1 key pairs (pk1, sk1), (pk2, sk2), . . . , (pkn , skn), (vkT , skT ); and then
S invokes A and initializes A with inputs xd1 ,xd2 , . . . ,xde , n+1 parties’ public keys
pk1,pk2, . . . ,pkn ,pkT and malicious parties’ private keys skd1 , skd2 , . . . , skde .
14
2. S plays the role of the n−k honest parties Ph1 ,Ph2 , . . . ,Phn−e and T , and executes our
protocol honestly with A except that:
• If by Algorithm 11, S has to send the (k−1)th message for 1≤ k ≤ n on behalf of
an honest party, then by the construction of Fiat-Shamir paradigm [147] and the
computational zero-knowledge property of veriﬁable encryption, S can simulate
the random oracle [148] and invoke the simulator (deﬁned in the computational
zero-knowledge property) to compute message mˆk−1 (that is computationally
indistinguishable from the (k−1)th message except with negligible probability).
• If by Algorithm 11, S has to send the (k −1)th message for end( jk−1)+1 ≤ k ≤
l +n−2 on behalf of an honest party Psrc , then S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf
of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de respectively toU . S obtains a response fromU , which contains
xh1 ,xh2 , . . . ,xhn−e . Then S uses xsrc to compute message mˆk−1. (How to obtain
xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde is explained later.)
• If by Algorithm 12, S has to send a response including the Ph1 ,Ph2 , . . . ,Phn−e ’s
inputs on behalf of T , then S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de
respectively toU . S obtains a response fromU , which contains xh1 ,xh2 , . . . ,xhn−e .
S uses xh1 ,xh2 , . . . ,xhn−e to compute a response. (How to obtain xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde is
explained later.)
• (S sends xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde on behalf of P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de respectively only once to
U .)15
3. In addition, S executes the following.
• If according to an honest party P ’s strategy of invoking Stop and μ, at some point
in the execution with A , P invokes Stop and outputs ⊥, then S sends ⊥ on behalf
of an arbitrary party in P¯d1 , P¯d2 , . . . , P¯de to U . If S ever sends ⊥, S sends ⊥ only
once.
• S saves xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde by decrypting V Ed1 ,V Ed2 , . . . ,V Ede from the messages
exchanged with A (in π or μ).
14Both A and S are also initialized with public information, including the relations κ =
(a1,R1)||(a2,R2)|| · · · ||(an ,Rn), the algorithms of our protocol and in particular, the deterministic strategy
of when to invoke Stop for every honest party.
15We note that on behalf of T , when S has to verify the ciphertexts of veriﬁable encryption in a request, S only
veriﬁes those ciphertexts V Ed1 ,V Ed2 , . . . ,V Ede (as S creates the others).
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4. Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs.
We verify that S has saved xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde before S has to send a message that contains at
least one honest party’s input. If by Algorithm 11, S has to send the (k −1)th message for
end( jk−1)+1≤ k ≤ l +n−2, then S has received and veriﬁed the (k−2)th message. By the
deﬁnition of sequence i , if jk−1 = jn−1, then end( jk−1) ≥ n+1; if jk−1 = jn−1, then the ﬁrst
symbol of i is not jk−1 and thus end( jk−1) ≥ n. In either case, k ≥ n+1, and therefore the
(k−2)th message includes V Ed1 ,V Ed2 , . . . ,V Ede . If by Algorithm 12, S has to send a response
on behalf of T , then S has veriﬁed the corresponding request, which also includes veriﬁed
V Ed1 ,V Ed2 , . . . ,V Ede . Thus, by the validity property of veriﬁable encryption, S successfully
decrypts xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde such that {adi , xˆdi } ∈Rdi ,∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,e} except negligible probability.
We also verify that S does not send⊥ and xˆd1 , xˆd2 , . . . , xˆde toU in the same execution, except
with negligible probability in a separate lemma (Lemma 17, which is given and proved later).
To show that the joint outputs OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are
computationally indistinguishable, we ﬁrst consider the transcript between S and A , and
the transcript among P1,P2, . . . ,Pn and A . By the computational zero-knowledge property
of veriﬁable encryption and the deﬁnition of S , any computationally bounded algorithm
A cannot distinguish the two transcripts except with negligible probability. Let F be any
execution between A and S in the game above when S is well-deﬁned16. W.l.o.g., in F ,
honest parties played by S output according to Algorithm 11. Denote by OF the joint output
of P1,P2, . . . ,Pn and A in F . Then OF and OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are computationally
indistinguishable.
We next consider the execution G among P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n ,S andU whenS runs F . We compare
the joint output OF with the joint output OG of P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n ,S in G as follows. S ’s output is
the same as A ’s output. For any honest party Phi , i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−e}, we show that P¯hi outputs
the same. There are three possibilities for Phi : Phi either (1) invokes Stop and outputs⊥, or
(2) invokes Stop and outputs a non-⊥ value, or (3) does not invoke Stop but outputs a non-⊥
value. In case (1), S sends ⊥ to U and thus in G , P¯hi also outputs ⊥. In case (2), (a) if Phi
interacts with T , then S uses U ’s response as T ’s response to Phi ; (b) if not, then to Phi , π
ﬁnishes and S must have obtainedU ’s response to query inputs for honest parties including
Phi . Thus whether Phi interacts with T or not, P¯hi also outputs the same. Case (3) is the same
as case (2.b). Then OF and OG have the same distribution.
As a result, OG and OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are computationally indistinguishable. Denote
by event the event that S is not well-deﬁned. Since event occur with negligible probabil-
ity, OG and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are computationally indistinguishable. Then S is a
computationally bounded algorithm such that for any x1,x2, . . . ,xn such that OP1,P2,...,Pn ,A (x1,
16With negligible probability,S is not well-deﬁned. I.e.,S cannot simulate the game above withA , for example,
when the simulator deﬁned in the computational zero-knowledge property of veriﬁable encryption exceeds
polynomial time, when S decrypts xˆdi such that (adi , xˆdi ) ∉Rdi for some i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,e}, and when some honest
party outputs ⊥ but S still has to send a response that includes honest parties’ inputs.
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x2, . . . ,xn) and OP¯1,P¯2,...,P¯n ,S (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) are computationally indistinguishable.
Next, we give the necessary lemma, which we use to verify that S as deﬁned in the proof
of Theorem 11 does not send conﬂicting messages to U except with negligible probability.
However, instead of discussing S , we state the lemma in a more general but equivalent way.
Lemma 17 (Simulation of S ). By Algorithm 11 and Algorithm 12, for any e ∈N,1≤ e ≤ n−1
and any e malicious parties Pd1 ,Pd2 , . . . ,Pde , for any computationally bounded algorithm A
that controls the e malicious parties, ∀x1,x2, . . . ,xn, for any honest party P,
• either P outputs ⊥ with negligible probability,
• or P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible probability and given that an honest party P outputs
⊥, any other party Q outputs the honest parties’ inputs except with negligible probability.
By Lemma 17, for S , as deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 11, when S has to send ⊥ toU with
non-negligible probability, the probability that S has to send non-⊥ inputs toU is negligible.
Lemma 17 also implies the inverse: if a party outputs the honest parties’ inputs with non-
negligible probability, then an honest party P outputs ⊥ with negligible probability. In other
words, whenS has to send non-⊥ inputs toU with non-negligible probability, the probability
that S has to send ⊥ toU is negligible.
Proof of Lemma 17. We need only to prove the case where P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible
probability.
Since P is honest, then either (1) π has not started, or (2) P = Pjk for 0≤ k ≤ n−1, or (3) P = Pjk
for n ≤ k ≤ l +2n−3. (Some intermediary results are already deduced for the completeness
property in the proof of Theorem 11 and is thus not repeated here.)
In cases (1) and (2), P has not sent x jk or V E jk and thus by the property of (ajk ,Rjk ), any
computationally bounded algorithm outputs x with negligible probability. In case (3), since P
is honest, then by the determinism of the veriﬁcation algorithm V of veriﬁable encryption, T
accepts that reqk is consistent with P ’s claim, and in addition, P has not sent a request before.
When P interacts with T , at least one of the two holds: (a) ∃i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, V Ei is not in reqk ,
or (b) ∀i ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, V Ei is in reqk .
In case (3.a), P has not sent x jk . If Q interacts with T before P interacts with T , then T
sends “aborted” to Q. If Q interacts with T after P interacts with T , then we assume that
Q sends a request reqq . We show that the following two events occur at the same time
with negligible probability: event A is q > minindex∈{k+1,k+2,...,l+2n−3}{index| jindex = jq }
nextk (q) and event B is that Q passes the consistency veriﬁcation of reqq at T . We show this
by contradiction. Suppose that the two events occur at the same time with non-negligible
probability. Since q >nextk (q), then l astq ≥nextk (q)> k; therefore, reqq includes message
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mk which includes P ’s signature on message mk−1. Then Q is a computationally algorithm
which forges P ’s signature on mk−1 (which P has not signed before) with non-negligible
probability, a contradiction to the unforgeability of digital signatures. Therefore, A and B
occur at the same time with negligible probability. Let A¯ be the complement of A and let
B¯ be the complement of B . Then A¯ ∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible probability. Since
nextk(q) ≤ end( jq ) ≤ l +n − 2, T sends “aborted” to Q except with negligible probability.
If Q does not interact with T , then Q only obtains V E jk from π. Thus by the property of
(ajk ,Rjk ) and by the computational zero-knowledge property of veriﬁable encryption, any
computationally bounded algorithm outputs x with negligible probability.
In case (3.b), since k ≤ l +n−2, then by the deﬁnition of end , k ≤ end( jk ). By Equation (4.2),
P has not sent x. Similar to case (3.b), If Q does not interact with T , then Q only obtains
V E jk from π. Clearly, if Q interacts with T but T sends “aborted” to Q except with negligible
probability, then by the property of (ajk ,Rjk ) and the computational zero-knowledge property
of veriﬁable encryption, the probability that Q outputs x jk is negligible.
We show by contradiction that Q interacts with T but T sends “aborted” to Q except with
negligible probability. Suppose thatQ interacts with T but T sends a non-“aborted” value toQ
with non-negligible probability. Assume that Q sends a request reqq to T . Let pg be the value
of the variable progress at T when Q starts to interact with T . Let event A be q > nextpg (q)
and let event B be the event that Q passes the consistency veriﬁcation of reqq at T . Then
similar to case (3.a), A¯ ∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible probability. If B¯ occurs, then T
sends “aborted” to Q. Since A¯∪ B¯ occurs except with negligible probability, then A¯∩B occurs
with non-negligible probability. Clearly, if the recovery of the inputs from their ciphertexts
of veriﬁable encryption is not successful, then the condition κ is not satisﬁed and T sends
“aborted” to Q. However, by the validity property of veriﬁable encryption, given that B occurs,
the unsuccessful recovery occurs with negligible probability. In what follows, we consider the
case where A¯∩B occurs and the recovery for Q is successful.
W.l.o.g., Q is the ﬁrst process that receives a non-“aborted” value from T . Then since Q is
the ﬁrst process that receives a non-“aborted” value, by the validity property of veriﬁable
encryption, pg ≥ l +n−2 except with negligible probability.
When Q invokes μwith request reqq , the variable z at T is⊥. By Algorithm 12, thus T updates
progress in a speciﬁc way: progress is ﬁrst updated with request reqI1 where I1 is the ﬁrst
index of jI1 in the sufﬁx j [n−1 :] of sequence j , and then each update is with such a request
reqI2 that I2 is the ﬁrst index of jI2 in the sufﬁx j [progress+1 :]. Let α be the sequence of
parties who invoke μ and trigger T to update progress before Pjq invokes μ for reqq . Let σ
be the sequence of the subscripts of those parties.
Since pg ≥ l+n−2 except with negligible probability,σ is a subsequence of i = j [n−1 : l+n−2]
and, moreover, must be the preﬁx of some permutation of {1,2, . . . ,n} in i except with negligible
probability.
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Clearly, if T returns a non-“aborted” to Q, then q ≥ l +n−1. Since A¯ occurs, nextpg (q) ≥
l +n−1. When pg ≥ l +n−2, since σ ends at jpg (inclusive) and there is no jq between jpg
and jnext−1, jq must occur in σ. (Otherwise, as next ≥ l +n−1, there is no hope for σ to
include jq in the permutation before jl+n−2 (inclusive), contradictory to the deﬁnition of i .)
In other words, Pjq must have invoked μ before, except with non-negligible probability. Then
T returns “aborted” to Q for reqq except with negligible probability. A contradiction.
Thus, we conclude that when P outputs ⊥ with non-negligible probability, then given that an
honest party P outputs ⊥, any other party Q outputs the honest parties’ inputs except with
negligible probability.
4.5 Related Work
4.5.1 Optimistic fair computation
Cachin and Camenisch [6] formalized optimistic fair computation for two parties and a third
party T (that can also be malicious). Asokan et al. [48] formalized optimistic fair exchange of
digital signatures between two parties and T (where T is honest). In this chapter, we assume
T is honest. We brieﬂy compare here the two deﬁnitions above. Cachin and Camenisch [6]
formalized fair computation using the simulatability paradigm [5], while Asokan et al. [48]
formalized fair exchange through games [139]. As the former can provide stronger security
guarantee, we follow the deﬁnition of fair computation in [6]. Both formalizations consider the
termination property in an asynchronous setting. We model this property using Stop, which is
equivalent to the signal of termination in [48]. Asokan et al. [48] also deﬁned the completeness
property regarding the case where all parties are honest, while there is an ambiguity regarding
this case in [6]. We adapt the deﬁnition of the completeness property from [48]. The optimism
property was deﬁned differently in [6] and [48]. In [6], the asynchronous network must deliver
messages instantly, whereas in [48], the asynchronous network is allowed to deliver messages
arbitrarily (while the rest of the statement is the same). We adopt the optimism property
from [48], as it provides a stronger guarantee. Following Asokan et al.’s work [48], Küpçü and
Lysyanskaya [149] deﬁned optimism similarly in games.
In addition, we include the non-triviality property to rule out trivial protocols that send no
message and abort all the time. (Our proof of the lower bound is based on the existence
of at least one optimistic execution guaranteed by non-triviality and optimism, but our fair
computation scheme, on the other hand, allows arbitrarily many optimistic executions.)
4.5.2 Optimistic fair exchange
For two parties, Asokan et al. [48] proposed a 4-message optimistic fair exchange scheme that
ensures termination. Since = 3 for two parties, our Theorem 9 shows that the 4-message fair
exchange scheme is optimal for two parties. This also implies that a 3-message fair exchange
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scheme does not meet all of the required properties. For example, the optimistic fair exchange
scheme proposed in [128] was criticized by Asokan et al. [48] as not ensuring termination.
Another example is Ateniese’s 3-message optimistic fair exchange scheme [150], which also
does not ensure termination as noted by the author himself [150]. A recent follow-up work
[151] has the same drawback.
To the best of our knowledge, up to our work (presented in this chapter), no message-optimal
optimistic fair exchange or optimistic fair computation scheme among n parties for an arbi-
trary n (with n−1 potentially malicious parties) has been proposed.
4.5.3 Optimal optimistic schemes
We explain here the relation between the optimal efﬁciency of optimistic schemes of related
problems and our optimal message efﬁciency. Pﬁtzmann, Schunter, and Waidner (PSW) [54]
determined the optimal efﬁciency of fair two-party contract signing, Schunter [55] determined
the optimal efﬁciency of fair two-party certiﬁed email, whereas Dashti [56] determined the
optimal efﬁciency of two-party fair exchange in the crash-recovery model with no amnesia
[152]. None of these results implies our Theorem 9, even only for n = 2. For PSW’s result as well
as Schunter’s result, this is because there is no reduction of the problem of fair computation to
the problem of fair contract signing17 or fair certiﬁed email; for Dashti’s result, this is because
our model can be considered as the Byzantine failure model [152], and is thus stronger than
the model considered by Dashti. Our proof of the lower bound, together with our message-
optimal scheme, can be applied to prove that +2n−3 is the optimal message efﬁciency of
fair n-party contract signing in the model of PSW. The special case where n = 2 can be used to
prove PSW’s result, while PSW’s proof was, unfortunately, ﬂawed.
Draper-Gil et al. [153] determined the minimal message complexity of contract signing
schemes with weak fairness on four topologies. Weak fairness implies that the honest parties
might have different outputs as long as they can prove their honest behavior. On the contrary,
our optimal message efﬁciency +2n−3 applies to any topology, and employs a stronger
fairness deﬁnition than [153]. Thus their result does not imply our Theorem 9 and vice versa.
4.5.4 The shortest permutation sequence
Mauw, Radomirovic´ and Dashti (MRD) [51] proved that the optimal number of messages of
totally-ordered fair contract signing schemes18 falls between +n−1 and +2n−3. Later,
Mauw and Radomirovic´ (MR) [53] generalized the result of MRD to DAG-ordered fair contract
signing schemes19. Both [51] and [53] considered fair contract signing as fair exchange of
17The main difference is that contract signing outputs a proof which binds a contract agreed in advance while
computation usually does not require such binding.
18In a totally-ordered contract signing scheme, signers execute totally-ordered communication steps; i.e., at any
point in time, only one signer has sufﬁcient messages to calculate and send the next message.
19In a DAG-ordered contract signing scheme, communication steps can be ordered in a directed acyclic graph.
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digital signatures. They use a model different from PSW, and fall within the coverage of our
Theorem 9. Neither MRD’s result nor MR’s result implies our Theorem 9. Neither allows
arbitrarily interleaved messages as our Theorem 9; instead, they assume that communication
steps are either totally ordered or ordered following a directed acyclic graph (DAG). In addition,
both results [51, 53] propose a range of the optimal efﬁciency for fair exchange, instead of a
concrete lower bound for fair computation in general (as does our Theorem 9).
It is important to note that our Theorem 9 is not a generalization of MRD’s result nor of MR’s
result. What MRD or MR count are the messages sent from some signer. This makes the proof
difﬁcult to extend: after a message m leaves its source s, due to the asynchronous network,
m does not help s’s knowledge about other parties’ possible states. Thus m should not help
s reach an agreement if s wants to stop after sending m, unless the messages after m are
deﬁned and ordered in advance. On the contrary, what we count throughout our proof are the
messages received (or not) at a destination d , which affects d ’s stop event. This is the key in
our case for not requiring any ordering.
Another crucial concept used by MRD is the idea of an idealized protocol. An idealized
protocol is informally deﬁned as a totally-ordered fair exchange protocol of which the number
of messages in an optimistic execution is optimal [51]. (Here a protocol is equivalent as
a Compute protocol in our Deﬁnition 20. The communication with a third party T is not
considered as part of the protocol.) At the end phase of the idealized protocol, each of
the n signers is supposed to send exactly one message [51]. It is not clear yet whether the
assumption can be justiﬁed or not: the main theorem in [51] relates the end of an idealized
protocol with part of the shortest permutation sequence; however, (the form of the end of)
the shortest permutation sequence is still open for a large n [129]. This also leads to a non-
optimal fair exchange protocol in [51] and a non-optimal protocol compiler in [52] which
generates a protocol speciﬁcation of an optimistic fair contract signing scheme given a shortest
permutation sequence.20 Compared with MRD’s idealized protocol, our proof of Theorem
9 shows that, at the end of an optimal protocol, each of the n parties may receive exactly
one message, and moreover, the end of an optimal protocol is not related to the shortest
permutation sequence. We believe that this has further implications on the design of correct
and efﬁcient fair computation protocols.
20Although [52] proved that the resulting protocol needs at least +2n−3 messages in an optimistic execution,
the number of messages exchanged during every optimistic execution is actually strictly larger than +2n−3 for
n ≥ 3, and is thus not optimal.
130
5 Concluding Remarks
In this dissertation, we study the complexity and propose optimal protocols of decentralized
solutions for reliable and secure distributed transactions. Here a decentralized solution refers
to the one which does not use a distinguished coordinator or use the coordinator as little as
possible. To this end, we perform two analyses on atomicity and causal consistency in reliable
distributed transactions and one study on optimistic fair computation in secure distributed
transactions. We now summarize our complexity results and outline a few open issues and
research directions for future work.
5.1 Summary
5.1.1 Distributed transaction commit
We present the ﬁrst systematic study of the complexity of atomic commit. We study the best-
case complexity, i.e., the time and message complexity of any nice execution of a commit
protocol. To have a better understanding of the tradeoff between atomicity and efﬁciency, we
have a more ﬁne-grained view of atomicity, compared with previous work [16, 1, 25, 26]. We
consider two types of failures, crash and network failures and we study the complexity of a
commit protocol by its robustness, i.e., which property (of the classical non-blocking atomic
commit) is required in which executions (including less likely executions with failures). Our
systematic study exhaustively goes through 27 variants of of non-blocking atomic commit
(NBAC) deﬁned by robustness.
Interestingly, our complexity results show that
• The time complexity and the message complexity reach the maximum (among the 27
variants) respectively when NBAC is solved in the face of crash failures and agreement is
satisﬁed despite both types of failures;
• The message complexity increases (from zero to non-zero, and from n−1+ f messages
to 2n−2 messages for at most f crashes among n processes) when validity needs to be
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additionally satisﬁed;
These complexity results also highlight a tradeoff between time and message complexity in 18
out of the 27 variants. By the complexity results, we answer the open question on the time
and message complexity of synchronous NBAC (which solves NBAC only in the face of crash
failures) since Dwork and Skeen’s lower bound (on the number of messages) [1].
We propose the INBAC protocol which solves indulgent atomic commit, the most robust
form among atomic commit problems we study. INBAC performs almost as efﬁciently as
the widely-used two-phase commit (2PC) [22]: in some special case (for example, where
among n processes, at most one can crash), INBAC induces two communication rounds, the
same as 2PC, and needs additionally two messages, compared with 2PC. Previous protocols,
PaxosCommit, and faster PaxosCommit [73], solve indulgent atomic commit as well. Our
INBAC protocol is the most efﬁcient among these protocols in that
• INBAC is delay-optimal: same as faster PaxosCommit and better than PaxosCommit;
• INBAC is message-optimal among the delay-optimal protocols.
The comparison between PaxosCommit and our INBAC protocol also illustrates a tradeoff
between time and message complexity.
5.1.2 Causal transactions
We present the formal complexity analysis of causal transactions. We study the complexity of
read-only transactions, considered the most frequent in practice, and obtain two impossibility
results regarding fast read-only transactions:
• In an asynchronous system, if a causally consistent transactional storage system sup-
ports every transaction to read and write multiple objects, then even read-only transac-
tions alone cannot be fast.
• In an asynchronous system where only servers have access to a global accurate clock
(while client requests are oblivious to their local clocks), if a causally consistent transac-
tional storage system supports fast read-only transactions and single-write transactions
only, then read-only transactions cannot be invisible, where (in)visibility refers to the
complexity that a read-only transaction incurs some write to servers (or not).
Our impossibilities apply to causal consistency and hence to stronger consistency criteria.
They hold without assuming any message or node failures and hence hold for failure-prone
systems. Our impossibility results hold only assuming that no server stores all objects, inde-
pendent from any particular partial replication scheme.
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To complement our second impossibility result, we propose a protocol that implements
visible fast read-only transactions. Compared with COPS-SNOW, the previous protocol that
provides fast read-only transactions [44], our protocol also provides fast single-object write
transactions while COPS-SNOW does not. We show that under different system assumptions,
the impossibility results can break, by proposing two protocols. The ﬁrst protocol supports
generic transactions (that breaks the ﬁrst impossibility) in a synchronous system where there
is a known upper bound on the time spent on the communication and local computation and
a global accurate clock is accessible to all servers and clients. The second protocol provides
invisible read-only transactions (that breaks the second impossibility) in an asynchronous
system where a global accurate clock is accessible to all servers and clients. Both protocols are
based on timestamps thanks to the accurate clock.
5.1.3 Optimistic secure transactions
We present, for the ﬁrst time, a tight lower bound on the message complexity of optimistic
secure transactions. We study optimistic secure transaction in the model of optimistic fair
computation. Here fairness ensures a property similar to atomicity: either all participants may
output the result of the transaction or none can, and also preserves privacy: no participantmay
know information of others’ private inputs beyond the result of the transaction. We consider
the worst adversarial setting: a maximum number (n−1 out of n) of malicious participants
(or Byzantine failures), and study the message complexity of any optimistic execution.
Interestingly, our main result shows that in every optimistic execution, if we order all messages
according to when they are received and construct a sequence of the destinations of all
messages based on this order, then the sequence must contain all permutations of the n
participants. This relates the message complexity in our study to the permutation sequence in
combinatorics. Although the length  of the shortest permutation sequence in combinatorics
is still open for large n, by relating our problem to the shortest permutation sequence, we
prove that +2n−3 lower bounds the number of messages exchanged; we propose a matching
scheme of fair exchange of exact +2n−3 messages so that the lower bound is tight. This fair
exchange scheme can be applied to exchange digital signature (such as Schnorr signatures
[134], DSS signatures [135], Fiat-Shamir signatures [136], Ong-Schnorr signatures [137], GQ
signatures [138]), and hence can implement message-optimal electronic contract signing.
Clearly, an application of the scheme is to trade items in a secure and transactional way.
Compared with previous proposals of secure transactions that involve trusted third parties in
every execution, the time complexity of the scheme is +2n−3, which is θ(n) according to the
current progress in combinatorics [58, 59, 60, 130], while previous proposals ﬁnish in constant
time complexity. This highlights a tradeoff between the introduction of trust assumptions to a
protocol and the complexity of the protocol.
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5.2 Future Directions
5.2.1 Reliable transactions
Atomicity
The atomic commit protocol lies at the heart of distributed transaction processing systems
[17, 64, 18, 19, 20, 21] where 2PC is widely used. Although the 2PC protocol is efﬁcient, 2PC
does not guarantee termination when processes can crash and 2PC can be blocked by slow
messages caused by network failures where message delays can be unbounded (until some
unknown stabilization time).
According to our systematic study, the 2PC protocol actually solves the following atomic com-
mit problem: NBAC is solved in any failure-free execution, while only validity and agreement
are satisﬁed despite crash and network failures. Then our INBAC protocol can be considered
as an alternative to 2PC, as it solves indulgent atomic commit, which ensures termination
despite crash and network failures (in addition to what 2PC solves), and performs almost as
efﬁciently as 2PC. Hence it is intriguing to implement INBAC in those existing transaction
processing systems which employ 2PC and to evaluate the performance in the failure-free
settings and failure-prone settings. As we support the optimal nice execution by complex
failure-prone executions, the challenge of the implementation and further optimization of the
protocol would lie in the cases that abort transactions.
Our complexity results highlight a tradeoff between time and message complexity among 18
out of 27 variants of the atomic commit problem which we study. Thus it is also intriguing to
have a systematic study of the tradeoff. Among these 18 variants, the tradeoff between time
and message complexity for indulgent atomic commit is particularly interesting. In fact, some
tradeoff result exists, following our work: Goren and Moses [154] characterized the tradeoff
between time and message complexity for the atomic commit problem in the crash-failrue
system. In addition, they measured time complexity by rounds and distinguished between
a round where some process decides and a round where some process halts (i.e., quits the
protocol). Distinguishing the deciding round and halting round may also contribute to future
research in the investigation of the complexity of the atomic commit problem.
We also propose the 0NBAC protocol which solves the following atomic commit problem:
NBAC is solved in any failure-free execution, while only agreement and termination are
satisﬁed despite crash and network failures. The 0NBAC protocol with zero message and one
message delay in any nice execution, is both message-optimal and delay-optimal. Thus it
might be of practical interest to work on an application of 0NBAC and evaluate its performance
in the failure-free settings as well as failure-prone settings.
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Transaction consistency
Causal transactions are practically appealing, since (1) replication does not need to be per-
formed while a transaction is executed, as in the model of eventual consistency, and (2) causal
consistency allows more meaningful applications than eventual consistency. Hence the pro-
tocols which we propose to break the impossibilities of fast read-only transactions are of
practical interest as they can potentially perform as efﬁciently as transactions in the model of
eventual consistency. Possible future work includes the implementation of these protocols
(which support fast read-only transactions), evaluate their performance and compare them
with these protocols which ensure only eventual consistency to have a better understanding
of the cost of fast read-only transactions. We are particularly interested in the protocol of
visible fast read-only transactions which we propose. In our protocol, the inherent updates on
servers (i.e., visibility) are performed outside any transaction. This might reduce the impact
on the overall performance and enable it to outperform COPS-SNOW.
As fast read-only transactions are of practical interest, a more ﬁne-grained study on the
assumptions where the impossibilities hold or not could beneﬁt future design of causally
consistent storage systems. For example, in practice, clients and servers are given access
to their local clocks between which there can be arbitrarily large drift. Assuming that client
requests are non-oblivious to the local clocks, it is not yet clear whether the two impossibilities
we obtain still hold or not especially in the partially replicated setting in general.
A formal study on the inherent cost of read-only transactions in general would also be inter-
esting. To this end, a deﬁnition of visibility in general is necessary. The challenge to deﬁne
the visibility for transactions of more than one round lies in the fact that a server may batch
messages to increase throughput yet it is hard to isolate formally the message which brings
visibility without imposing a particular framework on the underlying protocols of distributed
storage.
5.2.2 Secure transactions
In electronic commerce, secure transactions preserve the privacy of data so that goods and
services are not taken advantage of due to an unsuccessful transaction. Hence considering
the current throughput of electronic transactions, it is worthwhile to investigate the time
complexity of optimistic secure transactions. Our result which relates the pattern of messages
in every optimistic execution to the permutation sequence may lay a basis on the investigation.
As the question of the shortest permutation sequence has been answered for small n [58],
possible future work includes the implementation of our protocol for a small number of
participants, evaluate the performance and compare it with the protocols which rely on
trusted third parties in every execution. For performance evaluation, one might be particularly
interested in the setting of parallel executions of the same protocol: by these protocols to
compare with, the parallel executions all access the same trusted parties, which may be a
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performance bottleneck, while by our protocol, the parallel executions access different parties.
Another future direction is to perform an exhaustive study on the complexity of optimistic
secure transactions on different types of failures and different numbers of possible failures
like in our study of distributed transaction commit. In practice, among a large number of
participants, an honest party may distrust a few rather than all of them. Then this future study
can further highlight the tradeoff between the trust or conﬁdence in the failure-prone setting,
and the complexity of secure transactions.
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